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This document is a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the
proposed action of completing the preparation and operation of the Galileo
spacecraft, including its planned launch in October 1989, and the
' alternatives of: (I) delaying preparations in favor of a launch in 1991,
and (2) cancelling further work on the mission. The delay alternative may
enable consideration of an alternative launch configuration, the Titan
IV/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) expendable launch vehicle.
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation, and are treated in
published National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle
(NASA 1978), the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), the Titan IV (USAF
1988a), and in the KSC Environmental Resources Document (NASA 1986) and the
Galileo Tier I EIS (NASA 1988a). The environmental impacts of a normal
launch were deemed acceptable. There also may be environmental impacts
resulting from launch or mission accidents that could release plutonium fuel
used in the Galileo power system. Intensive analysis of the possible
accidents associated with the proposed action reveal small health or
environmental risks. The results are largely the same under the delay
. option. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative.
The remote possibility of possible environmental impacts of the proposed
action must be weighed against the large adverse fiscal and programmatic
impacts inherent in the delay and no-action alternatives.
The U.S. Air Force has notified NASA that a Titan IV launch vehicle will not
be available for the May 1991 launch opportunity. Consequently, the Titan
IV/IUS launch configuration is no longer a reasonable alternative to the
STS/IUS configuration for the delay alternative discussed. The analysis of
the Titan IV/IUS is, however, presented in an appendix to this EIS.
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II-
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
The proposedactionaddressedby this draft EnvironmentalImpact
Statement(EIS)is the completionof preparationand operationof the
Galileospacecraftmission,includingits plannedlaunchon the Space
TransportationSystem (STS)Shuttlein October1989.
PURPOSEAND NEED FOR THE ACTION ,
The Galileomissionis part of the NationalAeronauticsand Space
Administration's(NASA's)Solar SystemExplorationProgram. The Galileo
missionwill studyJupiter,probe the Jovianplanetaryatmosphere,and study "
the four major moons and the planet'sextendedelectromagneticenvironment.
ALTERNATIVESCONSIDERED
The proposedactionis the completionof preparationand operationof
the Galileomission,includingits launchon the Space Shuttlein October
1989. The launchconfiguration,STS/IUS,will requirea Venus-Earth-Earth-
Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory,in which a Venus and two Earth flybysare
requiredto providesufficientvelocityfor the spacecraftto reach Jupiter.
T
Alternativesto the proposedactionare:
e Delay completionof preparationsin favor of a launch in May 1991
which enablesconsiderationof the two launchconfigurations,the
- STS/IUSand the Titan IV/IUS. (As noted in the Abstract,the
Titan IV/IUSis no longerconsidereda reasonablealternativeto
the STS/IUS.)
e No action; that is, terminatefurthercommitmentof resourcesto
the mission.
ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
The principalexpectedenvironmentaleffectsof the proposedactionare
associatedwith normallaunchvehicleoperation. These effectshave been
consideredin the previouslypublishedEISs on the Space ShuttleProgram
(NASA1978),the KennedySpace Center (NASA1979),and the Final EIS for the
Galileoand UlyssesMissions(NASA 1988a),and the KSC Environmental
ResourceDocument(NASA 1986). The expectedenvironmentalconsequencesof
Shuttlelauncheshave not been found to be significant.
In the event of (I) an accidentor missionabort duringlaunch,or (2)
reentryof the spacecraftfrom Earth orbit or duringan Earth flyby,there
are potentialadversehealthand environmentaleffectsassociatedwith the
possiblereleaseof plutonium-238from the spacecraft'sRadioisotope
ThermoelectricGenerators(RTGs)and the RadioisotopeHeaterUnits (RHUs).
The potentialeffectsconsideredin preparingthis EIS include: risks of
air and water qualityimpacts;local land area contaminationby plutonium-
238; adversehealthand safetyimpacts;the disturbanceof biotic
resources;the occurrenceof adverseimpactson wetlandareasor in areas
containinghistoricalsites;and socio-economicimpacts.
i
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An _ntensiveanalysisof the proposedactionindicatesthat the
possiblehealthand environmentalconsequencesof launchor mission
anomaliespose smallrisks. The accidentestimatedto be most probable
would pose very small healthrisks and very smallprobabilityof detectable
environmentalcontamination.The maximumcredibleaccident(havinga
probabilityof one in 10 million)would be an accidentalreentryinto the
Earth'satmosphereduringa plannedVEEGA flyby,releasingPu238upon impact
with the ground. The very low probability"maximumcase" would lead to an
increaseof an estimated9.8 ca:cerfatalitiesover a 70-yearperiodamong a
populationof 83,000persons,which normallywould have an estimated16,000
, cancer fatalitiesover the sameperiod.
Under the delay alternatives,the analysisof the Shuttleaccidents
still applies. While the Titan IV/IUSis no longerconsidereda reasonable
alternativeto the STS/IUS,the analysisof Titan IV/IUSmissionaccidents
providedin AppendixC indicatesthat there are risks to human healthand
the environmentsimilarto the Shuttle. The VEEGA analysisappliesto both
launchconfigurations.
_: There are no environmentalconsequencesassociatedwith the no-action
:_ alternative.
L
There are severeadversefiscaland programmaticimpactsattendantto
. the delay and no-actionalternatives.As of October1988, some $800 million
; has been expendedon the Galileomission. No furtheractionwould render
that expenditurea sunkcost and entaila largerscientificloss in terms of
._ personaleffortand the scientificknowledgethatwould resultfrom the
mission. The delay alternativcwould implyadditionalcosts of at least $4
_ millionper month untilthe 1991 launch. These impactsmust be weighed
againstthe very smallrisks.
This missionspecificEIS followson a program-levelEIS (NASA 1988a)
:_ and providesupdatedand more detailedinformationto supportdecision-
making regardingthe completionand operationof the Galileomission.
Launchapprovalfollowsa processset forth in NASA regulationsthat takes!,
into accountall missionspecificand programmaticenvironmental,safety,
and healthfactors.
The U.S. Air Force has notifiedNASA that a Titan IV/IUSlaunchvehicle
will not be availablefor the May 1991launchopportunity. Consequently,
the Titan IV/IUSlaunchvehicleconfigurationis no longera reasonable
alternativeto the STS/IUSconfigurationfor the delay alternative
discussed. Nevertheless,the data and analysison the Titan IV/IUSare •
, presentedin an appendixto this document,and thuswill be availablefor
decision-makers.
I
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I. PURPO3EAND NEED FOR ACTION [
1.1 BACKGROUND
The Galileomission,as part of the NationalAeronauticsand Space
Administration's(NASA's)Solar SystemExplorationProgram,is designedto
• studyJupiter,its fourmajor moons,and its extendedelectromagnetic
environment.
This draft (Tier2) EnvironmentalImpactStatement(EIS)has been
preparedto provideupdatedinformationnecessaryto supportdecision-making
associatedwith completingpreparationsfor and implementingthe Galileq
mission. The proposedactionaddressedin this EIS is to implementthe
Galileomissionin the 4th quarterof 1989 as presentlyplanned,using the
NationalSpaceTransportationSystem (STS)Shuttlewith an InertialUpper
Stage (IUS)and a Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory. This
documentsucceedsa programlevel finalEIS (Tier I) for the Galileoand
UlyssesMissions(NASA1988a).
The GalileomissionsupportsNASA'sSolar SystemExplorationProgr&m
and its continuingresponsibilityto engagein the scientificexplorationof
the solar systemusing Earth-b=sedobservations,spacecraft,laboratory
studies,and theoreticalresearch. The goals of this Programare as !_
follows:
I) To further.the understanding of the origin and evolution of the
Solar System
2) To furtherthe understandingof the originand evolutionof life
3) To furtherthe understandingof Earth by comparativestudiesof
the other planets.
The Galileomissionhas beendesignedto furtherthesegoals•
Solar systemexplorationconsistsgenerallyof three phases:
reconnaissance,exploration,and intensivestudy. These phasesare
characterizedby missionsas follows: reconnaissanceusing remote
observationsfrom fly-bymissionssuch as Pioneers10 and II (1973,1974)
and VoyagersI and 2 (1977);explorationgenerallyinvolvesorbiterssuch as
MarinerIX and Galileo;and intensivestudy usinglanderssuch as the Apollo
missionsto the Moon and the Vikingmissionto Mars.
Developmentof the Galileomissionwas startedin October1977 as the
first step in the explorationphase studyingth- outer planets,OuGiterand
beyond,which had been reconnoiteredby the Pioneersand Voyagers.
Implementationof the Galileomissionhas beendelayedbecauseof the series i
of delaysand changesin launchconfiguration(e._.,the Challengeraccident
and subsequentcancellationof the Shuttle-Centaqruppe_ stage).
1.2 PURPOSEOF THE PROPOSEDACTION
The scientificobjectivesof the Galileom_ssionare to conduct
comprehensiveinvestigationsof the Jovianplanetarysystemby making
I-I J
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measurementsof the planet,its environmen* and its satellites. Jupiteris I
;i the largestand most massiveplanetin th. _nlar system,and is unique in
(
that it emits more energythan it receives. Togetherwith its moons,the
planetalmostcomprisesa mini sJlar system. Close-upstudiesof the planet
and its principalsatelliteswill greatlyextendthe knowledgeof the Jovian
systemand provideinsightsintothe complexand analogousrelationships "
existingbetwee,1the Sun and its planetarysystem.
• },
The Galileoobjectiveswill be accomplishedthroughtwo separate
missionelements:
_ • An orbiterwill tour and study the Planetand the Jovian i
I satellitesover a 20-monthperiod
! • A detachableatmosphericentry probewill descendthroughthe
atmosphereof Jupiterand d;,ringa periodof roughlyI hour will
: relay scientificmeasurementsof the atmosphericprofileto Earth
via the orbiter. _
The Galileomissionwill b_ a study of the entireJovian system,with
scientificobjectivesthat fall intothree broadcategories: (I) the
structureand compositionof Jupiter'satmosphere;(2) the compositionand
physicalstateof the fourlargestsatellitesof Jupiter;and (3) the
structure,composiLion,and dynamicsof the Jovianmagnetosphere.
: Previousmissionsto Jupiterhavemade only remotemeasurementsof the
Jovianatmosphere. Scientistsbelievethat Jupiteris composedof the :
originalmaterialfromwhich stars,and most specificallyour Sun, are
formed. The atmosphericentryprobe shouldprovidedata, during a one-hour
atmosphericdescentperiod,on the J(Jvianatmosphericcompositionto a cepth
of 10 to 20 timesthe sea-levelpressureon Earth. It is anticipatedthat
thiswill includeall the major cloud layersof the Jovianatmosphere. This
willgreatlyenhdncethe presentunderstandingof the Jovianatmosphere,and
of planetaryatmospheresin general. It may be possibleto acquire
knowledgeof the conditionsin the solarsystemat the time of planetary
formation. The abundanceof heliumand rare gases in the Jovianatmosphere
are importantindicatorsof conditionsin the early solar systemand of how
the giant planetskepttheir atmospheres.It i_ possiblethat the outer
Jovianatmosphereis representativeof the unmodifiedmaterialthat
subsequentlyformedthe Sun, the planets,and other solar systemobjects, i
Other informationthatwill be obtainedfromthe atmosphericentry probe
includesthe locationand characterizationof the JovianciGuds,an analysis
of how solarenergyis absorbedand the quantityof energythat is flowing .
out of Jupiter'sstill-coolinginterior,a determinationof lightning
frequency,and a determinationof whetheror not smallquantitiesof organic i
moleculesare beingcreatedfrom methaneand ammonia.
The 20-monthperiodduringwhich the orbiterwill be obtaining i
informationwhile in orbit aroundJupiterwill providenew informationon 2
the deep interiorof Jupiterthroughmeasurementsof the Jovian
gravitationalfield.
The Joviansatelliteswill be investigatedat rangesfrom 20 to 100
timescloserthanearliermissions,typicallyat rangesof 1,000 kilometers
I-2
1990012832-014
or less. This proximitywill permitimagesof 20 meters resolutionthat are !
comparableto the Viking imageryof Mars. This increasedresolutionwill
resultin new and detailedknowledgeof the surfacesof the satellites, i
includinginterestingfeaturessuch as the activevolcanoesof Io, the
innermostof the fourJoviansatellites. It shouldbe possibleto determine
the composition,temperature,and activityof Io'svolcanicplumesand
volcanicflows over the durationof the orbitalinvestigations.In a manner
similarto the investigationof the interiorof Jupiter,gravitationdata
may determinewhetherIo has a completelymoltencore, as some theories
suggest.
The Jovianmagnetosphereis the regionof space underthe dominant
influenceof Jupiter'smagneticfield. It is an immensestructurethat, if
visiblefrom Earth,would appearseveraltimes largerthan the fullmoon.
The resultsof brief flybymeasurementsof fourpreviousspacecrafthave
determinedthat the Joviapmagnetosphereis much more complexand dynamic
than had been anticipatedfrom Earth-basedmeasurementsand theoretical4
extrapolationsfrom the Earth'smagnetosphere.The outer regionsof the
-_ Jovianmagnetosphereexpandand contractby millionsof kilometersin
responseto solarwind and internalforces. (Thesolarwind comprisesthe
magneticfields,protons(hydrogennuclei),electrons,and ionsof other
elementsfrom the Sun.) The innerregionsof the Jovianmagnetosphereare
influencedby Jupiter'srapid spin (onerevolutioneach 10 hours)and by the
large quantitiesof sulfurand oxygenatoms emanatingfrom Io. Jupiteralso
is a "laboratory"for studyingphenomenaapplicableto other astrophysical
objectsand to processesof ionizedgases in general. The Galileomission '
will explorethese phenomenawith new and more sophisticated
_ instrumentation.Furthermore,the investigationsof this dynamic
environmentwill extendover nearlytwo years. New regionsof the outer
magnetospherewill be explored,as well as repeatedpenetrationsintothe
innerregions. The missionwill includeat leastone longorbit into the
"magnetotail,"a distended,cone-shapedregionformedas the solarwind
sweepsthe magneticfield back away from the planet. This missionwill
providethe resultsof measurementswhich, in detail and specificity,can
not conceivablybe made from Earthor from Earthorbit.
Duringits journeyto Jupiter,Galileowill performadditional
observationsof the planetVenus,the Earth/Moonsystem,and a flybywith
one or possiblytwo asteroids. The specificlaunchdate withinthe Galileo
launchwindowwill determineif flybyswith both asteroidsGaspraand Ida
are possible. These additionalplanetarydata collectionopportunities
fully exploitthe sciencereturnpossibilitiesof the Galileomission.
1.3 NEED FOR THE ACTION
It is vital,at this stageof planetaryscience,to get in-situ
measurementsof the planetJupiterand its satellites. For instance,the
atmosphericprobewill returndata on the composition,temperatureand
_ pressureof the atmospherethat can be attainedby no other means. So, even
thoughscientistswill continueto studyJupiterfrom Earth orbit and ._
groundbased telescopes,the in-situdata from the Galileomissionwill ,
provideotherwiseuaattainabledata to anchorthosecomplementary
investigations.
1-3
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FThe Galileo mission can be launched only during specific periods in any I
given decade depending on the position of the planets and the capability of
available launch vehicles. Presently, the first available launch
opportunity for Galileo occurs during 0ctob_r/November 1989; the next
feasible opportunity does not occur until May 1991. The proposed action is
needed to implement the mission at the earliest available opportunity.
1
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2. ALTERNATIVESINCLUDINGTHE PROPOSEDACTION
This draft (Tier2) EnvironmentalImpactStatement(EIS)addressesthe
potentialenvironmentalimpactsassociatedwith the completionof
preparationsand implementationof the Galileomission,includingits
plannedlaunchin October1989,and alternativesto the proposedaction.
2.1 ALTERNATIVESCONSIDERED
This EIS considersthe followingalternatives:
e ProposedAction: completionof preparationand operationof the
mission,includingits plannedlaunchon the NationalSpace
TransportationSystem/InertialUpper Stage (STS/IUS)vehiclein
October1989.
• DelayAlternative:delay preparationsin favor of a launch in
1991,which possiblywill enableconsiderationof two launch
options- the STS/IUSand the Titan IV/IUSexpendiblelaunch
configuration(seediscussionon availabilityof Titan IV in
-_ Section2.3.5).
e No-ActionAlternative:cancelany furthercommittingof resources
to the mission.
2.2 DESCRIPTIONOF T:_EPROPOSEDACTIONTO PROCEEDAS PLANNEDWITH
COMPLETIONOF PREPARATIONSAND OPERATIONOF THE GALILEOMISSION,
INCLUDINGITS PLANNEDLAUNCH IN OCTOBER1989
2.2.1 MissionDesign
No combinationof launchvehiclespresentlyavailableto NASA has the
capabilityto place the Galileospacecrafton a directtrajectoryfrom Earth
to Jupiter(NASA1988a). Therefore,Galileowill first fly to Venus and
then returnto Earth for the firstof two Earth flybys. These flybysallow
the spacecraftto use the gravitationalfieldsof Earth and Venus to gain
sufficientvelocityto proceedto Jupiter. Figure2-I illustratesthe
Galileospacecraft'sVenus-Earth-Farth-Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory.
After arrivingat Jupiter,the orbiterwill fly by the moon Io prior to
orbitingJupiter. The orbiterwill conducta studyof Jupiter'satmosphere
and the characteristicsof the spaceenvironmentsurroundingJupiter. The
atmosphericentry probe,which is to be releasedprior to the arrivalof the
orbiterat Jupiter,will descendintoJupiter'satmosphere. Duringthe
descent,scientificmeasurementswill be made to determinethe structureand
compositionof Jupiter'satmosphere. The data will be relayedto Earth b)
the orbiter.
2.2.1.1 LaunchOpportunityConsiderations
The Galileomissioncan be launchedonlyduring specificperiods
dependingon the positionsof the planetsand the capabilitiesof available
launchvehicles. Due to programmaticconstraintsassociatedwith resumption
of Shuttleoperations,the first periodfor the launchof Galileooccurs
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duringOctober/November1989. After 1989,the next feasiblelaunchperiod
for Galileooccursin May/June1991. For each day of eitherthe 1989 or
1991period,the rotationalpositionof the Earth limitsthe launch from a
few minutesto an hour of each day.
2.2.1.2 Trajectory(VEEGA)
, To gain the velocityrequiredto reachJupiter,the Galileospacecraft
( will firstexecutea Venus gravity-assistflybyand then two Earthgravity-
assistflybys. This trajectoryis known as the Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-
Assist,or VEEGA,trajectory. The VEEGA trajectoryand an Earth avoidance
analysisare addressedin the Tier I FEIS (NASA 1988a).
The trajectorydesignand navigationoperationsare being developed
consistentwith an Earth avoidanceplan to bias the spacecraft'strajectory
away from Earthbetweenthe time of launchand any Earth flyby. Duringthe
majorityof Galileo'sinner solarsystemjourney,the spacecraftwill follow
!- a trajectorythat,withoutany furthermaneuvers,would miss the Earth by at
least severalthousandkilometers. The spacecraftis placedon a trajectory
passingthroughthe requiredEarth flyby pointonly 25 days prior to each
-+, passage.
On the finalapproachto each Earth flyby,additionaloperational
• requirementsare being imposedto furtherinsureagainstinadvertentre-
entry. Continuoustrackingby the Deep Space Networkis plannedbeginning
.+ 35 days prior to each flyby. Around-the-clocktrackingand monitoringof
the spacecraftprovidesnear-real-timevidenceof any spacecraftanomalies.
:_+ Duringthe periodfromthe last spacecraftmaneuver10 days out througheach
Earth flyby,no commandswill be sentto the spacecraftother than those
deemedessentialfor maintainingvehicleoperationssuch as solar pointing
for thermalcontrol-- the premisebehindthis requirementbeing that
minimalspacecraftactivityyieldsa minimumprobabilityof occurrenceof
+_ unplannedevents. The GalileoEarth avoidancestrategiesresult in a total
probabitityof inadvertentre-entryduringboth Earth flybysof less than
5 x 10-_. For a detailedVEEGAdiscussion,see Section4.
]
+
! 2.2.2 SpacecraftDescription
The Galileospacecraftconsistsof an orbiterand an atmosphericentry
probe and weighsapproximately6,000 pounds(see Figures2-2 and 2-3). The
spacecraftis spin-stabilized,but incorporatesa separatesectionthat does
not spin. The "spun"part of the spacecraftspinsat about three +
. revolutionsper minuteto allow its instrumentsto "sweep"the sky
continuouslyto make theirmeasurements. The spinningpart of the
spacecraftcontainscommunicationantennas,the spacecraftpropulsionand
power subsystems,most of the electronicsand communicationsequipment,and
variousscienceinstruments.The non-spinningpart of the spacecraft
providesa stableplatformfor remote-sensinginstrumentswhich must be
preciselypointed. The non-spinningpart also accommodatesthe atmospheric
entryprobe and supportingelectronics.
The spacecraftelementsthat are relevantto the assessmentof
potentialenvironmentalimpactsare the two RadioisotopeThermoelectric
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Generators(RTGs)in the power subsystem,the RadioisotopeHeaterUnits
(RHUs)in the temperaturecontrolsubsystem,and the propellantsin the
propulsionsubsystemand the attitudecontrolsubsystem.
2.2.2.1 Power/HeatSources
RadioisotopeThermoelectricGenerators(RTGs)
A RTG (see Figure2-4) is a devicethat convertsthe heat from Lhe
naturalradioactivedecay of plutonium-238(a non-weaponsgrade of
plutonium)to electricityfor spacecraftinstruments.RTGs have been used
on 22 previousspacemissions,includingsome of NASA'smost successful
(e.g.,Voyager,Pioneer,Viking,and all but the first of the manned Apollo
landi_igson the Moon). The Galileospacecraftwill have two RTGs, each
generatingapproximately284 watts of electricalpower.
The U.S. Departmentof Energy(DOE) safetyphilosophyfor the design of
the RTG requirescontainmentor immobi1_zationof the plutoniumfuel to the
maximumextentpossibleduringall missionphases,includingground
handling,launch,and unplannedeventssuch as reentry,impact,and post-
impactsituations(Bennett1981). As indicatedabove,the dominantform of
plutoniumused in RTGs, plutonium-238(seeTable 2-I), is not the type used
in nuclearweapons (i.e.,plutonium-239).
An RTG consistsof two major elements: (1) a heat sourcethat contains
the plutoniumfuel and (2) a thermoelectriconverterthat convertsheat to
electricity.The heat source,referredto as the GeneralPurposeHeat
Source (GPHS)containsthe plutonium-238fuel in a stackedcolumnof 18
individualmodules. Eachmoduleconsistsof a graphiteblock that encases
two graphitecylinders(see Figure2-5). Each cylindercontainstwo pellets
of plutonium-238dioxideencasedin iridium. In the event that the modules
are releasedin a launchaccidentand fallback to Earth,the graphiteblock
constructionprotectsthe module from burning-upin the atmosphereand
releasingany plutonium. The graphitecylindersprotectthe plutonium
pelletsfrom impactswith the ground or debris. The iridiummetal contains
the fuel and providesan additionallayer of protection.
Liqht-weiqhtRadioisotopeHeaterUnits (RHUs)
The Galileospacecraftwill use 131 light-weightRHUs to maintain
portionsof the orbiter/atmosphericentry probe temperaturewithin
acceptablelimits,to minimizethe use of electricalpower for thermal
control,and to reduceelectromagneticinterference.Each RHU provides
about one Watt of thermalpowerderivedfrom the radioactivedecay of
2.7 grams of plutonium-238.The plutonium(in the formof a plutonium
dioxidepellet)of each RHU is containedwithina platinum-rhodiumalloy
capsule. Similarto the RTGs, each RHU is encasedin a graphite insulator
surroundedby a graphiteblock to provideprotectionfrom atmospheric
heatingand groundor debrisimpactin the event of an accident(see Figure
2-6). The RHUs are designedto be lightweightunits capableof containing
the plutoniumdioxidefuel in both normaloperatior_sand accidents. The
locationsof RHUs on the Galileospacecraftare shown in Figure2-7.
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TABLE 2-I. ISOTOPICCOMPOSITIONOF RTG FUEL
Plutonium Weight Half-Life Radioactivity Total
Isotope Percent (Years) (Curies/gramof Curies
at plutonium*) (11/89)
Manufacture
236 <10-6 2.85 532 <i
238 *83.880 87.7 17.1 *'130,050
239 13.490 24,100 0.0621 80.2
240 1.900 6,560 0.227 41.3
241 0.379 14.4 103.2 2,650
242 0.124 376,000 0.00393 <I
Other TRU
isotopes 0.228 ...... 3.3
TOTALS 100.00 ...... 132,825
.! *The radioisotopefuel is a mixtureof plutoniumdioxide(Pu02)
containing83.5% (plusor minus I%) of Pu 238 (DOE 1988).
**Basedon valuesfrom TableA-I in DOE 1988.
i
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The only alternativeto the GalileospacecraftRHUs would be the
additionof anotherRTG,whichwould result in an unacceptableweight
increasefor the spacecraft.
2.2.2.2 RTG and GPHS Designand Performar,.eHistory
The GPHS,which is the sourceof energyfor the RTGs on the Galileo
spacecraft,is the culminationof almost25 years of designevolutionof
r heat sourcetechpology. Safetyis a principalengineeringdesigngoal of
the heat source. Tilesafety-relatedesigngoals are to: I) containor
immobilizethe fuel to the maximumextentpossibleunder norm_land accident
environments,and 2) ensurecompatibilitywith the powpr generationbystem.
The followingis a brief summary(Bennett1987)of relevantsafety
environmentsand GPHS response:
• LiquidPropellantFirQs. The GPHS mndulessurvivethe most severe
fires that can resultfromon-padevents.
• Solid PropellantFire_. The GPHS survivesfires in contactwith
the burningsolidpropellant.
e Explosions. Moduleswere shown to surviveup to approximately
1,070psi overpressuresand clads were shownto surviveimpulses
in excessof 2,000psi.
• Hiqh-velocityFraqments. Test data for bare fuel clads impacted
by flyerplatesrepresentativeof _tructuresinvolvedin External
Tank (ET)explosions(i.e. aluminumof thicknessof approximately
3.5 mm) were onlyminimallybreachedat velocitiesup to 1,170m/s
(3,838f/s). Furthertests representativeof Solid RocketBooster
(SRB)fragments(I/2 inchthick stainlesssteel)show the RTG to
survivefragmentvelocities,with a face-onimpactup to 700 fps,
with no releaseof fuel.
• Reentry. GPHS modulessurviveEarth-escape-velocity-reentry
ablation,and thermalstresswith wide margins.
• Earth Impact. GPHS moduleswere designedto surviveimpacton
hard surfaces(granite/steel/concrete)at terminalvelocity;
53 m/s (172 f/s). Test resuitsshowno failuresof clads against
sand up to 250 m/s (820f/s), no clad failuresagainstconcret_at
terminalvelocityand smallreleasesagainststeel or graniteat
terminalvelocity. Clads aloneshowedsmall releasewhen
impactingat terminalvelocityon a hard surface. When protected
by the aeroshelland graphiteimpactshell,the normal
configuration,no releasewould be expectedto occur. !:
e Ocean Impact. GPHSmodulessurvivewater impactand will resist i
significantfuel releasefor virtuallyunlimitedperiods. L
I
The designfeaturesfor the GPHS incorporatemany safety-related
considerations.The fuel used in the GPHS design is plutonium-_38dioxide, i
high-firedand hot-pressedinto62.5 Watt capacityceramicfuelpellets. In l
i
I
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this form, plutonium-238 is virtually insoluble in ground or sea water
should such exposure occur, i
lhe primary protective material used to encapsulate the fuel is an
alloy of iridium. Iridium is a unique noble metal found in deposits of gold
and platinum. It is compatible with the fuel material to over 1,SO0°C
(2,700°F)_(resistsoxidationin air to 1,000°C(1,800OF),and melts at _;, 2,447uC ,437°F). Each clad also containsa fritvent design d o release
the heliumgeneratedby the fuel alpha particledecay and to preventthe
releaseof plutonium.
The graphiticmaterialsin the GPHS performseveralfunctions. The
primaryfunctionis to providereentryprotectionfor the fueledclads.
This is the job of the aeroshell. A secondmajor functionis impact
protection. This is accomplishedby boththe aeroshelland the impact
shell. The impactshell also servesas a redundantreentryaeroshell. The
third functionis to providea mountingstructurefor the clads to survive
normalgroundhandlingand launchdynamicloads. The materialused for the
aeroshelland impactshell is calledfineweave,piercedfabric(FWPF).
FWPF is a carbon-carboncompositematerialwovenwith high-strengthgraphite
fibersin three perpendiculardirections. Upon impregnationand
graphitization,the materialhas an extremelyhigh thermalstressresistance
as requiredfor reentryprotection. FWPFhas a very fine structurethat
resultsin uniformablationcharacteristicsleadingto high confidencein
ablationmargins. This material,used primarilyby the Air Force for
missilenosecones, is one of the best availablefor reentryapplications. _,
The GPHS deliberatelywas designedto be composedof small,modular
units so that reentryheatingand terminalvelocitywould be lower than they _;
were for previousheat sources. A modularheat sourcetends to minimizethe
amountof fuel that can be postulatedto be releasedin a given accident.
For example,for a high-velocityfragmentimpactresultingfrom a severe
explosionthat penetratesthe GPHS, only a few of the fueledclads would be
expectedto releasefuel. This is an improvementover earlierheat source
designs.
Overall,the U.S.Departmentof Energy(DOE)has spent9 years in
engineering,safety,and environmentaltestingof the GPHS, buildingon the
experiencegainedfrom previousheat sourcedevelopmentprograms. The test ';
programresultshave proventhe presentdesignto be the most successfulof
any heat sourcedevelopedfor past programs.
. There havebeen threeU.S. spacecraftwhich failedto achievetheir ,_
intendedmissionand includedRTGs onboardthe spacecraft. Early RTG _
modelscarriedrelativelymuch smalleramountsof radioactivematerialand
were built to burn up at high altitudeduringaccidentalreentry. This
designrequirementwas met in 1964duringthe malfunctionof the Navy's
Transit-SBN-3navigationalsatellitewhich carriedthe SNAP 9A RTG. ,!
Since 1964,RTG systemshave been designedfor full fuelcontainmentin
the event of an accident. This designphilosophyhas performedflawlessly !
in two missionfailureswhere RTGswere present. A SNAP 19B2RTG landed
intactin the PacificOcean in May 1968 aftera NimbusB weathersatellite
failedto reachorbit. The fuelwas rec_Jeredand used in a later mission. !
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In April 1970, the Apollo 13 lunar module reentered the atmosphere and its
SNAP27 RTG, which was jettisoned, fell iptact into the 20,000 feet deep
Tong_ Trench in the Pacific Ocean. Measurementsshow there was no release
of radioactive material into the atmosphere.
2.2.2.3 Spacecraft Propulsion Subsystem
The Galileo spacecraft uses monomethylhydrazine fuel and nitrogen
tetroxide oxidizer for its propulsion subsystem. This propellant
combination is hypergolic (i.e., the propellants ignite spontaneously upon
contact with each other). The spacecraft's propellant tanks are loaded at
the KSCwith about 807 poundsof monomethyl hydrazine and 1,290 pounds of
nitrogentetroxide, i
i
2.2.3 STS/IUSLaunchVehicle
i
The STS/IUSlaunchconfigurationconsistsof the STS Shuttlebooster *
with an IUS that is carriedto Earthorbit in the Shuttlebay. Figure2-8
illustratesthe configurat.ionof the spacecraftin the Shuttlebay for
launch. The selectionof the STS/IUSlaunchvehiclewas addressedin the
Tier I FEIS (NASA 1988a).
: The STS cansistsof a pilotedreusablevehicle(theShuttle)mounted
on a non-reusableExternalTank (ET)containingliquidhydrogenand oxygen
propellantsand two Solid RocketBoosters(SRBs). The Shuttlehas three
main rocketenginesand a cargo bay 60 feet long by 15 feet in diameter
(NASA1978).
At launch,both SRBs and the Shuttle'srocketenginesburn
simultaneously.After approximately128 secondsinto the flight,the spent
SRB casingsare jettisonedand subsequentlyrecoveredfrom the ocean. The
ET is jettisonedbeforethe Shuttlegoes into Earthorbit. The Shuttle's
OrbitalManeuveringSystem (OMS)is then used to propelthe Shuttleinto the
desiredEarthorbit. Once the IUS with its payloadis deployed,the OMS
is used to take the Shuttleout of orbit. The Shuttleis pilotedback
• to Earth for an unpoweredlanding. A more detaileddescriptionof the
Shuttlecan be found in AppendixB and the ShuttleEIS (NASA ]978).
Once deployedfrom the Shuttle,the IUS can propelpayloadsinto higher
Earthorbitsor to Earth-escapevelocitiesneededfor planetarymissions.
The IUS proposedfor use on the Galileomissionis a two-stagesolid rocket
(Boeing]g84). Figure2-9 illustratesthe configurationof the Galileo
spacecraftassembledwith the IUS.
2.2.4 Ranqe SafetyConsiderations
The EasternSpace and MissileCenterat PatrickAir Force Base is
responsiblefor range safetyfor any NASA/KSCspace launch. The goal of
Range Safetyis to controland containthe flightof all vehicles, _
, precludingthe impactof intactvehiclesor piecesthereofin a location
that could endangerhuman life or damageproperty. 31thoughthe risk can
_, never be completelyeliminated,Range Safetyattemptsto minimizethe risks
while not undulyrestrictingthe probabilityof missionsuccess.
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Each STS flightvehiclecarriesa Range SafetyFlightTermination
System (FTS). When activatedby an electronicsignalsentby the Range
SafetyOfficer,the FTS activatesexplosivechargesdesignedto destroythe
vehicle. The STS FTS enablesthe Range SafetyOfficerto destroythe SRBs
and ET if the flighttrajectorydeviatestoo far from the plannedcourse.
2.2.5 MissionContinqencies
m
2.2.5.1 IntactAborts
The STS vehiclehas an intactabort capabilityin the event specific
failures(e.g.,engineloss,electrical/auxiliarypower failure,etc.) occur
duringthe earlyphasesof launch. Intactabort is definedas safely
returningthe Shuttlecrew, and cargo to a suitablelandingsite. Five
basic abortmodes exist providingcontinuousintactabort capabilityduring
ascentto orbit: ReturnTo LaunchSite, TransoceanicAbort Landing,Abort-
Once-Around,Abort-To-Orbit,and Abort-From-Orbit.These intact,safe abort
capabilitiesenableprotectionof the crew and the payloadafter anomalies
and may avoid lossof missions. Therefore,manned systemsoffer a
capabilitythat does not exist on expendablelaunchvehicles. The planned
intactabortlandingsites for the Galileomissionare as follows:
Type of Abort Site
Returnto LaunchSite KennedySpace Center
: TransoceanicAbort Landing Ben Guerir,Morroco
Alternate-
Moron,Spain
Abort-On_e-Around EdwardsAir Force Base,California
Alternates-
White Sands Space Harbour,NM
Kennedy'SpaceCenter
Abort-From-Orbit EdwardsAir Force Base, California
Alternates-
White Sands Space Harbour,NM
KennedySpace Center
2.2.5.2 ContingencyAborts
Contingencyabortconditionsare definedwhen two Space ShuttleMain
Enginesfail prior to singleengineTransoceanicAbort Landingcapabilityor
when three enginesfail prior to achievingan Abort-Once-Aroundcapability.
These conditionsresultin a crew bailoutand subsequentocean impactof the
Shuttle.
There is a possibilityof performinga Returnto LaunchSite abort if
two or three main enginesfailwithin20 secondsafter launchor a
TransoceanicAbort Landingif threeenginesfail duringthe last 30 seconds
._ of poweredflight. However,duringthe remainderof the ascentphase,two
or threemain enginefailuresresultin a contingencyabort scenario.
2.2.5.3 On-orbitSpacecraftAborts
It is also possibleto abort the Galileomissionif problemsoccur !
afterdeploymentof the Galileo/IUSfrom the STS Shuttleand beforeVEEGA :
L
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trajectoryinsertion. For example,shouldthe IUS fail to insertthe I
spacecraftinto an Earth escapetrajectory,the spacecraftwill be separated
automaticallyfrom the IUS. The estimatedlifetimeof the spacecraftin low
Earthorbit will be severaldays. However,the spacecraftwill be carrying
a full propellantload and for most scenarioswill be capableof achieving
an altitudeof approximately2,000 kilometersresultingin an orbital
lifetimeof severalthousandyears.
2.3 DESCRIPTIONOF THE ALTERNATIVETO DELAY IMPLEMENTATIONOF THE GALILEO
MISSIONUNTIL 1991AND CONSIDERTHE STS/IUSAND THE TITAN IV AS LAUNCH
VEHICLEALTERNATIVES
This sectionaddressesa delayedlaunchin terms of scientificreturns,
spacecraftdescription,alternativelaunchvehicleconfigurations,mission
design/contingencies,and spacecrafttrajectory.
2.3.1 Overviewof Alternative
The alternativeof delayingcompletionof preparations_or launching
Galileoin 1989 in favor of a launchin 1991 could allow for two potential
Galileolaunchvehicleconfigurations:I) the STS/IUSand 2) the Titan
IV/IUSexpendablelaunchvehicle(seediscussionon availabilityof Titan IV ¢
given in Section2.3.5). The STS/IUSlaunchvehicleconfigurationfor a
launchin 1991 (delayedSTS/IUSconfiguration)would essentiallyduplicate
the launchconfigurationdiscussedin Section2.2.
2.3.2 ScientificReturns
In additionto causinga delay in obtainingscientificresults,
delayingthe Galileolaunchuntil 1991will adverselyimpactthe planetary
sciencemissionin severalways:
• The atmosphericentry proberelaysdata to Earth via the Galileo
orbiter. As a consequenceof a 1991 launch,a less favorabledata
relay geometrywill exist betweenorbiter,probe,and Earth.
• The electricalpower outputcapabilityof RTGs declinesover time.
A launchdelay until 1991will force spacecraftsystemsto operate I
4
with reducedpowermarginsand reducethe amountof scientific
data colIected.
• The 1991 trajectorydoes not providethe performancemargin needed
to exploitasteroidflybyopportunities.Currentstudiesindicate - '
the opportunitiesfor coliectingasteroiddata are much less
favorablethan thoseprojectedfor a 1989 launch, i
2.3.3 MissionDesiqn
i
The missiondesignchangesrequiredfor a 1991STS/IUS or a Titan '_
IV/IUSlaunchwould be those changesrequiredto accommodatethe
sciencemissionimpactsdescribLdin Section2.3.2 (i.e.,less favorable
probe relay geometry,reducedpower levels,probablelackof asteroid
encounters).
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A 1991Galileolaunchby eitherthe STS/IUSor a Titan IV/IUSwould
still requireuse of the VEEGA trajectory. No U.S. launchvehiclewill be
availablein 1991with the capabilityof placingGalileoon a direct
trajectoryto Jupiter. Therefore,there is no change in the missiondesign
found in Section2.2.1.2for the VEEGA trajectory."
2.3.4 ChangesCausedby a LaunchDelayUntil 199_
No hardwaredesignchangesare plannedto accomodatea 1991Galileo
launch.The spacecraftwould essentiallybe the same as describedin
Section2.2. Any changesnow expectedwould be in the areas of mission
' design,spacecrafttrajectory,and the possibleoptionof employingthe
Titan IV/IUSlaunchvehicle. At this time, a switchfrom the STS/IUSto a
Titan IV/IUSlaunchvehiclewould requirea considerableintegrationeffort
to meet the 1991launchopportunity(seediscussionon availabilityof Titan
IV in Section2.3.5). This topic is furtherdiscussedin Section2.5.
2.3.5 AlternativeLaunchVehicleConfiqurations
The U.S. Air Force (USAF)has informedNASA that a Titan IV will not be
availablefor the May 1991launchopportunity.Therefore,the Titan IV/IUS
launchvehicleconfigurationis no longera reasonablealternativeto the
STS/IUSin the delay alternative.Nevertheless,sincethe analyseswere
completedpriorto the USAF notification,the data are includedin this EIS
in AppendixC and thus will be availableto decision-makers.
2.4 DESCRIPTIONOF THE NO-ACTIONALTERNATIVE
The no-actionalternativewould resultin the terminationof the
furthercommitmentof resourcesto the mission. If NASA did not proceed
with the Galileomission,the goals of the NASA Solar SystemExploration
Program(i.e.,the potentialscientificreturnsof this mission)would not
be attained.
2.5 COMPARISONOF ALTERNATIVES
The factorspertinentto a comparisonof the "ProposedAction",the
"DelayAlternative",or the "No ActionAlternative"have been separatedinto
those relatedto normalmissionsand to accidents. The comparisonis
presentedin Table 2-2.
2.5.1 EnvironmentalImpactsof the Mission
2.5.1.1 EnvironmentalImpactsfromNormalMission
None of the alternativesincludingthe proposedactionare expectedto
result in any significantenvironmentalimpactsto the physicalenvironment.
Both the proposedactionand the delay alternativewill resultin limited
short-termair,water qualityand biologicalimpactsin the immediate
vicinityof the launchsite. These impactshave been previouslyaddressed
in other NEPAdocuments(NASA1985a,NASA 1986,NASA 1988a,USAF 1986,USAF
1988)and are associatedwith the routinelaunchoperationsof the STS and
Titan IV launchvehicles. The impactswere determinedby NASA to be
acceptable. The followingsubsectionsbrieflysummarizethe impacts
describedin Section4.
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ProposedA_IQn Bn_ _TS/IUSDelayA!_rnatives
Short term air qualitydegradationat the launchsite and downwindof
the launchwill occur from the HCI and aluminumoxide emissionsfrom the
solid rocketboosterengines. The greatesteffectwill be in the "near
field"(i.e.,within about go0 feet of the launchpad). Additional
depositionwill occur outsidethis area In lower concentrations,with most
depositionexpectedto occur over the ocean.
i
Short term impactson naturalvegetationand biota could be acute near
the launchpad if the launchoccursduringprecipitation.This damagewould
be confinedto vegetationand biota near the launchpad. Acidificationof
mosquitoimpoundmentsnear the launchpad also may occur. These impactsare
sinlilarto those observedduringthe past ten years and are on KSC land. At
the time of launch,birds are expectedto be startledby the noise,but no
long term consequencesare expected. No adverseimpactson endangered
speciesis expected(basedon experiencewith Shuttlelaunchesto date).
Beneficialimpactson the local economywill resultfrom the influxof
touristswho come to view the launch. Additionalbenefitswill resultfrom
the sciencereturnsas discussedin Section2.5.2.
_Q A_tionAlt_rnativ_
, The "No Action"alternative,while not creatingany direct ,
environmentalimpacts,could limit the scientificbase for future
technologicaladvances. On the other hand, successfulcompletionof the
missionunder eitherthe "ProposedAction"or the "DelayAlternative"would
resultin new scientificknowledgethatcould lead to technologicaladvances
that could have significantlong-termpositivebenefits.
2.5.1.2 PossibleEnvironmentalImpactsof MissionAccidents
J
For both the proposedactionand the delay alternative,there is a
slightchanceof adverseimpacts. Analysisindicatesthat the chanceof any
plutoniumreleasingaccidentoccurringis remote (NASA 1988a,and Section4
of this EIS).
!
The DOE has conductedan extensiveprogramof safetyanalysis,testing,
and verificationto determinethe chancesand consequencesof releasing
plutonium-238from thK Galileospacecraft'sRTGs and RHUs in the event of an
accident. The goal er the DOE programis to ensure the integrityof RTGs,
predicttheir responseto a broadrange of accidentconditions,and estimate
the environmentalimpact,if any, of an accident. The resultsof these
analysesare presentedin Section4 and AppendicesB and C of this document
and are brieflysummarizedin Table 2-2.
i
For the proposedaction,it can be concludedfrom the analyses
presentedin Section4 that the risksto human healthare small (generall.y
lessthan one chance in 10,000for healtheffects)for the more seriousof
the accidentscenarios. In the event of thesemore seriousaccidents,some
environmentalcontaminationabove the screeninglevel of 0.2 uCi/m_ cou]d
occur The maximumarea contaminatedi_ this type of accidentis predicted
to range from approximately19 to 85 km_ for the launchphase and about
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15 km2 for the VEEGA flyby phase. These risks are small compared with those
of other human activities.
Under the delay alternative, the possible accidental health and
environmental impacts of the STS/IUS option remain unchanged in 199! from
those in the ]989 launch except for those impacts where significant changes
occur in population density between 1989 and 1991. The only potentially
significant health or environmental impact in the Titan IV/IUS analysis are
in the VEEGA flyby. These impacts are identical with the VEEGA fly-by
accidental impacts evaluated for the STS/IUS. Thus, the STS/IUS and the
Titan IV/IUS have essentially the same level of acceptability in terms of
environmental impact.
No-Action Alternative
There are no adverse health or environmental impacts from the no-actio_
alternative.
2.5.2 Scope and Timinq of Mission Sci_nc_ Returns
In comparing the alternatives it is clear that there are no significant
health or environmental impacts associated with a normal mission for either
the proposed action or the delay alternative. There are, however, major
adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts attendant upon with the delay or the
no-action alternative.
Both the "Proposed Action" and the "Delay Alternative" would accomplish
most of NASA's scientific objectives for the Galileo mission's study of
Jupiter. The "Proposed Action" would result in the earliest collection of
mlssion scientific data; additionally, it would afford NASA the opportunity
for close observation of two asteroids.
Both options under the "Delay Alternative", relative to the "Proposed
Action", would delay by one and one-half years NASA's collection of mission
scientific data. Additionally, because of less favorable spacecraft
trajectories (which result in higher propellant usage) in I£91 and
diminished RTG power levels, the "Delay Alternative", relative to the
"Proposed Action", would not allow any asteroid observations and would
require NASA to limit some spacecraft instrument operations during the
Probe's descent into Jupiter's atmosphere and would raise the risk that the
mission would be limited to 9 as opposed to 10 encounters with Jupiter's
satellites.
E
The "No Action" alternative by definition would result in not obtaining
any science data and therefore would effectively prevent NASA T,'omachieving
its solar system exploration program objectives as they relate to advanced
studies of Jupiter and its satellites
2.5.3 _aunch Preparation and Operation Co_si n_lv)
The "Proposed Action"> with an estimate, _ to completion of
approximately $! billion represents the mini,,_,_st alternative to NASA for
meeting the objectives of the Galileo mission. Both options under the
"Delay Alternative" would cost approximately $100 million more than the
"Proposed Action". The next available launch opportunity after the planned
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1989launchis in May 1991. This impliesa delay of 19 months. Becauseof
the need to maintainthe spacecraftin storageand to retainkey project
personnel,the costof delayingthe missionwill be about $4 millionper
month or approximately$76 million. In addition,there would be the further
delay in gainingthe scientificreturns. The 1991STS/IUS optionwould pose
_ a $90 millioncost of delay and,due to inflationeffects,increasethe
operationscosts of the missionby an estimated$105 million. The 1991
launchon a Titan IV/IUS,relativeto the "ProposedAction",would pose a
higherincrementalcost to NASA (in excessof $15 million)than the 1991
STS/IUSoptionas a resultof the needto integratethe Galileospacecraft
' with the Titan IV/IUS. No differencein NASA costs for STS versusTitan IV
launchservicesis assumed.
The "No Action"alternativewould representthe least cost alternative
for NASA but would renderuselessthe $800millioncurrentinvestment.
Implementationof this alternativewould also incuradditionalcosts for
decommissioningfacilitiesdedicatedfor the Galileomissionand for
disassemblingand/orstoringthe Galileospacecraft.
2.5.4 LaunchSchedulesand LaunchVehicleAvailability
. Consistentwith the "ProposedAction",the Galileomissionhas been
manifestedfor flightonboardthe STS in October/November1989. There are
no planswithinthe existinglaunchmanifestto launchGalileoon board the
STS in 1991;however,if NASA decidednot to launchGalileoin 1989and
pursuethe "DelayAlternative",an STS/IUSlaunchcould likelybe made
available. The USAF has informedNASA that a Titan IV will not be available
for the May 1991launchopportunity.Therefore,the Titan IV/IUSlaunch
vehicleis no longera reasonablealternativeto the STS/IUSin the delay
alternative.Nevertheless,sit_cethe analyseswere prepared,_nedata are
includedin AppendixC to this EIS and will be availableto decision-makers.
2.5.5 Facilityand PersonnelAvailability
To maintainthe "ProposedAction",the necessaryscientificand
engineeringpersonnelare in place to implementthe Galileomissionin 1989.
NASA'sDeep SpaceNetwork(DSN)is preparedto meet the project'stracking
and _ata relayrequirements.The FederalRepublicof Germanyhas agreedto
providespacecrafttrackingsupportfor the 1989mission'sscience
experimentsthat are plannedduringthe Venus,Earth,and asteroidflyby
phasesof the mission.
Underthe "DelayAlternative",itwould be difficultfor NASA to
maintainthe existingGalileoengineeringteam if the launch is delayed
until 1991. Severalkey individualsand many newer peoplewould likely
transferto otherprojects;as a result,the GalileoProjectcould
experiencesomelossesthatcould jeapordizethe 1991 launchopportunity.
This could representa significantrisk to the Project.
Selectionof the "No Action"alternativewould resultin releasing
a Shuttlelaunchcommitment(and an IUS upper stagebooster)in
October/November1989for eithera NASA or DOD mission. Existingengineers
would be availableto work on other NASA projects. Most significantly,the
scientificinvestigationsof scoresof scientistswho have preparedIO years
to conductexperimentsas part of the Galileomissionwould be terminated.
2-26
1990012832-042
¢ ,
3. AFFECTEDENVIRONMENT i
This secLionaddressesthose elementsof the human environmentthat
could potentiallybe affectedby the proposedand alternativeactions
addressedwithin thisdocument. The sectionis dividedinto threemajor
parts addressing: (I) the regionin which the KennedySpace Centerand Cape
_ CanaveralAir Force Station(KSC/CCAFS)launchareas are located;(2) the ,
/ local area encompassingthe STS and Titan IV launchsites; and (3) the
"globalcommons"or the globalenvironment.A brief discussionof plutonium
levelsin the environmentis includedin the third subsectionto providethe
readerwith a perspectiveregardingthe types:sourcesand levelsof
environmentalplutoniumon a broad scale.
¢
_" 3.1 REGIONALOVERVIEW
• For the purposeof this document,the region is definedas the six
countyarea (Brevard,Volusia,Seminole,Lake,Orange,Osceolacounties)
_ which encompassesKennedySpaceCenter (KSC)and Cape CanaveralKennedy
Space Center (KSC)and Cape CanaveralAir Force Station(CCAFS),as shown in
Figure3-I.
3.1.1 Land Use
About 8 percent(328,000acres)of the total region (4.1millionacres)
is urbanized,(ECFRPC1987),with the largestconcentrationsof people
occurringin threemetropolitanareas:(I) Orland_in OrangeCountywith
i. expansionsintothe LakeMary and Sanfordareas of SeminoleCountyto the
north;and intothe Kissimmeeand St. Cloud areasof OsceolaCountyto the
south;(2) the coastalarea of VolusiaCounty includingDaytonaBeach,Port
Orange,OrmondBeach and New SmyrnaBeach;and (3) alongthe IndianLagoon
and coastalarea of BrevardCounty,specificallythe citiesof Titusville,
Melbourneand Palm Bay. Approximately85 percentof the region'spopulation
lives in developedurban areas.
The majorityof the region is consideredrural which includes
agriculturallands and associatedtrade and servicesareas,conservationand
recreationlands as well as undevelopedareas. Agriculturalactivities
includecitrusgroves,wintervegetablefarms,pasturelandand livestock,
foliagenurseries,sod farms and dairy land. Citrusfarminghas been harmed
in recentyears by cankeroutbreaksand freezes,and the majorityof groves
in Lake, Seminole,Volusiaand Orangecountiesremainvacantand unused, i_
(ECFRPC1987). With over 5,000 farms,nurseriesand ranchesin the region, _'
about35 percent(1.4millionacres)of the regionalarea is devotedto !
agriculture. :.!,
Conservationandrecreationlands accountfor almost25 percentof the
total acreagein the region,or slightlyover I millionacres, (ECFRPC I:
_ Undated). About866,600acres are land resources,and about 156,000acres
acreswater area. The regionalso containsabout 5,400 acres of saltwater
beachesand about 48 acres of archaeologicaland historicsites. I
A numberof areaswithinthe regionhave specialstatusland use I
designations.These includea portionof the Ocala NationalForest,the
CanaveralNationalSeashoreadjacentto KSC, one state preserve,seven state
wildlifemanagementareas and two nationalwildliferefugesincludingthe I
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MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefugeat KSC. The locationsof these and
other such areas can be found in AppendixD-5. I
3.1.2 Meteoroloqyand Air OualitY
The climateof the regionis subtropicalwith two definiteseasons:
long,warm, humid summersand short,mild, dry winters. Rainfallamounts
, vary both seasonallyand from one year to the next. Averagerainfallis 51
inches;the monthlyhigh occursin July and the low usuallyin April. These
fluctuationsresult in frequent,thoughnot usuallysevere,episodesof
floodingand drought. Temperatureis more constantthan precipitationwith
prolongedcold spellsand heatwaves being rare. Tropicalstorms,tropical
depressions,and hurricanes,all of which can producelarge amountsof
rainfalland highwinds,occasionallystrikethe region. The last hurricane
to strikethe regionwas David in Septen,ber,1981,which paralleledthe
coast, (ECFRPC1987).
There are 14 air monitoringsites in the region: seven are for total
suspendedparticulatestwo each for sulfurdioxide,carbonmonoxideand
ozone,and one for nitrogendioxide. Lead (Pb) is not monitoredanywherein
._ the region. Most of the monitoringsites are locatedin the Orlandourban
i
area; there are no air qualitymonitoringsites in Lake or Osceolacounties.
Air qualityis generallygood. OrangeCounty is the only county in the
regionthat has beendesignateda _n-attainment area (in this case, for '
1 ozone). Data from the period1984-1986indicatethat ozone standardswere
_!_ being met (Florida1987). OrangeCounty is expectedto be re-designatedan
_ ozone "maintenance"area, (ECFRPC1987).
3.1.3 Hydroloqyand Water Quality
_ The regionnot only bordersthe AtlanticOcean but contains
approximately2,300 lakes,two major estuaries,and about 700 miles of
_ streamsand rivers.
! Almost all (89 percent)of the freshwater used in the regionis drawn
fromgroundwatersupplies,principallythe artesianFloridanAquifer. Some
small userswithdrawwater from the nonartesiansurficialaquifersthat i
overliethe FloridanAquifer. The FloridanAquifercovers82,000square
miles and is 2000 feet thick in some areas In portionsof the region such
as the coastalzone and an area borderingthe St. Johns River,the Floridan
i Aquiferis too salinefor potablewater use, (ECFRPC1987). Wells tapping
the surficial,unconfinedaquiferare largelyused for non-potableor
individualdomesticuses,althoughthis sourceis also used for some
municipalpublic supplysystems(e.g.,the citiesof Mims, Titusville,about
15 miles northwestof the KSC/CCAFSlaunchsites,and Palm Bay, about40 '
miles southof the KSC/CCAFSlaunchsites, in BrevardCounty). (See
AppendixD-2 for locationsof BrevardCountypotablewater sources.) Lake
_ Washington,in BrevardCounty,about32 miles southof the KSC/CCAFSlaunch i
sites,is the only surfacewater used as a potablewater supplyin the
region,supplyingthe Cityof Melbourne,(ECFRPC1987).
Groundwaterreservesare rechargedby the percolationof rainwater.
The regioncontainssomeeffectiverechargeareas for the FloridanAquifer
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Z(Figure3-2). These areas are locatedprimarilyin the uplandportionsof
Lake, Orange,Seminole,Osceola,and Volusiacountiesand are composedof
very poroussandy soils. Rainfallquicklypercolatesthroughthe soils into
the aquifersbelow. In the most effectiverechargeareas,approximately15
inchesof rainfallenter the FloridanAquifereachyear -- almost30 percent
of the total rainfall.
The major surfacewater resourcesin the regionare the upper St. Johns "
River basin,the IndianRiver Lagoonsystem,the BananaRiver and a portion
of the KissimmeeRiver alongthe westernborderof OsceolaCounty. The St.
Johns River,from its headwatersin the marshesat the southernend of
BrevardCountyto the northernmostpart of Lake Washingtonis classifiedby
the State as Class I water (potablewater supply),and as noted earlier
servesas the sourceof potablewater for the City of Melbourneand much of
the surroundingpopulationin that area. The remainderof the St. Johns
withinthe regionis Class Ill water (recreationand fish and wildlife i
; propagation).
The KissimmeeRiver (and its systemof lakes)is a major contributorof
i flow into LakeOkeechobeeto the south of the region,and is the major
drainagefor OsceolaCountyand a portionof easternOrangeCounty. The
river systemis characterizedby a seriesof controlstructuresand
; channeledconnectionsbetweenthe lakes for the purposesof floodwater
, level controland navigation(FSU 1984).
Waterswith specialstatuswithinthe region include:
i (I) the WeikivaRiver;a federallydesignatedWild and ScenicRiver,
which formsthe borderbetweennorthwesternSeminoleCountyand
easternLake County;
(2) the MosquitoLagoonportionof the IndianRiver Lagoonwhich is a
Stateof FloridaAquaticPreserve;
(3) the southernportionof the BananaRiver from the southernend of
CCAFS south,and the IndianRiver LagoonbetweenMalabarand
SebastianInlet,alsodesignatedas AquaticPreserves;
(4) the portionsof the BananaRiver and MosquitoLagoon,as well as
the northernportionof the IndianRiverwithinthe confinesof
KSC designatedby the State as OutstandingFloridaWaters,along
with the WeikivaRiver,the Butlerchain of lakes and the Clermont ._
chain of lakes.
i
In total,the regioncontainsfour aquaticpreserves,24 bodiesof surface
water designatedas OutstandingFloridaWaters,and one Area of Critical
State Concern- the Green Swamp. The locationsof these areas can be found
in AppendixD-5.
3.1.4 Geoloqyand Soils
The regionis underlainby a seriesof limestoneformationswith a
totalthicknessof severalthousandfeet. The lower formations(theAvon
Park and Ocalagroup)constitutethe FloridanAquifer. Overlyingthese
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IN EASTERNCENTRALFLORIDA (Source: Reference 3-4)
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formationsare beds of sandyclay, shellsand clays of the Hawthorn
formationwhich form the principalconfiningbeds for the FloridanAquifer.
Overlyingthe Hawthornformationare Upper Miocene,Pleioceneand recent
depositswhich form secondarysemi-confinedaquifersand the surficial
aquifer.
3.1.5 BioloqicalResources
As noted in Sections3.1.1 and 3.1.3,the regionhas a large numberof
terrestrialand aquaticconservationand specialdesignationareas (e.g.,
wildlifemanagementareas and aquaticpreserves),which serve as wildlife
habitat,and compriseabout 25 percent(aboutI millionacres)of the total
land and water acreagewithinthe region(about4.1 millionacres).
Figure3-3 providesan overviewof landcover types found throughout
the six countyregion,with a county-by-countybreakdownprovidedin Table
3-I. Freshwaterand coastalwetlandscompriseabout 23 percentof the total
area of the six countyregion,followedby xeric grassland(21 percent),
-_ scrub and bush (17 percent),water (12 percent)and hardwood/pineforest (11
percent)the dominantcover types in the region.
A total of 141 speciesof freshwater,esturineand marinefish have
' been documentedwithin the northernportionsof the IndianRiver Lagoonnear
KSC (ECFRPC1988). Of this, 65 speciesare consideredcommercialfish and
85 are sport fish and/orfishedcommercially.One speciesknown to inhabit
the river,the rainwaterkillifish(Lucaniaparva),while not on the Federal
or State threatenedand endangeredlists,has been listedby the Florida
Committeeon Rare and EndangeredPlantsand Animalsas "imperiledstatewide"
($2),and by the FloridaNaturalAreas Inventoryas a "speciesof special
concern."
The St. Johns River supportsboth fresh and saltwaterfishing(DOE
1985c). Sport fish includelargemouthbass, bluegill,black crappie,
bowfin,gar, bullhead,bream and catfish. That the St. Johns River basin is
heavilyfishedis indicatedby an estimated50,000man-hoursof fishing
effortin 1983 in Lake Washingtonand Lake Harneyalone.
As noted in Section3.1.6.2.,commercialfishingis an important
economicasset to the region. BrevardCountyand VolusiaCountyranked
fifth and sixth respectively,among the ]2 east coast Floridacountiesin
termsof 1987finfishlandings. Brevardrankedfirst in invertebrate
landings(crab,clams,oysters,etc.) and first in shrimplandings,with
Volusiafifth in both categories.
Importantterrestrialspeciesin the regionincludemigratoryand
nativewaterfowl(ringneck,pintailand bald pate ducks,for example),as
well as turkey,squirrel,white-taileddeer and wild hogs. Black bear also
are known in the region. The St. Johns River basin is an important
waterfowlhuntingarea. The seven statewildlifemanagementareas in the
region(seeAppendixD-5) are huntedfor smallgame, turkey,hogs, or deer.
3.1.5.1 EndangeredSpecies
The Federalgovernment'slist, preparedby the USFWS,currently
recognizes19 endangeredor threatenedspeciesin this reqion. Another55
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speciesare "underreview"for possiblelisting,of which 35 are plants.
The State of Floridalist includes47 speciesconsideredendangeredor
threatened. The FloridaCommitteeon Rare and EndangeredPlantsand Animals
: (FCREPA),a group consistinglargelyof researchbiologists,gives
endangeredor threatenedstatusto 55 species. The FloridaNaturalAreas
. Inventory(FNAI,run by the NatureConservancyunder contractto the Florida
Departmentof NaturalResources),includes62 speciesin its top two most
_, , endangeredcategories. Roughlyhalf of all the endangeredand threatened
speciesidentifiedby these lists occur in wetlands,principallyesturine
environments;the other halfdependon uplandhabitats,(ECFRPC1987).
3.1.6 SocioeconomicEnvironment
The socioeconomicenvironmentof the six countiesthat could be
affectedby the launchincludesfastgrowingcommunitiesand urban areas
that have adoptedlong range plans reflectingthe rapid influxof
developmentin the regionalarea.
3.1.6.1 Population
The existenceof three separatemetropolitanareas is reflectedin the
designationof threeMetropolitanStatisticalAreas (MSAs)within the region
by the US Bureauof the Census (ECFRPC1987). TheseMSAs are the Orlando
MSA (Orange,Osceolaand Seminolecounties),the DaytonaBeach MSA (Volusia
County),and the Melbor'_r_Titusville-PalmBay MSA (Breva:dCounty). The
populationin LakeC y, thoughgrowingfasterthan the state average,is
split betweenmany small-to-medium-sizedmunicipalitiesand rural areas.
GrowthRate
The regionalpopulationis growingat a rate fasterthan the state;
during 1960the regioncontained12.8percentof the statepopulation,in
1970 and in 1980 the growthrate flattenedout and the regioncontained13.6
percentand 13.7percentof the state populationrespectively. In June of
1980the disproportio_a)£rowthof the regionresumed. The 1980 regional
populationwas 1,336,646,a 45 percentincreasefromthe 1970 census. The
estimatedgrowthfrom I980to 1986was a 33.6 percentincrease(an addition
448,898persons). Currentestimates(I987)are that the growth rate is
higherin recentyears than at the beginningof the decade,and that between
1986 and 198 the populationincreased4.6 percent(77,711people),placing
14.6 percentof Florida'spopulationin the region. This trend is projected
to continuethrough1991. The 1987-1991growth is expectedto be almost20
percent(337,000people),(ECFRPCUndated).
All countiesare expectedto show increasesin population. In the
early 1990s,it is anticipatedthat 2,000,000peoplewill be living in the
• region. By the year 2000,officialestimatesshow the regionwill have
about 2,300,000residents,40 percentmore than in 1985, (ECFRPC1987).
OrangeCounty is expectedto remainthe most populatedcounty,going
to 673,200in 1991,followedby Brevard(428,200),Volusia(373,400),
Seminole(302,100),Lake (153,000),and Osceola(115,200). Osceolais
projectedto have the fastestpopulationgrowth rate over the 1987 to 1991
time framewith an increaseof 39.5 percent. Seminoleis projectedto have
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, a 25.2 percent increase, followed by Brevard (19.9 percent), Lake (17.6 I
I percent), Volusia (17.1 percent) and Orange is expected to showthe slowest
) growthrate (16.5percent).This projectedpopulationgrowth is summarized
I in Table 3-2, (ECFRPCUndated).
i
3.1.6.2 Economics
-t
The region'seconomicbase is tourisPand manufacturing.Tourism
.; relatedjobs, althoughdifficultto define,includemost jobs in amusement
parks,hotels,motels,and campgroundsas well as many jobs in retailtrade
and varioustypes of services. Manufacturingjobs,while probably
outnumberedby tourismjobs, may providemore monetarybenefitsto the
regionbecauseof higheraveragewages and a largermultipliereffect (as
jobs are added to the economyin one sector,needs are createdwhich lead to
an expansionof employmentin other sectors),(ECFRPC1987).
i EconomicBase
J
' Tourismin the regionnow attractsmore than 20,000,000visitors
annually. The two Wal_ DisneyWorld theme parks and Sea World, near
: Orlando,alongwith KennedySpaceCenterare fourof the fivemost popular
touristattractionsin the state, (ECFRPC1987).
Manufacturingemploysapproximately100,000peopleregionwide. Orange
i and Brevardcountiesaccountfor about 70 percentof this employment.
Retailand wholesaletrade providejobs for more than half (58.9 percentin
: 1984)of the regions'semployedpersons. Other economicsectorsthat
providesignificantemploymentin the regioninclude: construction(7.5
percent),transportation,communicationand utilities(5.6percent),
finance,insurance,and real estate (5.9percent),and agriculture(2.7
percent).
Commercialfisheriesof the 2 regionalcountiesborderingthe ocean
(Brevardand Volusia)landeda total of 23,608,458poundsof finfish,
invertebrates(clams,crabs,lobsters,octopus,oysters,scallops,squid,
etc.),and shrimpin 1987 (FSU 1984). Brevardand Volusiaranked 5th and
6th respectivelyamong the 12 east coast countiesof Floridain total 1987
finfishlandings. Brevardled east coast countiesin invertebratelandings
with about 16 millionpounds. VolusiaCountyranked5th with about 0.4
millionpounds. Brevardalso rankedIst on the east coast with 1.6 million
poundsof shrimp; Volusiawas 5th with about0.3 millionpounds.
The region'sagriculturalactivitiesincludecitrusgroves,winter
vegetablefarms,pastureland,foliagenurseries,sod, livestock,and dairy
production(ECFRPC1987). In the centralregion,30 percentof the land is
forestedand supportssilviculture,includingharvestingof southernyellow
pine, cypress,sweetgum,maple and bay t_ees. Largecattleranchesoccupy
almostall of the rural land in Osceolacounty,(ECFRPC1987). Agricultural
employmentdeclinedin 1986to 2.2 percentof the region'semploymentbase
(ECFRPCUndated).
Reqional_mployment
About 49 percentof the residentsin the regionare employed,ranging
from 56 percentin OrangeCountyto 33 percentin Lake Countywith 55
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TABLE 3-2. PRGJECTEDPOPULATIONGROWTH,EAST CENT_L FLORIDAREGION
. (]986-1991)
• Population Change1986-1991
_rea 1986" 1991 Number Percent
Brevard 357,000 428,200 71,200 19.9
Lake 130,100 153,000 22,900 17.6
Orange 577,900 673,200 95,300 16.5
Osceola 82,600 115,200 32,600 39.5
Seminole 241,300 302,100 60,800 25.2
Volusi_ 319,000 373,400 54,400 17.1
TOTAL 1,707,800 2,045,100 337,300 19.8
* BEBR, April 86 estimate(roundedto nearestIO0)
(Source: ECFRPCUndated)
i
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ipercent in Seminole, 49 percent in Osceola, 45 percent in Brevard and 41 i, l
percent in Volusia. The region's labor force and employmenthas risen each
year since the mid-1970s, and employmentis expected to continue to increase
through 1991 to a total of 1.08 million civilian jobs by 1991 from 0.83
million in 1986. The region's unemploymentrate in 1986 was 5.1 percent,
(ECFRPCUndated).
R_qional Inqom_
Income in the region has been increasing faster than inflation. The
1985 to 1986 ave-age annual wage rose 3.7 percent (about two times faster
than the inflation rate of 1.9 percent). The 1986 average wage over all
sectorswas $]7,604. Per capitaincomein the regionhas risen steadily
since 1979 ($7,799)to $12.273(1984). The highestincomewas in Orange
County ($12,901),followedby Brevard($12,235)and Osceola($11,026). The
regionalper capita incomefor 1987 -1991 is projectedto increaseat a rate
somewhatgreaterthan inflation,perhapsurpassingthe nationalaveragein
._ 1991, (ECFRPCUndated).
3.1.6.3 Transportation
The region'sairports,for the most part, still are able to accommodate
increasingnumbersof passengers. OrlandoInternationalAirport,already
the 43rd busiestairportin the world in numberof passengers,is an
exception. The GreaterOrlandoAirportAuthorityhas recentlyannounced
plans to double its capacityto 24,000,000passengersannually. Two other
major airportsare DaytonaBeachRegionaland MelbourneRegional,(ECFRPC
1987).
The region'sroadnetworkincludes5 major limitedaccesshighways:
Interstate4, Interstate95, Florida'sTurnpike,the SpessardL. Holland
East.WestExpressway,and the MartinL. AndersenBeelineExpressway. In
dddition,numerousfederal,state,and countyroads are locatedin the
region (ECFRPC1987).
The remainderof the region'stransportationetworkis varied. Rail
servicefor freightis availablein all counties,but passengerserviceis
limited. Ports at Cape Canaveraland Sanfordprovideaccessfor water-borne
shippingand cruises. Mass transitor paratransitis currentlyoperatingin
all countiesof the regionexceptfor Osceola(ECFRPC1987).
3.1.6.4 Publicand EmergencyServices
Nearly90 percentof the peoplein the regionrely upon pub|ic supplies
of potablewater,while the remainderuse privatewells. Problemswith
saltwaterintrusionintogroundwater is alreadyevident,especiallyin
coastalBrevardCounty,(ECFRPC1987).
Healthcarewithin the regionis availableat 28 generalhospitals,
three psychiatrichospitals,and two specializedhospitals. Over 6,600 beds
are providedin the generalhospitals• Doctors,dentists,other heath care
professionalsand nursinghomes are locatedthroughoutthe region,(ECFRPC
1987). (SeeAppendixD-3 for locationsof BrevardCountyemerqency
services.)
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3.1.6.5 Historical/CulturalResources ' ;
There are 45 sites w_.s,, the region that are listed in the National
Registryof HistoricPlaces,2 in the NationalRegistryof Historic
Landmarks,and one area (Kissin_eeRiver Prairie)that is a potential
additionto the NationalRegistryof NaturalLandmarks.
3.2 LOCAL ENVIRONMENT
The localenvironmentis definedas the Cape CanaveralAir Force
Station(CCAFS)and the KennedySpace Center(KSC). The followingbrief
descriptionsuse the Air Force EnvironmentalAssessmentfor the
ComplementaryExpendableLaunchVehicle(laterrenamedthe Titan IV) at
CCAFS (USAF 1986),the 1988 supplementto that documentaddressingan
increasein the numberof Titan IV launchesfrom CCAFS (USAF Ig88b),and the
KSC EnvironmentalResourcesDocument(NASA 1986)as primarysourcesfor data
and figures.
The KSC/CCAFSarea is locatedon the east coast of Florida,in Brevard
Countynear the City of Cocoa Beach,and approximately15 miles north of
' PatrickAir ForceBase (PAFB),about30 miles southof DaytonaBeach and 40
miles due east of Orlando(Figure3-4). The local area is part of th( Gulf-
Atlanticcoastalflatsand occupiesCapeCanaveraland the north end ur
MerrittIsland,both of which are barrierislands.
(
3.2.1 LandUse
KSC (Figure3-5) occupiesalmost140,000acres,5 percentof which is
developedland (6,558acres)and the rest (133,444acres)is undeveloped.
Nearly40 percentof KSC consistsof openwater areas such as portionsof
IndianRiver,the BananaRiver,MosquitoLagoonand all of BananaCreek.
NASA maintainsoperationalcontrolover about 4.7 percentof KSC (6,507
acres). This areacomprisesthe functionalareathat is dedicatedto NASA
operations. About 62 percentof this operation_larea is currently
developedas facilitysites,roads,lawns,and maintained_'ight-of-ways.
The undevelopedoperationalareas are dedicatedas safetyzones around
existingfacilitiesor held in reservefor plannedand futureexpansion.
For areasnot directlyutilizedfor NASA operations,land planningand J
managementresponsibilitieshave beendelegatedto the NationalPark Service
(CapeCanaveralNationalSeashorewithinKSC) and the United StatesFish and
WildlifeService(CapeCanaveralNationalSeashoreoutsideKSC, and the
75,400acre MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefuge). These ag)ncies i'
exercisemanagementcontrolover agricultural,recreational,and various )
environmentalmanagementprogramsat KSC.
• CCAFS occupie_approximately15,800acres (a 2S-square-milearea) of [
the barrierislandthat containsCape Canaveral(USAF1986). Approxir,lately I
3,800 acresor 25 percentof the stationis developedand consistsof launch
complexesand supportfacilities(seeFigure3-6). The remaining75 percent I
(about12,000acres)consistsof unimprovedland. The Titan IV Launch l
Complex41 is locatedat the northernmostsectionof CCAFS,occupying28.4
acres of land. This complexwas previouslyused alongwith LaunchComplex
40 for test flightsof the Titan Ill A, Ill C and CentaurVehiclesin the !
early 1960s. I
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FIGURE3-5. GENERALANDUSEAT KENNEDYSPACECENTER
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3.2.2 Meteoroloqyand Air Quality !
Like the region,the climateof KSC and CCAFS is subtropicalwith
summersthat are hot and humid,wintersthat are short and mildo Mean
temperaturesrange fromthe low 60s in the wintermonthsto the low 80s in
the summermonths. Precipitationis moderatelyheavywith an averageannual
rainfallof 45.2 inches. Hail falls occasionallyduringthunderstorms,but
• hailstonesare usuallysmall and seldomcause much damage. Snow is rare.
Historicalclimatologicaldata can be found in AppendixD-I.
In general,the winds in SeptemberthroughNovemberoccur predominantly
fromthe east to northeast(Figure3-7). Winds from Decemberthrough
Februaryoccur from the northto northwest,shiftingto the southeastfrom
March throughMay, _,,dthen to the southfrom June throughAugust. It
shouldbe noted thatthe radiologicalimpactassessmentsfound in Section4
and AppendicesB and C, use launchwindow-specificwind roses and
meteorologicalconditions. While those specificwind roses are consistent
with the seasonalconditionsillustratedhere, theydo vary slightlyfor the
specificlaunchwindow,and can be found in AppendixD-I. Sea breezeand
land breezephenomenaoccur commonlyduringthe day due to unequalsolar
heatingof the air over land and over ocean. Land breezeoccurs at night
when air over land has cooledto a lower temperaturethan that over the sea.
Temperatureinversionsoccur infrequently(approximately2 percentof the
time).
Tornadoesmay occur but are rare. The U.S. Air Force (USAF 1986)cited
a studywhich concludedthat the probabilityof a tornadohittinga point
withinthe Cape Canaveralarea in any given year is 0.00074,with a return
frequencyof approximatelyonce every 1,300years.
Tropicaldepressionsand hurricanesoccur throughoutthe wet seasonin
Florida. While the possibilityfor winds to reach hurricaneforce (74miles
p_r hour or greater)in any given year in BrevardCounty is approximatelyI
in 20, (USAF 1986),only 24 hurricaneshave passedwithin 115 miles of KSC
and CCAFS since 1887 (NASA 1986). HurricaneDavid (September,1981)was the
last hurricaneto affectthe area.
Air qualityat KSC/CCAFSis consideredgood, primarilybecauseof the
distanceof the launchsitesfrommajor sourcesof pollution. There are no
!
Class I or nonattainmentareas (forozone,NOx, SO2, lead,CO, and
particulates)within about60 miles of KSC/CCAFS,exceptOrangeCountyto
the west, which is a nonattainmentarea for ozone, (USAF1986).
3.2.3 Hydrologyand Water Quality
3.2.3.1 SurfaceWaters
Major inlandwater bodiesin the CCASF and KSC area are the Indian ,
River,BananaRiver,and MosquitoLagoon (Figure3-8). These water bodies
are shallowlagoons,exceptfor the portionsmaintainedas part of the
IntercostalWaterway,betweenJacksonvilleto the north and Miami to the
south. The Indianand BananaRiversjoin at Port Canaveraland form a
combinedareaof 150,000acres in BrevardCounty,with an averagedepth of
6 ft. This area receivesdrainagefrom 540,000acresof surroundingarea,
(USAF1986). I
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LThe surfacewater shorelinesat KSC are dominatedby mosquitocontrol
impoundments.The water levelsin these impoundmentsare raisedand I
loweredseasonallyas a controltechniqueto reducemosquitopopulations.
These impoundmentsare typicallyfringedby mangroveor saltmarsh
communities.The shallowsubmergedbottomsrange from unvegetatedsand
shell bottomsto meadowsof seagrasses.
The BananaRiver and IndianRiverwere historicallyconnectedby Banana
Creek.This connectionwas severedin 1964with the constructionof the
LaunchComplex39 crawlerway. Navigationlockswithin Port Canaveral
virtuallyeliminateany significantoceanicinfluenceon the BananaRiver.
Publicnavigationon the BananaRiver is prohibitednorth of NASA Parkway
East.
3.2.3.2 SurfaceWater Quality
In compliancewith the CleanWater Act (CWA),the state has classified
the surroundingsurfacewaters,accordingto five classificationsbased upon
their potentialuse and value.
All of the area of MosquitoLagoonwithinKSC boundariesand the
northern-mostsegmentof the IndianRiver are designatedas Class II waters
(ShellfishPropagationand Harvesting)(Figure3-9). Class II waters
establishstringentlimitationson bacteriologicaland fluoridepollution.
The dischargeof treatedwastewatereffluentis prohibited,and dredge and
fill projectsare regulatedto protectthe area from significantdamage. _
The remainderof surfacewaterssurroundingKSC are designatedas Class Ill
(BodycontactRecreationand Fish and WildlifePropagation)waters,
(Figure3-9).
BananaCreekwater quality(ClassIll) is influencedby non-point
sourcerunofffrom the ShuttleLandingF_cility,the VerticalAssembly
Buildingarea,KennedyParkwayand undew_lopedareasof the MerrittIsland
NationalWildlifeReserve. BananaCreek has experiencedfish kills in the
summerwhen high temperatureand extenslvecloud cover reducethe dissolved
oxygenlevelsin the shallowwatersof the Creek.
There are about 21,422acres of mosquitocontrolimpoundmentsin 75
cells at KSC. These impoundmentsdominatethe shorelineof KSC. Water :
levelsare managedby the U.S. Fish and WildlifeServicefor mosquito
controlpurposes.
Limitedwater qualitydata for the IndianRiver,BananaCreek,the "
BananaRiver and MosquitoLagoonare providedin Table 3-3.
The surfacewatersadjacentto the MerrittIslandNationalWildlife
Refugehave beendesignatedas OutstandingFloridaWaters (OFWs)(see Figure
3-I0). The OFW designationsupersedesother surfacewater classifications, !
and water qualitystandardsare based on ambientwater qualityconditionsor
the designatedsurfacewater standard,whicheveris higher. This level of
protectionprohibitsany activitythat would reducewater qualitybelow the
existinglevels. The entireMosquitoLagoonhas been designatedby the
Stateof Floridaas an AquaticPreserve(Figure3-11).
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TABLE3-3. SURFACEWATERQUALITYAT KSC.*
Dissolved Turbidity
WaterBody Salinity(ppt) pH Oxygen Nitrogen Phosphorous(NTb)
IndianRiver 30.2 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.06 3.64
(Titusville- north)
IndianRiver 28.4 8.1 6.9 0.04 0.06 3.75
(Titusville- south
toNASAParkway
West)
IndianRiver 27.8 8.1 7.2 0.06 0.05 5.0
(NASAParkwayWest
southtoBennett
Causeway)
MosquitoLagoon 31.8 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.08 4.9
(atKSC)
BananaCreek 11.4 8.2 9.8 0.003 0.38 7.5
MosquitoControl
Impoundments 9.4 8.8 11.1 <0.02 0.31 14.8
(northof Launch
Complex39)
BananaRiver 25.9 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.05 4.3
(NASACauseway,
northto nearTitan
IVLaunchComplex
41)
*Allmeasurementsare inmg/lunlessotherwisenoted.
Source:ReferenceNASA1986.
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The FloridaDepartmentof NaturalResources(FDNR)in its capacityto
managemarine fisherie_has establishedwater classificationsthat regulate
the harvestingof shellfish. Shellfishmay be harvestedfrom "approved"or
"conditionallyapproved"areas only, with "conditionallyapproved"areas
closedto harvestingfor 72 hours after rainfallswhich exceedpredetermined
amounts. Prohibitedand unclassifiedareas can not be harvested. Shellfish
harvestingclassificationof the waters surroundingKSC/CCAFSare
illustratedin Figure3-12.
LaunchComplex41 at the Cape CanaveralAir Force Station(CCAFS)is
borderedby the BananaRiverAquaticPreserveto the west and the Atlantic
Ocean to the east. The BananaRiver is classifiedby the State of Florida
as a Class Illwater for body contactrecreation,and the i','opagationand
maintenanceof diversefish and wildlife. Surfacerunofffrom Launch
Complex41 flows towardthe BananaRiver. Basicwater qualitydata for the
BananaRivercan be found in Table 3-3.
3.2.3.3 GroundWaters
Threegeohydrologicunits underlieKSC and the CCAFSo In descending
order,these units are: a SurficialAquifer,SecondarySemi-Confined
Aquifers(foundin the confininglayer underlyingthe SurficialAquifer),
and the FloridanAquifer.
SurficialAquifer
The SurficialAquifer(an unconfinedhydrogeologicunit) is contiguous
with the land surfaceand is rechargedby rainfallalong the coastalridges
and dunes,with littlerechargeoccurringin the low swampyareas. The
rechargearea at KSC/CCAFSfor the SurficialAquiferis shown in
Figure3-13.
In general,water in the SurficialAquifernear the groundwaterdivide
of the islandhas potentialgradientsthat tend to carry some of the water
verticallydownwardto the deepestpart of the SurficialAquiferand
potentiallyto the upperunits of the secondarysemi-confinedaquifers,
(NASA ]986). East and west of this zone,water in the SurficialAquiferhas
verticaland horizontalflowcomponents. Farthertowardthe coastline,
circulationbecomesshalloweruntil,at somepoint,flow is essentially
horizontalto the water table (Figure3-14). Major dischargepoints for the
SurficialAquiferare the estuarylagoons,shallowseepageoccurringto
troughsand swales,and evapotranspiration.Inlandfreshsurfacewaters are
primarilyderivedfromSurficialgroundwater.
SecondarySemi-ConfinedAquifersand the F!ori_anAquifer
b
• Groundwatersunderartesianand semi-confinedconditions,the Floridan
and SecondaryAquifers,have upwardflow potentials. However,becauseof
the thicknessand the relativelyimpermeablenatureof the confiningunits,
it is believedno significantinter-aquiferleakageis occurringfrom the
FloridanAquifernaturally. The generalhorizontaldirectionof flow in the
FloridanAquiferis northerlyand northwesterly.The great elevation
differentialbetweenthe FloridanAquiferrechargeareas (e.g.,Polk and
OrangeCounty)and dischargeareasalong the Atlanticcoast providesthe i
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%potentialfor the flowingartesianpressureexperiencedat KSC. Rechargeto
the SecondaryAquifersis dependenton leakagethroughthe surroundinglower
permeabilitybeds.
3.2.3.4 Qualityof Groundwater
Water from the Flori_n Aquiferat KSC and CCAFS is highlymineralized
. (principallychlorides)and is not used as a potablewater source.
. Floridagroundwatercriteriahave been establishedas four classes,
Class G-I throughG-IV, with Class G-I beingthe most restrictive. The
majorityof the state'sgroundwatersare classifiedas G-II (potablewater
use), and for all practicalpurposes,there are no G-I or G-IV
classificationsin Florida.
Overall,water in the surficialunconfinedaquiferat CCAFS is of good
qualityand meets Stateof FloridaClass groundwaterqualitystandardsfor
potablewater use with the exceptionof chloride,iron,and totaldissolved
solids. The elevatedconcentrationsof these parametersare due to the
influenceof adjacentsalinesurfacewaters. No potablewater wells are
locatedat LaunchComplex41 or in its vicinity. At KSC high chloride
concentrationsoccur on the north,east, and west fringesof KSC due to
intrusionfrom surroundingsalinewater bodies. Thus, water quality
improvestowardsthe north-southaxis of KSC becausethis is where prime
areasof freshwaterrechargeoccur and where potentiometric(watertable)
headshave preventedseawaterintrusion.
Preliminarydata for the SecondarySemi-ConfinedAquifershow that some
of these aquifersmay be marginalwater sources;however,it appearsthat
they are not capableof sustaininglarge scaledevelopment. '
3.2.3.5 OffshoreEnvironment
J
The AtlanticOcean offshoreenvironmentat KSC/CCAFScan be described
accordingto its bottomtopographyand characteristicsof ocean circulation
in the area.
Out to depthsof about 60 feet, sandyshoalsdominatethe underwater
topography. The bottomcontinuesseawardat about the same slope out to
about34 miles where the bank slopesdown to depthsof 2,400 to 3,000 feet !
to the Blake Plateau. The Blake Plateauextendsout to about 230 miles from
the shore at KSC/CCAFS. Figure3-15 shows the bathymetryof the offshore
r;
areas. Figure3-16 illustratesthe generalocean bottomfor a 100 degree
azimuthfor 0 to 115 miles from KSC/CCAFS(USAEC]975). _.
Studiesof water movementsin the area indicatea shorewarddirection
: of the currentfor the entiredepth, surfaceto bottom,in the regionout to
depthsof 60 feet (I8 nauticalmiles)at speedsof severalmiles per day.
Wind-drivencurrentsgenerallydeterminethe currentflow at the surface. :i
In the regionout to the slopingbank, the Flow is slightlyto the north
tendingto move eastwardwhen the winds blowto the south. Water over the
Blake Plateauflows to the northmost of the time and is known as the
Floridacurrent(of the Gulf Stream),(USAEC1975).
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p3.2.4 G_oloav and Soils I
KSC/CCAFSis locatedon a barrierislandcomposedof relictbeach .,
ridges. This islandparallelsthe shorelineseparatingthe AtlanticOcean
from the IndianRiver, IndianRiver Lagoon,and BananaRiver. The area is
underlainby limestoneformationsa few thousandfeet thick. The
formations,from oldestto youngest,respectivelyare: the Avon Park and
the Ocala;overlyingthe artesianFloridanAquiferare the confiningbeds of
the HawthornFormation;the confiningbeds are overlainby Pleistoceneand
RecentAge unconsolidatedeposits.
Soils in the area of KSC/CCAFShave beenmapped by the U.S. Department
of AgricultureSoil ConservationService(SCS). Fivemajor soil
associationshave been identifiedby SCS. (Thelocationsof the major soils
associationscan be found in NASA 1986.) The soils in the immediate
vicinityof LaunchComplex39 at KSC consistof poorlydrained,nearlylevel i
salineto brackishsoils. The principalsoils associationat LaunchComplex
41 are moderatelyto excessivelydrainedsandy soils on level or moderately
slopingtopography.
3.2.5 BioloqicalResources
J3.2.5.1 TerrestrialBiota
Vegetationcommunitiesand relatedwildlifehabitatsare representative
of barrierislandresourcesof the region (Figure3-17). Major natural
communitiesincludebeach,coastalstrandand dunes,coastalscrub,and .
wetlands. Coastalhammocksand pine flatwoodsfoundon KSC to the
northwestincreasethe ecologicaldiversityand richnessof the area. About
go percentof the totalKSC land area (about73,300acres) is undeveloped, '
and falls intothese communitytypes. About 77 percent(about12,000acres)
of CCAFS is undisturbedor has revertedback to naturalconditions. '
Major Plant Communitiesand RelatedHabitat
The principalcommunitiesin the vicinityof LaunchComplex39 at KSC
and 41 at CCAFS are beach,coastalstrandand dune, coastalscrub,and
wetlands. Beachesof KSC and CCAFS are largelyunvegetated,but provide
significantwildliferesources. The tidal zone supportsa high numberof
marine invertebrates,as well as small fish that are food for many shore
birds. Severalspeciesof gulls,terns,sandpipers,and other birds use
beachesof the Cape Canaveralarea. In addition,researchindicatesthat
these beachesare very importantto nestingsea turtles(seeSection
3.2.5.3). .!
Coastalstrandand dune communitiesare markedby extremesin
temperatureand prolongedperiodsof drought. Vegetationon the dunes are
dominatedby sea oats. Othergrassessuch as slendercordgrassand beach i
grass also occur. Shrubssuchas beach berry and marsh elder occur in the ,_
dune communityalongwith herbs such as beach sunflowerand camphorweed.
The strandoccursbetweenthe coastalscrub communityand the salt spray i
zone of the dune system. Growthcharacteristicsof strandvegetation
producesa low profilethat is maintainedby nearlyconstantwinds. Plants
thatcan toleratestrandconditionsare saw palmetto,wax myrtle,tough
buckthorn,cabbagepalm, partridgepea, pricklypear, and variousgrasses.
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Coastalscrub is the largestnaturalcommunityat CCAFS, covering
approximately9,400 acres at CCAFS and almost20,000acres at KSC. The I
coastalscrub associationis characterizedby xeric tree speciesincluding
scruboak, live oak and sand liveoak, and myrtleoak. The scrub community
is a harsh environmentlimitedby low soilmoistureconditions. Herbaceous
and shrub vegetationis sparseand includeswire grass, saw palmetto,tar
flower,lantana,wax myrtle,greenbriar,pricklypear,gopher apple,and
others.
Wetlandswithinand surroundingthe launcharea are importantwildlife
resources. About 78 percentof KSC, for example,is consideredwetland
habitat• Wetlandtypes that are found in the area includefreshwaterponds
and canals,brackishimpoundments,tidal lagoons,bays, rivers,vegetated
marshes,and mangroveswamps. Thesewetlandsprovideresourcesfor a vast
assemblageof marineorganisms,waterfowl,and terrestrialwildlife.
Pine flatwoodsoccur principallyin the northwestand centralportions
of KSC. Dominanttree speciesare pines,includingslash pine, longleaf,
and sand pine.
Coastalhammocksare characterizedby closedcanopiesprovidedby
cabbagepalms,which is the dominanttree species. Pdditionaltree species
in hammocksare red bay, liveoak, and stranglerfig.
Ruderalvegetationdominatessites disturbedby or createdby past
human activitysuch as constructionand agriculture.Vegetationcommunities
includeBrazilianpepper;Australianpine;wax myrtle and melaleuca. Citrus
groves,the only agriculturalcommunitycurrentlyoccurringwithin KSC
occupyabout 2,500acres of land, slightlyover 3 percentof the total KSC
land area. The grovesoccur in the northernportionof KSC along Mosquito
i Lagoonand on the MerrittIslandportionof KSC south of BananaCreek.
Wildlife
. Nearly60 speciesof reptilesand amphibiansare known to inhabitthe
area. Three of the residentspecies(theAmericanalligator,the eastern
i indigosnake,and the Atlanticsaltmarsh snake)are federallyprotected.
, KSC and the surroundingcoastalareasprovidehabitatfor nearly300
bird species Nearly90 speciesare residentbreederswhile over 200
speciesoverwinterat KSC. The breeding,winteringand migratorybird
speciesand their relativeoccurrencewithin 17 habitattypes at KSC have
beendocumentedand are found in NASA 1986.
The expansiveareasof wetlandsprovideidealfeeding,roostingand
nestinghabitatfor nearlytwo dozen speciesof wading birds. Many of the
wetlandswithinthe MerrittIslandNationalWildlifeRefugeare managedto
providewinteringhabitatfor approximately200,000waterfowl•
it
Colonialnestingbirds occurwithin 11 rookeriesat and near KSC/CCAFS, .
with 4 rookerieslocatedwithin 2 miles of launchcomplexes39 and 41, (see J
AppendixD-4). Among the speciesutilizingthese locationsare egrets,
ibis,heron,cormorantand anhingua.
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More than 20 species of mammalsare known to inhabit the Merritt Island
land mass. Mammalsinclude mice, voles, raccoons, opossum, rabbit, wild hog
and aquatic mammalssuch as the manatee and bottlenose dolphin.
3.2.5.2 Aquatic Biota
The coastline from Daytona south to Melbourne and extending seaward to
a depth of 100 fathoms is one of the most productive marine fishery areas
along the southern Atlantic coast. The inshore waters support an important
sea trout and _edfish sport fishery. The lagoons and rivers support
commercial fishery operations for blue crab and black mullet.
Shellfishing forms an important componentof the commercial and
recreational fishing effort. Brevard County leads the state in the
production of hard clams (quahogs) and scallops. The commercial scallop
fishery predominates off shore; it is estimated that 30 to 40 million pounds
of calico scallops were harvested off Cape Canaveral in 1984. A numberof
renewableoysterleasesare held in the watersnear KSC. The southern
quahog is the most frequentlytaken specieswith large numbersbeing
gatheredfrom the tidalmud flats by both commercialand recreational
fishermen. See Figure3-12 for shellfishharvestingareasaroundKSC/CCAFS.
The lagoonalsystemsurroundingKSC providesboth recreationalfin and
shrimpfishing. It is estimatedthat, in 1985,90,300recreational
fishermenutilizedthe fisheryresourcessurroundingKSC. The fish fauna of
the India_River lagoonsystemhas receivedconsiderableattention. The
fresh and brackishwaters associatedwith the KSC area are reportedto
support141 species.
Benthicmacroinvertebratesof the northernIndianand BananaRiverscan
be classifiedas estuarine-marineanimals. A total of 122 speciesof '
benthicmacroinvertebrateshave beenreportedfrom brackishlagoons
surroundingLaunchComplex39A and the northernBananaRiver. Although
shrimpspeciesof commercialimportancewere collected,the northernIndian
River is not consideredan importantnurseryarea for these species.
MosquitoLagoon,however,is consideredan importantshrimpnurseryarea.
Blue crabswere determinedto spawn in the area also.
3.2.5.3 Endangeredand ThreatenedSpecies
The U.S. Fish and WildlifeServiceand FloridaGame and FreshWater
Fish Commissionprotecta numberof wildlifespecieslistedas enQangeredor
_hreatenedunder the FederalEndangeredSpeciesAct of 1973 (as amended),
and underthe FloridaEndangeredand ThreatenedSpeciesAct of 1977 (as
amended),respectively.A list of the protectedspeciesat KSC/CCAFSis
found in Table 3-4. The Federallistcontainsseven speciesas endangered, '
: and three speciesas threatened. The State of Floridaliststwo additional
speciesas threatened, i
A reviewof CCAFS endangeredor threatenedspeciesshowsthat only
three species(southeasternKestrel,Floridascrubjay, easternindigo
snake)potentiallyoccur in the immediatevicinityof LaunchComplex41. An
additionalthree species(woodstork,bald eagle,peregrinefalcon)may
occasionallyoccur in wetlandslocatedto the east of the complex.
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TABLE 3-4. ENDANGEREDAND TIIREATENEDSPECIESRESIDINGOR
SEASONALLYOCCURRINGON KSC/CCAFSAND ADJOINING
WATERS.
Status
Species USFWS* FGFWFCT**
Mammals
Caribbeanmanates(Trichechusmanatus) E E
Birds
Wood stork (MycteriBamerican) E E
Bald eagle (Haliaeetusleucocephalus) E T
Peregrinfalcon (Falcopereqrinus) T E
Southeasternkestrel(Falcosparverius) T
Red-cockadedwoodpecker(Picoidesborealis) E T
Floridascrubjay (Ahpelocomacoerulesens) T
Dusky seasidesparrow(Ammospizamaritima) E E (lastknown
individualdied
in captivityin
1987)
Reptiles
Atlanticgreen turtle(Cheloniamydas) E E
Atlanticridleyturtle(Lepidochelyskempi) E E
Atlanticloggerheadturtle (Carettacaretta) T T
Easternindigosnake (Drymarchoncorais) T T
*U.S. Fish and WildlifeService
**Gameand FreshWater FishCommission
E = Endangered.
T = Threatened.
(Source: USAF 1986)
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Caribbeanmanatees,green turtles,ridleyturtles,and loggerheadturtles
are knownto occur in the BananaRiver,MosquitoLagoonand alongAtlantic
Ocean beaches. Of the remainingtwo species,dusky seasidesparrowis now
thoughtto be extinct,and the red-cockadedwoodpeckeris not expectedto
occur in the vicinityof LaunchComplex41 due to the absenceof suitable
habitat.
Ten nestinglocationsthat have b_en used by the bald eagle have been
locatedat KSC. A 1985surveynoted that 5 locationswere active,with 10
adultsproducing7 eaglets. NestingtypicallyoccursbetweenOctoberand
mid-May. Eaglesare susceptibleto disturbanceduringthe mating and
rearingcycle from courtshipthroughaboutthe first 12 weeks of nesting.
(SeeAppendixD-4 for additionaldetailsof nestinglocations.)
With respectto the West IndianManatee,the followingareas at
KSC/CCAFShave been designatedas CriticalHabitatby the U.S. Fish and
WildlifeService: the entire inlandsectionof water known as the Indian
River,from its northernmostpoint immediatelysouth of the intersectionof
US HighwayI and SR-3,the entireinlandsectionof water known as the
BananaRiver,and all waterwaysbetweenthe Indianand BananaRivers
(exclusiveof those existingmanmadestructuresor settlementsthat are not
necessaryto the normalneeds of the survivalof the species). Critical
habitatand areasof manateeconcentrationare delineatedin AppendixD-4.
Osprey,listedby the Conventionon InternationalTrade in Endangered
Speciesof Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES),were thoughtto be actively
utilizinga total of 25 nestingsites nearKSC. lh_ closestsitewas a
nestingarea about 2 miles to the west of KSC LaunchComplex39 (about3
miles approximatelynorthwestof CCAFS LaunchComplex41). (See
AppendixD-4 for additionaldetail.)
3.2.6 $ocioeconomics
3.2.6.1 Population
The demographicsof the local area sites are based upon the workforce
employedat CCAFS and KSC and are influencedby the influxof peopleand
theirdistributionprior to and duringlaunches. Duringa launch,
approximately6,000employeesmay be onsite. The populationmay increase
duringlaunchesof specialinterestby more than 100,000spectators,varying
with the time of day and year, and the weather. These individualsoccupy
nearbybeach areas and line the publicroads in the area. Onsitepopulation w
at launchtime is increasedby about 17,300visitorsand press personnel
(Harer1988). These additionalpeople (seeAppendixD-3 for detail)are
distributedamong variousviewingareas as follows:
e 2,000 peopleat the #I VIP Site (StaticTest Area)
e g,o00 peopleat the #2 VIP Site (eastof the Banana ,_
River Causewaydrawbridge;totalcould increaseto
11,000-13,000peopleif #I VIP Site can not be used)
e 2,000 pressmembersat sitewest of the BananaRiver
drawbridge
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r• 4,000 peopleat the IndianRiver CausewaySite (eastof the
drawbridgefor I mile)
o 250 peopleat the O&C Building
• 50 peopleat the LCC Building.
3.2.6.2 Economy
The economyof the surroundingarea is influencedby the presenceof
both CCAFS and and KSC, but the area'sdependenceupon them has lessenedin
recentyears. NASA civilianemploymentin BrevardCountyaccountedfor
about 11 percentof countyemploymentin 1987,whereasin 1967 it accounted
for about 25 percentof countyemployment,(BrevardCounty 1988). KSC
contracts,however,providea substantialamountof income,totalingabout
$720 millionin 1987.
3.2.6.3 Transportation
The area is servicedby Federal,state,and local roads. Primary
highwaysincludeInterstate95, US-I, State Route (SR)-AIA,and SR-520.
: Urban areas on the beachesand MerrittIslandare linkedby causewaysand
bridges. Road accessto KSC is from SR-3 and the Cape Road from the south,
NASA Causeway(SR-405)and the Beach Road (SR-406)from the west, and
KennedyParkwayfromthe north. There are about 211 miles of roadwayat
KSC; 163 miles paved,48 miles unpaved. CCAFS is linkedto the highway
systemby the SouthGate via SR-AIA,NASA Causeway,and Cape Road.
Rail transportationin the area is providedby FloridaEast Coast
Railway(FECR). A mainlinetraversesthe citiesof Titusville,Cocoa, and
Melbourne. LaunchComplex41 is servicedby a branchline from Titusville
throughKSC. At KSC approximately40 miles of rail track pro_ de heavy
freighttransportto KSC.
MelbourneRegienalAirportis the closestfacilityand is located30
miles southof CCAFS. CCAFS containsa skidstrip used for government
aircraftand deliveryof launchvehicles. Any air freightassociatedwith
operationof LaunchComplex41 uses the CCAFS skid strip. Ferryingand
supportaircraftservingKSC utilizethe ShuttleLandingFacility.
PortCanaveralis the nearestnavigableseaportand has a total of
1,578ft of dockageavailableat existingwharf facilities.
3.2.6.4 Publicand EmergencyServices
A mutualagreementexistsbetweenthe City of Cape Canaveral,KSC, and
the RangeContractorat CCAFS for reciprocalsupportin the event of an
emergencyor disaster. Two fire stationslocatedin the VerticalAssembly
Building(VAB)Area and the IndustrialArea providefor effectivecoverage
of KSC.
Securityoperationsincludeaccesscontrol,personnelidentification,
trafficcontrol,law enforcement,investigations,classifiedmaterial
control,and nationalresourceprotection. The Brevardand VolusiaCounty
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Sheriff'sdepartments,the U.S. Fish and WildlifeServiceand the National
Park ServicesupplementKSC securityforcesin patrollingnon-secureareas _ I
of KSC (e.g.,Cape CanaveralNationalSeashore,MerrittIslandNational
WildlifeRefuge),(NASA1986).
Medicalservicesare providedat the facilitiesand by hospitalsat
PatrickAir Force Base and in Cocoa,Titusville,and Melbourne. CCAFS is
equippedwith a dispensaryunder contractto NASA. Medicalservicesare
providedto KSC by an OccupationalHealthFacilityand an EmergencyAid
Clinic.
No publicschoolfacilitiesare presenton CCAFS or KSC. All school-age
: childrenof the KSC and CCAFSworkforceattendschool in the vicinityin
which they live.
No recreationalfacilitiesare presenton CCAFS,exceptfor those
associatedwith the TridentSubmarineWharf, a serviceclub and a naval
! recreationfacility. Culturalfacilitiesonstationincludethe Air Force
Space Museum,tow facilitiesand MissionControl,all locatedat the
southernportionof the base. Offbasemilitaryand civilianpersonnel
utilizerecreationaland culturalfacilitiesavailablewithin the
communities.
: KSC has a 238 acre recreationalarea (Complex99) locatedon the Banana
River near the southernlimit of KSC property(NASA I979). The Visitor's
InformationCenterat KSC, locatedabout 6 miles east of U.S. HighwayI,
providesexhibits,lecturesand audio-visualdisplaysand ous tours on the
facilityfor visitors.
KSC and CCAFS obtaintheir potablewater from the City of Cocoa water
systemunder a contractthat providesfor some 9 milliongallonsper day.
Approximatelyhalf that amount is normallyused by the two facilities. The
on-sitedistributionsystemsare sized to accommodatethe constanthigh
volumeflow requiredby the launchdelugesystem. The city'swell-fieldin
Orange Countyhas a capacityof 32 milliongallonsper day, (USAF 1986).
Additionaldetailsof facilitiesin the local area can be found in
AppendixD-2 and D-3.
)
KSC also enforcesprocedures,plans and personneltrainingwith respect
to the use and handlingof radioactivesources. Comprehensiveradiological
contingencyplans are being developedto addressall launch/landingphase
accidentsthat could potentiallyinvolvethe RTGs and RHUs aboardthe
Galileospacecraft. These plans conformto the requirementsof the Federal
RadiologicalEmergencyResponsePlan (FRERP)that is under developmentand
involvesthe effortsof numerousgovernmentagenciesincludingNASA, DOE,
the Departmentof Defense,the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency and the State
of Florida. An overviewof radiologicalcontrolsand emergencyplanningat
KSC can be found in AppendixD-6. i
3.2.6.5 Historic/ArchaeologicResources
A map showingthe relativelocationsof state listedarchaeologicsites
is providedin Figure3-18.
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A systematicsurveyof areas in the F ',riftIslandNationalWildlife i I
Refugewas conductedin 1978, (NASA1986). No significantcultural (
resourceswere found other than fourhistoricsites: Sugar Mill Ruins,Fort
Ann, the Old HauloverCanal,and the Dummetthomestead, i
Two locationswere assessedin 1981, (NASA 1986). One area covered6
acreswhere PeacockPocketRoadmarks the east boundaryand SR-402bcrders
- on the north;the other area was locatedon the southedge of SR-402some ,
2,3000feetwest of PeacockPocketRoad. No significantarchaeological
siteswere found on eitherof the two locations. No slgnificantcultural
resourceswere foundas the resultof other surveysthat includedd 1982
surveyof the UnitedSpace BoosterFacilitytract on MerrittIslal;dand of ('
the SpaceShuttleSolid RocketBousterFacilitysite.
An archaeological/historicalsurveyof CCAFS was conductedin 1982,
(USAF 1986). It was determinedthat Cape Canaveralhad been inhabitedfor
4,000 to 5,000years. The surveylocated32 prehistoricand historicsit_s
and severaluninve_tigatedhistoriclocalities. The initialresultsof the _field surveyindicatedthat many of the archaeologicalresourceshad been
severelydamage_by constructionof roads,launchcomplexes,powerlines,
drainageditches,and other excavation. None of these sites are locatedirl
the vicinityof LaunchComplex41.
Most recently,NASA proposedto developa site along BananaCreek to (
allowVIPs to view STS launches. It was determinedthat this site contained
state listedarchaeologicsite BR170. NASA fundedar,extensivearchaeologic
dig of this site. The studywas completedin Aug_ist1988 and the final
reportis pending.
3.3 GLOBALCOMMONS
This sectionprovidesa generaloverviewof the globalcommonsin terms
of overallpopulationdistributionand density,generalclimatological
characteristics,and surfacetype (ocean,rock, soil),and also providesa
brief discussionof the globalatmosphericinventoryof plutonium, lne
informationprovidedwas extractedprimarilyfrom the "OverallSafety
Manual"preparedfor the U.S. AtomicEnergyCommissionin 1975, (USAEC
1975). The "OverallSafetyManual"utilizedworldwidepopulationstatistics
and other informationcompiledinto720 cells of equal size. The cellswere
derivedby dividingthe entireEarthfrom pole to pole into 20 latitude
bandsof equal area. Each latitudebandwas then segmentedinta 36 equal
size cells for a total of 720 cells. Given thateach of t);ecells covered
an areaof the Earthequal to 273,528squaremiles, it has been assumedfor
the purposesof thisdiscussionthat whileworldwidepopulation,for
example,has certainlychangedsincethe referencewas prep_red,the change
is not significantrelativeto a given 273,528squaremile (ell.
3.3.1 PopulationOistributionand Oen_ity
Figure3-19 illustratesthe distrib,tionof the Earth'spopulation
acrosseach of the 20 equal _rea latitudebands. It shouldbe neteo that
the populationscale is logarithmic.Figure3-20 illustratesthe land-
adjustedpopulationdensitieswithinthe latitudebands.
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u! From these exhibitsit can be seen that,with the exceptionof the four
more southernlatitudebands,the total populationamong the bands variesby
• about one order of magnitude. In addition,Figure3-19 indicatesthat t_,o
bulk of the populationwithinall but the more southernbands,can be founu
in urban areas. The greatestpopulationdensities(Figure3-20) occur in a
relativelynarrowgroupingof the four northernbands betweenlatitudes17
! and 44 degreesnorth, (bands4-7).
_i 3.3.2 Climatoloqy
' Worldwideclimatictypes,which range from the perpetualfrost of the
polar climatesto the dry desertclimates,are illustratedin Figure3-21.
3.3.3 SurfaceTypes
i
, The distributionof surfacetypes,worldwide,is an important
= characteristicin consideringthe potentialconsequencesof accident!
scenariosanalyzedfor the Galileomission. Table 3-5 providesa breakdown,
by each of the 20 equal area latitudebands noted above,of the total land
fractionand the total ocean fractionbrokendown by two ocean depth
categories- surfacedepth,i.e., 75 meters (246 feet)averagedepth; and
intermediatedepth, i.e.,500 meters (1,640feet) averagedepth. The land
fractionwas furthersubdividedby the fractionconsistingof soilcover,
' and rock cover. For the most denselypopulatedbands (bands4-7), it can be
I seenthat the land fractionvariesfrom about 34 percent(band7) to about
46 percent(band4) and withinthose four bands the soil fractionis
:i dominant(75 percentin band 4 to 92 percentin band 7). It can also be
I seen (by subtractingthe Total Land Fractionfrom 1.0)that the bulk of the
Earth'ssurfaceis coveredby water.
3.3.4 WorldwidePlutoniumLevels
Plutonium-238,the primaryfuelof the GalileospacecraftRTGs, already
i exists in the environmentas a resultof atmospherictestingof nuclear
i weaponsand a 1964launchaccident. The followingparagraphs_escribethe
worldwide,national,and regionallevelsof plutoniumin the environment.
This informationis relevantto analyzingthe scope of postulated
incrementalreleasesof plutoniumintothe environmentthat could result
I from a Galileomissionaccident.
,!
_ Over the period 1945through1974,abovegroundnuclearweaponstests
i producedabout 440,000curiesof plutonium(EPA 1977, USAEC 1974). About 97
percent(about430,000curies)of this plutoniumwas Pu 239 and Pu 240 which
are essentiallyidenticalboth chemicallyand with respectto their
radiologicalemissionenergies. The remainder(about10,000curies)
consistedcf principallyPu 238 (aboutg,o00 curies),and Pu 241 and Pu 242.
Abovegroundnucleartestingthus representsthe major sourceof the
worldwidedistributionof plutoniumin the environment. "i
! Of the approximately430,000curiesof Pu 239 produced,about 105,000
curieswas depositedat and near the test sites, (EPA 1977). The remaining i
325,000curieswas injectedintothe stratosphere(about6 to 15 miles above '
the Earth'ssurface). The stratosphericinventoryreturnedto Earth as
"fallout." About 25,000curieswere depositedin the northernhemisphere,
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TABLE 3-5. SURFACE TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH LATITUDE BAND
Latitude Total Land Ocean Surface Ocean Intermediate Lar, d Soil Land Rc,c'::
Band Fraction__ D_epth Fra.c..tJon Depth ,Fraction ,,. Fracticn Fractin._
1 0.4739 O. 1648 0. 1444 0.0" 1.00"
2 0.5845 O. 1247 0. 0704 0.0" 1.00"
3 0.5665 0.0441 0.0452 0.749* 0.251"
4 0.4580 O.0349 O. 0429 O. 749 0.251
5 0.4353 0.0357 0.0290 0.847 O. 153
6 0.3980 0.0312 0.0365 0.912 0.088
7 0.3391 0.0358 0.0334 0.924 0.076
8 0.2545 0.0214 0.0300 0.942 0.058 ,
9 0.2444 0.0400 0.0368 0.923 0.077 '
I0 0.2211 0.0400 0.0197 0.916 0.084
II 0.2500 0.0326 0.0263 0.956 0.044
12 0.2199 O. 0387 O. 0299 0.945 0.055
13 0.2169 0.0329 0.0200 0.915 0.085
14 0.2480 0.0128 0.0319 0.911 0.089
15 0.2231 0.0088 0.0155 0.908 0.092
16 0.1372 0.0185 0.0172 0.888 O. 112
17 0.0465 0.0191 0.0256 0.704 0.296 :
18 0.0223 0.0172 O. 0427 0.704" O, 296* ,
19 0.0034 0.0036 O.Oll5 0.0" 1.00"
20 0.5438 O.0077 0.0850 0.0" 1.00*
* Assumed Values Source: USAEC1975 i
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principallyin the mid latitudes,with about 70,00Ccuriesdepositedover i
the southernlatitudes,(EPA1977). About 5,000 curiesremainedaloft as of
1974. Approximately16,000curiesof falloutsettledon the continental
UnitedStates,(USAEC1974). Figure3-22 illustratesthe accumulationof
Pu 239 falloutin millicuriesper ;quarekilometermeasuredat various
locationsin the U.S. In general,drier areas of the U.S. had lower
accumulationsthanwet areas,indicatingscavengingof Pu 239 from the
atmosphereby rainfall. Some dry westernareas are apparentexceptionsto .
this indicatingthe possibilitythat there are regionswhere stratospheric
debrismay preferentiallyenter the troposphereto be depositedon the
Earth'ssurface.
w-
Referringto Table 3-6, it will be noted that the Pu 238 inventoryfrom
weaponstests (about9,000 _uries)was increasedby a space nuclearsource,
specificallyfrom the 1964 re-entryand burn-upof a SNAP-gARadioisotopic
ThermoelectricGenerator. This releaseof plutoniumintothe atmospherewas
consistentwith the RTG d_signphilosophyof the time. SubsequentRTGs,
includingthose on the Galileospacecraft,have been designedto fully
containthe Pu 238 fuelto the maximumextendpossible(seeSection
2.2.2.2).
TABLE 3-6. MAJOR SOURCESAND APPROXIMATEAMOUNTSOF PLUTONIUM
DISTRIBUTEDWORLDWIDE
Amount % Activityby Isotope
Sources (Curies) Pu-238Pu-239Pu-240
AtmosphericTesting1945-74
e Depositednear testingsites 110,000 3 58 38
• Depositedworld wide 330,000 3 58 39
SpaceNuclear(Snap-_A,1964) 17,000 100 -
t
Total 457,000
4
Total globalexcludingamounts 347,000 <
near to test sites
(Source: USAEC 1975)
Z
The additionof 17,000curiesof Pu 238 from the SNAP-gAbroughtthe
to_al global inventoryof plutoniumto about457,000curies. Since 1964,
essentiallyall of SNAP-gAreleasehas beendepositedon the Earth's
surface,(USAEC1974). About 25 percent(approximately4,000 curies)of
that releasewas depositedin the northernlatitudes,with the remaining75
percentsettlingin the southernhemisphere.
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4. ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
The principal purpose of this draft (Tier 2) Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) is to present information to enable a choice among the
alternative actions presented in Section 2. This section discusses the
, potential environmental consequences that could result from the
implementation of each of the alternatives available to the National .
_,1 "" Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as presented in Section 2.
: 4.1 ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCESOF THE PROPOSEDACTION
4.1.1 Implications of Completion of Preparation of the Spacecraft
,~
The activities associated with completing the preparations to the
spacecraft primarily involve the completion of post-test spacecraft
mechanical assembly, integration tests with the launch vehicle and final
launch preparation. The impacts associated with final launch preparations
are addressed in the following subsection. There are no environmental
consequences associated with the balance of the activities identified above
(NASA 1988a).
4.1.2. Environmental Consequences of Normal La'mch of the STS
The environmental consequences of normal operations and normal launches
are summarized in this section and were discussed in detail in previously
published NASA documents including EISs on the Space Shuttle Program (NASA
1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) EIS (NASA 1979), the KSC
Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986), and the Tier I EIS for the
Galileo and Ulysses missions (NASA 1988a), and were found to be acceptable
when weighed against the benefits of the space program.
Impacts on Land Use
Launch of the Galileo mission aboard the National Space Transportation
System/Inertial Upper Stage (STS/IUS) would occur at Launch Complex 39 at
the KSC. The launch complex and the area surrounding it are dedicated space
launch land uses. The only special land uses nearby are Cape Canaveral
National Seashore and Mosquito Lagoon about 2 miles to the north. Mosquito
Lagoon is a designated State of Florida aquatic preserve and also an
Outstanding Florida Water. Designated land uses in these areas would be
unaffected by a launch of the Galileo mission.
Air Quality Impacts
A ground cloud will be formed by combustion in the Space Shuttle rocket
engines during launch (NASA 1979). This cloud consists of the exhaust
: products from the solid rocket motors and liquid engines, the products of
afterburning in the exhaust plume, _he air that is mixed with the exhaust
gases, and much of the heat energy that is generated. These gases have the
potential for forming high concentrations of acids (hydrogen chloride mist
HCI) that can rain on and affect vegetation. This acid rain can affect the
density of vegetation as described in the section on biological systems
below.
., 4-I
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Upper AtmosphereEffects
The Space Shuttleexhaustreleaseswater,hydrogenchloride,chlorine,
and aluminumoxide particlesintothe stratosphereand producesnitricoxide
in the hot plume. The quantityof water releasedby the Space Shuttleis
small comparedto naturalsources,and its effecton the ozone densitywill
be insignificant(Corer1987).
DuringShuttlemaneuversabove an altitudeof 180 kilometers(in the "
ionosphere),the exhaustproductsfrom the OrbitalManeuveringSystem (OMS)
will reducethe ion concentration.This effectis localizedand temporary.
Effectson radio wave propagationwill be insignificant.DuringShuttle
reentry,which will occur betweena 70- and 90-kilometeraltitude,some of
the heatedatmospherewill be convertedto nitricoxide,which ionizesin
ultravioletsunlight. The lengthof the trailcould extendto one-fourth
the circumferenceof the Earth,but th,e width will be narrow. The required
time for the trail to disappearhas been calculatedto be lessthan I day,
and if wind shearsare present,the trail coulddisappearin hours. The
effectsof the ionizedtrail on radio wave propagationare expectedto be
insignificant.The long-termeffectsof the nitricoxide on the
stratospherealso have been studiedand have been determinedto be
negligible(NASA 1978).
Sonic Boom
¢
Launchof the STS resultsin three sonicboo,nswith focal zones over
uninhabitedocean waters. The Shuttlealsowill producea sonic boomduring
reentry. Becauseof the large range of entry trajectories,the boom may
occur partiallyover land. Overpressureshave been calculatedfor these
conditions,and trajectorieshave beentailoredto minimizethe effecton
the ground (NASA 1986). These overpressuresare not enoughto cause damage
or injurybut are in the nuisanceor annoyancerange accordingto the report
issuedby the Sonic Boom Panelof the InternationalCivil Aviation
Organizationin October1970.
Hydrologyand Water Quality
Each STS launchgeneratesabout 863,000gallonsof delugeand washdown
wastewater(NASA 1986). Much of the delugewater is vaporizedand contained
in the groundcloud. Shallowimpoundedwatersnear the launchcomplex
typicallyexperiencea sharp but short-term(about2 hours)depressionin pH
immediatelyfollowinglaunchdue to the HCl scavengingfrom the groundcloud. ;
About 326,000gallonsof washdownwater,along with an unknownquantityof "_
delugewater, are collectedin two concretetanks connectedto the launch
pad flame trench. This water is neutralizedto a pH of about 8.5 after the
launchand is landspreadover the adjacentpad area. Groundwaterstudies
have been unableto establisha cause/effectr_lationshipbetweenlaunches
and periodicallydetectablequantitiesof aluminum,cadmium,chromium,iron, _ ._
lead, and volatileorganiccompoundsin the groundwater.
BioloqicalSystems
Informationon the impactsof launcheventsto the local environment
has been documentedfrom a 54-acreareaoutsideof the perimeterof Launch
4-2
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Complex39A (LC-39A). Described as w,Chin the near field environment, this
tract has experiencedsignificantchangesin vegetativecommunitystructure I
(NASA Ig86). Overall,total vegetativecover in the near field have been
reducedand unvegetatedareas have expanded.
Impactanalysesindicatethat thin-leafedherbaceousspecies,and
: shrubswith succulentleaves,are more sensitiveto launchcloud deposits ._
than are typicaldune grasses(NASA 1986). Dune communityspecies
- "- exhibitingsensitivityto launchcloud effectsincludecamphorweed
(Heterothecasubaxillaris),inkberry(Scaevolaplumieri),beach sunflower
(Helianthusdebilis),and marsh elder (Iva i.mbricata).Dune species
exhibitingresistanceto launchcloud effectsincludesea oats (Uniola
paniculata),beach grass (Panicumamarum),and slendercordgrass(Spartina
patens).
Shallowimpoundedwaters in the vicinityof LaunchComplex-39Ahave
experiencedfish kills followingthe launchof the Space Shuttle(NASA
1986). Thesewaters can experiencesharpdepressionsin pH as a resultof
lauhchcloud rainout. Reductionsin pH of four unitswithin 30 minutesof a
launchevent are possible. The suddenacidificationof surfacewateFs is
believedto be responsiblefor the fish kills accompanyinglaunchevents.
Speciesof fish collectedfrom the near field impactarea exhibitsymptoms
of severeionic imbalanceand anoxia,resultingfrom extensivegill damage
' (NASA1986). Fish kills have rangedfrom small (lessthan 100 individuals)
to major (greaterthan 1,000 individuals)(NASA 1979).
While the impacton the near field flora and fauna is measurable
followingeach launchevent, these impactsare localizedand are not likely
to extend significantlyfrom the near field environment.
Endangeredand ThreatenedSpecies
Sume protectedspecies,principallycolonialnestingbirds such as snow
egret,white ibis and yellow-crownednight heron,are knownto inhabitat
least the Picnic Island_estingarea about I mile to the west of Launch
Complex39. Of these three species,the snowy egret is listedby the State
of FloridaGame and FreshwaterFishCommissionas a "speciesof special
concern". The ibisand heron are listedby the FloridaCommitteeon Rare
and EndangeredPlantsand Animalsas "speciesof specialconcern". An 1
ospreynestingsite is also locatPdin the PicnicIslandarea. The osprey
is listedby the Conventionon InternationalTrade in EndangeredSpeciesof
Wild Flora and Faunawhich was implementedby the EndangeredSpeciesAct of i
1973. The nearestbald eagle (Federallyendangered)nestingsite is over 5 (
mil__ from the launchcomplex. BananaCreek,about I mile west of the
la_. complex,is listedas criticalhabitatfor the Federallyendangered
Flomda manatee. (SeeAppendixD-4 for more detailand figuresshowing
locationsinhabitedby these species.) No endangermentof these species
will resultfrom a normallaunch.
I
In additionto the above,the potentialexistsfor other listedspecies ,_
such as the roseatespoonbill(Statespeciesof specialconcern)as well as
some listedplantsto occur in the vicinityof the launchcomplex, i
t
Birdswould be subjectto a startle/flightreactionwith ignitionof
the STS enginesand would probablyavoidthe area and the exhaustcloud,
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thus shouldnot experienceany significantadverseimpact. Protectedplant I
speciesthat may exist in the area could be exposedto the groundcloud and i
its high levelsof acidmist and particulates.Given that the near-field
area aroundthe launchcomplex(outto about 930 feet) has been impactedby
previousand future launchactivities,it is unlikelythat the Galileo
missionwould result in any additionalimpacton listedplants.
SocioeconomicFactors ..
: l
Launchof the Galileomissionaboardthe STS/IUSfrom KSC shouldhave
no significantadverseeffectson the socioeconomicenvironmentsurrounding
KSC. In fact, given the Nation'sinterestin the Space Programand general
publicviewingof plannedlaunchesfrom KSC, the launchof the Galileo
missionshouldhave a shortterm beneficialeffecton the economyof the
nearby area from the influxof touristswho come to view a launch. Such
touristscan ,umberover 100,000peoplewho add temporarilyto trafficand
congestionin the area at launchtimes.
RadiationExposure
Exposuresof occupationalpersonnelto minor externalradiationcould
occur duringthe normalmovementand handlingof the Radioisotope
ThermoelectricGenerators(RTGs)beforelaunchat KSC. Radiationfrom the
RTG and RadioisotopeHeaterUnit (RHU)compunentshas a very short range,
and all suchoperationsoccur under strictconditionsand supervision.
Therefore,there is no healtheffecton occupationalpersonnelor the public
from thes_ activities.
4.1.3 Implicationsof BalanceQf Mission
The balanceof a normalmissionwill have no significantadverse
impactsto the environment. Recoveryof the jettisonedreusablesolid
rocketboosterswould introducesome solubleproductsfrom the small amount
of residualfuels left in the boosters. The impactwould be temporaryand
localized"o an area immediatelyadjacentto the boosters.
With completionof its portionof the Galileomission,the STS would
returnto Earth for a landingat EdwardsAir Force Base in California.
A normalreturnwould resultin a sonicboom during reentryfrom
orbit and during landing. These sonic booms are not expectedto adversely
impactthe environment.
i
The Galileospacecraft,once injectedinto its Venus-Earth-Earth-
Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory,would have no impacton the human
environmentgiven a normaltrajectory. The Jupiterencounterof the Galileo
spacecraft!_ouldalso have no impacton the human environment.
4.1.4 Consequencesof ShuttleLaunchA¢ciderts
4.1.4.1 Overviewof ShuttleAccidents
AccidentScenarioDefinitionApproa(h
A systematicapproachwas utilizedto identifythose credibleacciaent
scenariosthat might occur. The Shuttlesystemwas.dividedInto its major
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Lelements: Launch Support Equipment, Payload, Orbiter, External Tank, Solid
Rocket Boosters, Space Shuttle Main Engine/Liquid Propellant System (SSME), l
and Range Safety Destruct System. Each of these elements was further
divided into its major failure components. Credible failure modes refer to
those which generally cause a loss of the vehicle and may produce an
environment which is a potential threat to the RTG(s). Representative
accident scenarios were defined by grouping similar accident scenarios which
resulted from each of the credible failure modes.
i
A detailed Galileo Earth Avoidance Study (JPL 1988) of possible
spacecraft and mission failures has determined only three failure types
. which represent even a remote threat of Earth impact during Earth-gravity-
assist flybys. They are: retro-propulsion module penetration by a
micrometeroid, a small combination of lesser probability spacecraft
failures, and multiple serial failures in the ground command system. Th_
total probability of spacecraft re-entry and impact is less than 5 x 10- .
Accident Scenarios and Environment Overview
Accident scenarios and environments from NASA 1988 are treated in
Appendix B and summarized in Table 4-I. For purposes of analysis, the mission
was divided into mission phases generally related to vehicle configuration
and/or activity.
The appTicable intact abort modes, primary accident causes, and
applicable environments are indicated in the Table.
The intact abort modes -- Return to Launch Site (RTLS), Transoceanic
Abort Landing (TAL), Abort-Once-Around (AOA), Abort-To-Orbit (ATO), and
Abort-From-Orbit (AFO) -- are explained in detail _n Appendix B.2. The
first four are generally caused by premature shutdown of one or more Space
Shuttle Main Engines SSMEs. AFO would be a result of ATO or a problem with
the IUS or spacecraft which prevented deployment on orbit. If two or more
SSMEs shut down during parts of the ascent to orbit, a contingency abort
mode leading to crew bailout and ocean ditch of the Shuttle would occur.
Finally, there is a very small probability of multiple Shuttle system
failures leading to a crash during the landing phase.
The primary accident causes for each phase are generally the most
active portion of the system during that phase. For the Propulsive Phases,
it is generally that system providing the propulsive thrust_ the structure
supporting the thrust and being acted on by external loads, and/or the
guidance system. Multiple redundancies in the Shuttle guidance tend to
decrease the likelihood of guidance failures for the Shuttle.
Environments created by the accidents generally depend on the source of
the accident and the time that it occurs. Time is important because it may
affect the character of the source or the resulting secondary environments.
For example, the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) fragments will achieve
higher velocity if a case failure occurs near the end of the burn when less
propellant is available to be accelerated along with the case wall. Liquid
propellant explosions are more severe near the ground where the ground
promotes mixing. Early failures can result in ground impacts, while
failures above the upper atmosphere can result in re-entry heating and
subsequent ground or water impact.
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ri Tileexplosion environments can have multiple elements as seen by the
RTGs or RHUs. The sudden release of energy in air will drfve a shock wave i
that can distort or break up the RTG, depending on its strength. The same
explosive energy can push fragments of structure into the RTG. Finally, the
resulting fire associated with accidents on or near the ground can provide
thermal stresses on the RTG elements.
STS/IUS Configuration
' In the wake of the Challenger accident, NASA cancelled development of
the Centaur G-Prime for flight crew safety reasons unrelated to nuclear
launch safety. That rocket was an energetic liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen
upper stage launch vehicle. In its place, NASA will use the solid fueled
IUS in the Shuttle for launching deep space missions such as Galileo. _n
IUS successfully deployed a Trackin_ Data Relay Satellite into Earth orbit
during the successful September 1988 STS Discovery flight.
The STS/IUS configuration poses much less potential environmental risk
than the STS/C;_ntaur,which was addressed in _he draft EIS of September 1985
• (NASA 1985a). The earlier STS/Centaur safety analysis indicated that most
accident environments were dominated by Centaur involvement irrespective of
the initiating cause (e.g., a SRB rupture would generate high-velocity
fragments that would cause a Centaur rupture and explosion). The IUS, a
solid fueled upper stage whose fuel is more inert, is much less likely than
the Centaur to explode and contribute to accident environments.
It is noteworthy that an IUS upper stage w_s on ooard during the
Challenger accident in order to propel a data relay satellite to geosyn-
chronous orbit. De_iled examination _f photographic records, telemetry
data, and ',_agmentsr_covered from the Challenger accident have shown that:
I) no major exoiosion occurred, rather a rupture of t!_eexternal propellant
tank, initiated by the effects of the Shuttle boosts."joint failure, was
followed by release and rapid burn of some of the liquid propellants; 2) the
Shuttle Orbiter subsequently broke up under flight dynamic and aerodynamic
forces; and 3) the IU_ booster came out of the cargo bay relatively intact,
broke up under aerodynamic forces, and tell 50,000 feet to the ocean surface
without violent solid propellant ignition. Uncertain photographic evidence
and an incomplete recovery of the Trackihg and Data Relay Satellite did not
hermit an assessment of its response sequence.
These findings indicate that the IUS did not contribute to the accident
environment. Also, based on the general design of the RTG. it is reasonab!e
to infer that had an RIG been on board the Challenger with an IUS, it would
not have been damaged significantly in the accident, and therefore, it is
expected that there would have been no release of plutonium. _.
Safety and Envir_m?n_al Analysis Processe_ i_
The safety and environme_Italanalysis processes are depicted in Figures
4-I and 4-2. The analyses consist of defining potential accident scena,'ios
•. and resulting environm.nts to which the RTGs/RHUs may be exposed and the '
' probability distributions of these accidents and environments, and then
assessing the consequences of subjecting the RTGs/RHUs to those
environments. The risk is then a combination of the probabilities of the
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accidentsand their consequences.At this time, there is a ShuttleData
Book (NASA 1988c)that containsscenariosand environmentsfor the STS/IUS
configuration,and a SafetyAnalysisReport (DOE1988).
A numberof documentswere developedfor the planned1986 launchof
Galileoand Ulyssesusing the STS/Centaur. Among these documentswere: the
FSAR (DOE 1985a,DOE 1985b,DOE 1985c);a draft SER (INSRP1986) preparedby
the InteragencyNuclearSafetyReviewPanel (INSRP),but never formally
completeddue to cancellationof the STS/Centaur;and the "Assessmentof the _"
: SafetyDocumentationfor the Galileoand UlyssesMission"preparedby the
DOE Officeof NuclearSafety(DOE 1986).
Duringthe intervalbetweenthe completionof the FSAR (late 1985) and
the present,work has been redirectedto developand to improveand refine
the accidentmodelsand techniquesfor analysesapplicableto the STS/IUS
case as follows.
A new FSAR and SER are requiredfor the STS/IUSbecausethe analysesin
the December1985 FSAR are not applicableto the presentcase. The
replacementof the Centaurwith the IUS, and the assessmentof the STS 51L
and 34D-9 accidentdata, led NASA to developa revisedData Book of the
STS/IUSaccidentscenariosand possibleenvironments.Therefore,the
resultsof the earlierSTS/CentaurFSAR are not relevantto the STS/IUS
configuration.
i 4.1.4.2 Non-RadiologicalAccidentConsequences
Unplannedeventsthatmight occur duringSpace Shuttlelaunch
operationsincludeexplosions,fire, the releaseof toxicgases, crash,or!
missionabort. The followingdiscussionsare taken from the ShuttleProgram
EIS (NASA1978).
On-PadFire or Explosion
_ The most seriousconsequenceof an on-pad fire involvingthe entire
-' Space Shuttlevehiclewill be the releaseof toxic combustionproductsfrom i
the SRBs. The large heat releaseassociatedwith the burningof the main
engine'spropellantswill assistthe cloud of combustionproductsin rising
,_ to a high altitude. Althoughthe quantityof SRB combustionproducts
i releasedat groundlevelwill exceedthat releasedat or near groundlevel
in a normallaunch,the additionalheat and cloud rise contributedby the
main engine'spropellantswill compensatein terms of ground-level
concentrationsof hydrogenchlorideand chlorine.
Explosionson the launchpad might achievesignificantblast effects
under specialcircumstances.Such circumstanceswould be those that lead to '_
suddenruptureof the ExternalTank. Immediatelyprior to launch,all i
unprotectedpersonnelare evacuatedfromthe launchpad. Consequently,no
injuriesother than to the flightcrew are anticipate_,even for this worst-
case event.
AscentAccident "
Publicsafetyfromhazardsassociatedwith the launchand early ascent
of the Shuttleis the responsibilityof the Range SafetyOfficer. For early
4-10
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flight,this is exercisedthroughthe capabilityfor ground-commandedflight ! I
termination(vehicledestruct)to preventimpacton land shouldthe vehicle l
departradicallyfrom its nominalflightpath. This protectionof the
publicis provideduntil the vehicleachievesorbit.
ExternalTank Jettison
In a normalmission,the ExternalTank will be jettisonedto impactin
"" a preplannedocean area remotefrom shippingzones. Additionally,the
impactareawill be announcedto air transportersand shippersbeforethe
flight. This practiceis identicalto that used in currentspaceflight
. activityto protectaircraftand ships from re-entryof suborbitalrocket
stages. In case of an early missionabort,the ExternalTank may be
jettisonedinto the ocean near the launchsite. A portionof the possible
impactarea coincideswith the launchcorridorwhere warningsare issuedto
aircraftand shipsbeforethe launchand which is under surveillanceduring
launchoperations. Becausethe ExternalTank will not containtoxic
materials,the hazardto the environmentfrom impacteither in the
preplannedarea or elsewherewill be confinedto physicaleffectsat the
impactpoint.
Jettisonof the Solid RocketBooster
Damageto the environmentwould be limitedto the physicaleffectsof
the impact,as the SRBs are inertafter burnout. In a normalflightor in
an abort,the SRBs will descendto the preplannedocean area recoveryzone _
by parachute. The locationof the recoveryarea is announcedto aircraft
and ships beforelaunch,and the area is maintainedunder surveillance.
If the SRB parachutewere to fail, the SRB would still impactwithin
the preplannedzone. The SRB might be damagedbeyondfurtherusefulnessor
sink and be lost, but no long-termenvironmentalhazardswould result.
OrbiterLanding
Upon successfulcompletionof its missionthe Shuttleorbiterwill
returnto Earth and land at EdwardsAir Force Base (EAFB).
Shouldthe Shuttlecrash,the consequenceswould be similarto those of
any large aircraftcrash,exceptfor the fire which frequentlyfollowsthe i
crash of conventionalaircraft. Becausethe Shuttlewill containonly
minimalquantitiesof propellants,any postcrashfirewill be more confined,
less intense,and brieferthan fires accompanyingthe crash of conventional ._
aircraft.
In conventionalaircraftoperations,which shouldcloselyresemble
Shuttleatmosphericflightoperations,the most probablelocationof a crash
on landingis near or on the runway. The Shuttlewill land at the remote
EAFB.
Effectof UnplannedEventson the Marine Environmentand Water Quality
The potentialimpactof unplannedSpace Shuttleoperationaleventson
the marineenvironmentand water qualityare limitedto the following: in-
flightfailureswhich may resultin vehiclehardwareand propellantlanding
4-11
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in the ocean,and on-padaccidentsand propellantspillswhich may result in
run-offo: propellantsto local drainagesystems.
The potentialsourcesof pollutantsduring unplannedeventsand the
major pollutantsare as follows:
PotentialSource Major Pollutant
Solid propellants Ammoniumperchlorate(NH4CI04) "
Liquidpropellants Mono MethylHydrazine(MMH)
Hydrazine(N2H4)
Nitrogentet_oxide(N204)
Lubricants,hydraulic
fluid Hydrocarbons
In-FliqhtFailures
Possibilitiesof pollutionare primarilyassociatedwith toxic
materialswhich may be releasedto and are solublein the marine
environment. Rocketpropellantsare the dominantsourceof suchmaterials.
A se,.ondaryconsiderationrelatesto oils and other hydrocarbonmaterials
which may be essentiallyimmisciblewith water but, if released_may float
on the surfaceof the water. The quantitiesof hydrocarbonsused are small.
In case of an in-flightfailurein the early stagesof flight,the Shuttle
would be expectedto separateintactand returnto the launch site.
The SRB propellantwould continueto burn with the same productsof
combustionfrom a normallaunch(primarilyhydrogenchloride,aluminumoxide
and carbonmonoxide)being dispersedinto the air or absorbedintothe ocean
water. Any unburnedsolid propellantwould slowlydisperse.
The impactof the Shuttle'sExternalTank would releaseliquidhydrogen
and liquidoxygen,which would burn or evaporaterapidlyinto the
atmosphere. The MMH is containedin the Shuttleonly and would be returned
to the launchsite. However,if the Shuttlewere forcedto abort to a water
landing,thismaterialwould enter into the water. These materialsare
expectedto diluteto nontoxiclevelsof concentrationwithin the area
affectedby the emergencylanding(NASA 1978). Small schoolsof fish could
be affected,but no large-scaleor permanenteffectson marine life are
expected. The compoundsare all chemicallyactiveand are not expectedto
persistin the marineenvironment(NASA 1978).
On-padAccidentsand PropellantSpills
Provisionssuch as dikes and catch basinsare in place for containing
on-padspillsand disposingof the spilledpropellantwithoutcontaminating
the water environment.On-padvehiclefailureswould normallybe expected
to resultin a fire that consumedalmostall of the propellants. Any
unconsumedpropellantwould be treatedin the same way as a spill.
4-12
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4.1.4.3 Radio!ogicalAccidentAnalysis
The use of plutonium-238dioxide(PuO_)fuel, a radioactivematerial, i
in the two GeneralPurposeHeat Sources(GPHSs)- Radioisotope
ThermoelectricGenerators(RTGs)and the 131 lightweight Radioisotope
HeaterUnits (RHUs)on the Galileospacecraftnecessitatesevaluationof the
radiologicalrisks to personsin the launchsite vicinityand the general
populationworldwideresultingfrom postulatedaccidentsoccurringduring
- the mission The inventoryof PuO2 fuel is 132,200Ci in each RTG (264,400Ci total)and 33.6 Ci in each RHU [4334 Ci totalj. The RTGs and RHUs are
describedin Section_.2.2.1.
" Only accidentsthat could result in damage to a RTG and possiblefuel
releaseare addressedin this section. These accidentsare presentedin
Table 4-2 for each of the six missionphases.
The RHUs aboardthe Galileospacecraftcould be subjectedto a wide
varietyof hostileenvironments. A thorough,systematicassessmentof the
responseof RHUs to these environmentsshows that fuel releasewould occur
only in certaininstances.
Some RTG accidentslisted in Table 4-2, could resultin the releaseof
fuel. Each of these (whichcould resultin the releaseof fuel) has a
probabilityof occurrenceand a predictedamountof releasedfuel (calleda
sourceterm). The predictedreleaseis based on the subsequent(i.e.,
conditional)probabilitythat the accidentwill lead to a releaseof
radioactivematerial.
The distributionof accidentsand consequencesare characterizedby
threeparametricrepresentations:the most probablecase, the maximum
crediblecase, and the expectationcase. These cases are definedfor each
missionphase as follows:
e Most ProbableCase: The singlereleasehavingthe highest
probability.
• MaximumCase: The singlefuel releasethat maximizesplutonium
releasecoupledwith meteorologicalassumption§givingthe highest
populationdose. A probabilitylimit of Ixi0""was determinedfor
the maximumcredible_accident.It is recognizedthat limiting
probabilitiesof 10"b and I0"6 have been used in safety
eva_uationsfor nuclearpower plants. NASA has howeveradopted |
10-" as an addedmeasureof conservatismbecausespace launchesto _.
, date presenta smallersamplepopulationthan in the other I,
program. I- • ExpectationCase: The probabilitylistedfor the expectationcase
is the total probabilityof all accidentsfor a plutoniumrelease i
for that phase of the mission. The expectationcase uses all of I
the predictedreleaseand theirprobabilities(withoutregardto
the Ixi0""limitingvalue)for all of the accidentscenariosin a
missionphase to definea probabilityweightedsourceterm - the
statisticallyexpectedrelease.
4-13
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!i TABLE 4-2. ACCIDENTSBY MISSIONPHASE,STS
I Phase Description Accident " '
0 Prelaunchto Launch InadvertentRange SafetySystemdestruct
Fire/explosion
; I Ascent Solid RocketBoosterfailure
Range SafetySystemdestruct
Aft compartmentexplosion
Vehiclebreakup
Crash landing
, Ocean ditching
I
2 SecondStage Orbiterfailure
ExternalTank failure
Space Shuttlemain engine failure
Payloadfailure
Range SafetySystemdestruct
Crash Landing
Ocean ditching
3 On-orbit Orbiterfailureand re-entry
4 PayloadDeploy IUS Solid RocketMotor Case burst
IUS Solid RocketMotor no ignition,
low impulse
IUS Tumblingfrom separationor
recontact
IUS misalignedburns due to guidance
failure
IUS erraticburns
5 Venus-Earth-Earth High-speedre-entryof the spacecraft
GravityAssist
Maneuver
4-14
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The radiologicalconsequencesinclude: i 1i
I. The shortterm radiationdose that resultsfrom the initial
exposureby inhalationof the radioactivecloud. The doses are 70
year dose commitmentsresultingfrom the long-termretentionof
the materialin the body.
2. The long-termradiationdose which would resultfrom continuous
- exposureto materialsdepositedin the environmentover an
extendedperiodfollowingrelease. Long-termdoses includethose
outsideKennedySpace Centerboundariesand worldwidepopulations
due to inhalationof resuspendedmaterialand ingestionof
• contaminatedfood productsand water over a 70-yearperiod. In
addition,long-termdoses to onsiteKennedySpace Centerworkers
due to inhalationof resuspendedmaterialis calculatedfor onsite
workersfor a periodof 35 years based on 40 hours per week.
3. Estimatesof land and surfacewater areas contamination.This
contaminationresultsfromdepositionof PuO_ from a plume or
_loud createdby an explosionor fire, or from surfaceimpactof
unvaporizedreenteringPuO2 particles.
This informationis presentedin the followingterms for each case:
i. Numbersof personsestimatedto be subjectto greaterthan
specifiedlevelsof both short-termdoses and long term doses,
based on the launcharea populationdata and worldwidepopulation
densitydata.
Doses appear in terms of person-rems.A person-remis a unit of
collectivedose from a given sourceof radiationexposure. As
used here, it is the sum of all collf.ctiveindividuallifetime
(70-year)doses in a given populationfrom exposureto a release
of plutonium-238from a missionphase accident. To illustrate-
as the releasedmaterialis carriedaway from the point of
release,it is dispersedand its concentrationdecreases,but the
area and populationexposedgenerallyincreases,as illustratedin
Figures4-3, 4-4, and 4-5. The area under the curvesrepresents
the collectivelifetimeexposureof the populationwhere the
atmospherecarriesthe material. Health impactsare assessed
probabilisticallybased on populationdose. i
2. Total short-termand long-termpopulationdoses. In calculating .
#
populationdoses,the conceptof de minimishas been used,meaning
a dose level below concernand fromwhich no healtheffectsare
expected. For the purposeof this document,the de minimisdose
was taken to be I mrem/yearand 50 mrem total dose commitment.
: Total populationdoses are reportedboth with and withoutd__e
minimis.
c_
3. The maximumshort-termand long-termdoses to individuals.
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4. Estimatesof land and surfacewater areas contaminatedabove a
referencelevel. A "screeninglevel"of 0.2 uCi/m2has been
recommendedby the U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency (EPA)for
unspecifiedtransuranicelements,includingplutonium,and has
been used as the referencelevel.
Tables4-3 and 4-4 presentthe resultsof the accidentmodelingfor the
most probableaccidentin each missionPhase and the most severe"credible"
accidentfor each missionPhase. For these presentations,accidentswith
probabilitiesless than about I in 10 millionwere consideredbeyondthe
rangenormallyconsideredcredibleand not listed. In the detailedaccident
analysespresentedin AppendixB and the FSAR, all accidentsequencesand
scenarioswith probabilitiesas low as I in 10 ndllion (I x I0"_)were
considered. It is recognizedthat limitingprobabilitiesof I0-° and I0-_
have been used in s@fetyevaluationsfor nuclearpower plants. NASA has
howeveradoptedI0-"as an added measureof conservatismbecausespace
launchesto date presenta smallersamplepopulationthan in the other
program.
The releasesfor both the most probableand maximumcases illustrate
that the RTGs and RHUs survivemissionaccidentsremarkablywell and contain
essentiallyall of the radioactivematerialsas designed. The releasesare
only a very small fractionof the availableplutonium. The only accidents
identifiedin which more than 0.01 percentof the plutoniumcould be
releasedwere the near launchpad accidents,where both large quantitiesof
fuel and propellantwere availablein conjunctionwith hard surfacesfor the
GISs to impact,and the extremelylow probabilityinadvertentre-entryin
the VEEGAmaneuver,in which essentiallyall of the plutoniumin a graphite
impactshell is assumedto be releasedif the impactshell hits hard rock at
certainangles. The re-entrycharacteristicsof this accidentare such that
flightpaths of the GISs are essentiallyindependent,implyingthat the
probabilityof more than a few hittingrock and releasingplutoniumis
extraordinarilylow.
A summaryof the resultsof the radiologicalconsequenceanalysisare
presentedin Tables4-5 and 4-6. More detailedresultsare presentedin
SectionB.4 of AppendixB. Consequencesare expressedin termsof
collectivedose to the affectedpopulationand amountof la_d contaminated
above the screeninglevel proposedby the EPA. The populationdose
estimatesare 70-yeardoses.
The most probable,maximum,and expectationcases presenta
representativerange of accidentsand consequences. The most probablecase
has the highestprobabilitybut the consequencescould vary from those ,
indicatedin Table 4-5 uecauseit is representativeof only one set of the
variables--quantityof release,locationof release,particlesize
distribution,probabilityof occurrence,and meteorologicalconditions• A
changeof any one of these variables,exceptthe probabilityof occurrence,
could resultin a differentset of consequences. The maximum,presenting
the highestreleases,is utilizedto give an upper limit and is developed
primarilyfor emergencyplanningassistance. The expectationcase
representsa probabilisticcombinationof all accidentscenariosresulting
in a releasein a phase under averagemeteorologicalconditions. These two
cases togetherfor each Phase presenta range of the type and magnitudeof
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TABLE 4-5. SUMMARYOF RADIOLOGICALCONSEQUENCESMOST PROBABLECASES, STS
PopulationOosQ, Area (SquareKilometers)with
Person-rm DeposltloqAbove
0.2 uCi/m"
Mission Release Above Health Dry Inland
. Phase Probability Total De Minimis Effects Land Swamp Water Ocean
0 5 x 10.7 10.1 0 0 12.5 1.63 4.57 0
1 3 x 10.4 176 .003 0 43.3 15.9 25.7 0
2 2 x 10"6 .23 .068 0 0 0 0 0
3 6 x 10.6 5.99 2.45 0 .058 0 .001 0
4 4 x 10.4 5.99 2.45 0 .058 0 .OUI 0
5 I x 10.7 1280 833 .Z 13.2 0 .296 0
TABLE 4-6. SUMMARYOF RADIOLOGICALCONSEQUENCES,MAXIMUMCASES,STS
i
L
Population0ose, Area (SquareKilometers)with
Person-ram OeposltiolAbove
0.2 uCi/m_
Mission Release Above Health Dly Inlana
Phase Probability Total Oe Mintmis Effects Land Swamp Water Ocean
0 5 x 10.7 179 0 0 4.13 .128 2.64 .044
1 I x 10.4 4,910 3,710 0.7 2.03 .688 2.53 .18
2 2 x 10.6 7.9 1.8 0 0 0 0 0
3 ] x 10.7 217 58.8 0 .12 0 .003 0
4 7 x 10.6 217 58.8 0 .12 0 .003 0
5 I x 10.7 54,000 52,900 9.8 8.9! 0 .20 0 :.
,4
m
: The tables of radiologtcal consequences should be read as follc.ws: first columm
lists mission phase, see page 4-14 for descriptions; second column lists the total
probabllityfor the release in that phase; third colunm lists the collectlve llfetlme
(i.e., 70-year) exposure of the people resident where the atmosphere carries the
material; fourth column lists the lifetime exposure de mtnimis; fifth column gives
the statistical incremental health effect of that exposure; last four colun_s llst
areas over which the matertal deposits. Thus, tn Phase 5 for the maximum case: the
probabllity of the release is one i, ten million; if a releaseoccurs, then there
could be a maximum 70-year exposure of 54,OO0 person-ramto a population of 83,000
people (52,900 above de minima;); and there would be an increment of 9.8 cancer t
fatalities compared to a normally expected amount of about 16,000 in a population of 1|i
83,000 people.
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Foccurrences that could occur for each mission Phase. The impacts of the
various uncertainties in the accident modeling and analysis are presented in
Section 4.1.4.7.
The consequences presented in Tables 4-5 and 4-6 indicate that the
collective population doses to those affected by the acciaents is _uite
small, ranging from 0 (for wind blowing offshore) to 176 (for nominal
meteorological conditions) perso,l-remC_r the Most Probable Case or to 4,900
person-rem for the Maximum Case in Phase I. In mission Phase 5, the maximum -
case has a dose rate of 54,000 person-rem. The analysis for mission Phase 5
uses an exposed population of 83,000 - assuming a uniform areal population
distribution. Over a 70-year period, the Maximum Case dose in mission Phase .
5 equates to less than 20 percent of the average background level of 150
mrcm/yr. So the exposures are seen to be small even in the Maximum Credible
Case. Note that the maximum case uses meteorological conditions which would
maximize the dose to persons. The consequence calculations include the
onsite, launch day population of workers and visitors to KSC.
Tables 4-5 and 4-6_also include estimates of the area of material
deposition at 0.2 uCi/mz or greater. At that level, EPA suggests one
consider monitoring; below that level, monitoring was not recommended. The
screening level corresponds to a dose rate of less than I mrem/yr, or !
percent of the average background. This represents a sort of de minimis
level. NASA's actual monitoring plans will be based on real time estimates
of the amount and location of the release and updated atmospheric analyses
of the advection of the released material. As discussed in Appendix B,
clean up will be based upon a number of factors including the amount,
particle sizes, and concentration of the deposition and the normal use of
the area in question.
4.1.4.4 Impacts of Radiological Accidents to Individuals
Individual members of the KSC workforce, launch-day visitors, and
members of the general population of Florida and of the world could, under
some accident conditions, receive small radiological impacts. The degree of
the impact would be highly dependent on the nature and point in the flight
path of the accident, the characteristics of the material released, and the
specific meteorological conditions prevailing. The individual doses
presented throughout this document are expressed in 70-year (i.e., lifetime)
dose and are the sum of two components: the initial dose due to inhalation
of very small (generally less than 10 microns) particles during initial
cloud passage, and the long-term dose resulting from continuous exposure to
material deposited in the environment over an extended period following the
release.
i
Figures 4-3 through 4-5 present plots of the individual doze rate
(abscissa) versus the population exposed (ordinate). In general, th,:models
ca]culate exposure versus area and then estimate the population within the ..
area. As the distance From the point of maximum exposure increases the dose
decreases. The population exposure is the cumulative population exposed to
a dose exceeding the minimum within that area. The area under the curve
with an absicca of dosage and an ordinate of populatio_ exposed represents
the "population doze" which is used to assess increme_tal health impact.
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rThe incrementalhealthimpactis presentedin terms of incrementalcancer
fatalitieson the basis of 1.85 x 10-_ cancer fatalityper person-remabove
the de minimislevel.
The figuresindicatethatdose le,elsfrom possiblelaunchaccidents
will be very low. For instance,in the _',ostprobablereleasecase,
which uses an averagemeteorology,the • ssion Phases0 and I no individual
would receivemore than the de minimisdose. In Phase 2 through5, the
numberof personsreceivinggreaterthan de minimisdoses would be I, 8, ""
and 1,000,respectively.Note that missionPhases3 and 4 are groupedas
one value in the figures.
The inadvertentre-entryaccidentduring the VEEGA operation,although
extremelyunlikely,has the potentialfor higher releasesand hence higher
theoreticalconsequencesthan any of the accidentsidentifiedfor Phases0
to 4. Consequenceswere calculatedassumingworldwideaveragepopulation
densityon land and averagemeteorologicalconditionsfor the most probable
case, and the maximumlatitudeband populationdensity(90.1 persons/kmc)
and meteorologicalconditionsthat maximizedradiologicalconsequencesfor
: the maximumcase. Under the most probableassumptions,less than 11,000i
i personswould receivemore than a de minimislifetimedose, with as many as
100 receivingI rem and the maximumreceivingless than 100 rem lifetime
dose. Under the maximumcase conditions,as many as 90,000could receive
more than a de minimisdose,more than 25 could receiveup to 100 rem
lifetimedose, and a few could receiveup to 580 rem. The few receivingthe
higherdoses would have to be very close to the impactarea and immediately °
downwind. About 56 percentof that dose would be receivedfrom the initial
cloud passageafter impactand the remainingfrom long-termexposureto
contaminatedlands and foodstuffsassumingno cleanupor mitigationmeasures
take place. In practice,mitigationmeasuressuch as discussedin the next
sectionwould likelyreducethe long-termimpactsto those residingin the
' contaminatedareas. None of the calculatedindividuallifetimedoses are
high enoughthat any immediatehealthproblemsdue to radiationexposure
i would be expectedalthoughin the maximumcase, some excess long-term
cancerscould be expected.
The radiologicalconsequencesummaryfor the expectationcase presented
in Table 4-7 indicatesthatwhen probabilityis factoredinto the
calculationof the consequencesand expectednumberof peopleexposed,the
resultsare very similarto the most probablecase. (It shouldbe noted
that the populationdose estimatesassumea 70-yearexposureperiod.) This
is because,for Phases2 to 5, the higherconsequencesare the resultof _
more GISs both hittingrock and hittingat such an angle that plutoniumis
released. While the consequencesmay doublewith each additionalhit, the , "
re-entrycharacteristicsand flightpaths of the GISs are essentially
independent,implyingthe probabilitythat more than a few hittingrock and
releasingplutoniumis extraordinarilylow. Thereforethe probability
weightedconsequences(andrisk) for accidentsin Phases2 through5 are '.
, dominatedby the most probableaccidents. For Phase 1, the expectationcase
! is higherthan the most probablecase becauseseveralPhase I accidentswere ;.
! identifiedthat could lead to about the same amountof materialbeing
1 released.
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rTable 4-8 presentsa summaryof the risk from each phase of the I
mission. The excesshealtheffects(or excesscancerfatalities)assuming
the accidentsfor each Phase occur are quite small and indistinguishable
from healtheffectsdue to naturalbackgroundradiation. In the Phase 5 or
VEEGA accident,less than 0.2 healtheffects(incrementalfatalities)would
be expectedamong the 1,550peoplethat statisticallymight be expectedto
receivemore than a de minimislifetimedose. Among all the peopleexposed "_
to any radiation,includingbelow de minimislevels,the total expected
populationdose (fromTable 4-7) is 1,430 person-rem,equivalentto about " '
0.26 healtheffects(incrementalfatalities)among the exposedpopulation.
When the probabilityof the accidentsis factoredintothe analysis,the
risk to the exposedindividualscan be calculated. The averageindividual
risk in the Table equalsthe probabilitytimes healtheffects,dividedby the
populationaffected. This risk is quite low. The risk to membersof the
genera]populationis actuallyquite a bit lower than the risk presentedin i
the Table becausedifferentsets of peoplecould be affected,dependingon i
impactareas and meteorologicalconditions. These risks can be comparedto
the approximateindividualrisksof early fatalitiesby other causes faced by !_
the publicpresentedin Table 4-9. The populationfacingthe highestrisk is i
likely the KSC workforce. Table 4-8 impliesthat the most severerisk is i
due to Phase I accidents,with a maximumindividualrisk of early fatalityof
j about 2 in i billion,much lessthan the ordinaryrisks faced. J_,
4.1.4.5Impactsand Mitigationof Land Deposition ,(
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof an accidentin
which plutoniumdioxide(PuO))is exposedto the environment. The impact i
analysi_is dividedinto two-majorcategories:I) the potentialimpactsof _
the most probableand maximumcase accidentsduring Phases0 and I; and 2) _i'
the potentialimpactsof the most probableand maximumcase accidentsduring !!
Phases2, 3, 4, and 5. The first categoryare those accidentswhich could _,
affectKSC and vicinityand can be representedby a specificmathematical
model. The secondcategoryof accidentsare those which could affect i
unspecifiedareas of the world and cannotbe preciselymodeled, i,
Resultsare presentedfor immediateimpactsand long-termimpacts.
Immediateimpactsare those that result fromthe depositionof PuO2 on _
variousenvironmentalmedia. Long term impactsare those that resultfrom _,
leavingPuO_ in the environment.They includeimpactsto naturalenviron-
ments, agriculturalresources,ma_-usedresources,and water bodies,along
with possiblemitigationmeasuresand the impactsof mitigation. The
economiccost estimatesassociatedwith the impactanalysesare also
presented. ,
Assessmentof Impactsto KennedvSpace Center and Vicinity
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof PhaseO,
Prelaunch/Launchand Phase I, First StageAscentmost probableand maximum I
case accidents. The areas affectedby the accidentsare primarilyon _
KennedySpace Centerproperty. The land areas of depositionfrom the most i
probable,maximum,and expectationaccidentsin Phases0 and I are presented
in Table B-20 of AppendixB. Mnst of the radioactivematerial (about94.5
percent)will remainwithin 10 km of the accidentlocationand hence,
primarilyimpactKSC property.
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TABLE 4-9. INDIVIDUALRISK OF FATALITYBY VARIOUSCAUSESa
Numberof Approximate
AccidentType Accidents IndividualRiskc
for 1983
Motor Vehicle 44,452 2 x 10.4
Falls 12,024 5 x 10.5 .
Drowning 5,254 2 x 10-5
Fires and Flames 5,028 2 x 10.5
Poison 4,633 2 x 10.5
Water Transport 1,316 5 x 10.6
Air Travel 1,312 5 x 10.6
Manufacturing 1,200 5 x 10-6
t
Railway 1,073 4 x 10.6 ,
Electrocution 872 4 x 10.6
Lightning 160 7 x 10-7
Tornadoes 114b 5 x 10.7
Hurricanes 46b 2 x 10.7
All Other Accidents 9,311 4 x 10.5
All Accidents 77,484 3 x 10.4 I
Diseases 1,631,741 7 x 10.3 ;
Source: USBC 1986.
Notes:
a. Based on 1983U.S. population
b. 1946 to 1984 average
c. Fata]ities/TotalPopulation
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TSurface contamination resul_ing from the Phase 0 most probable case
produces a total area of 18.7 km: which will receive deposition above 0.2
uCi/m:. T_e phase I most probable accident produces a total deposition area
of 84.9 km: above the 0.2 uCi/m: screening level. The breakdown of these
totals by the six land cover types (natural vegetation, urban, agricultural,
wetlands, inland water, and ocean) is shown in Table B-Ig. Ocean impacts do
not occur for either the Phase 0 or Phase I most probable accident scenarios.
-. The _hase 0 maximum case produces a total surface area deposition above
0.2 uCi_m_ of 6.94 km_. The Phase I maximum case produces an area of
5.43 km_. In Phase O, dry land receives the greatest amount of
contamination, while in Phase I, inland water receives the greatest
" contamination. Again, as noted earlier the areal extent of land
contamination for the maximum case is smaller because the model utilizes
conditions which maximize population dose. Hence, the smaller contaminated
area is in the maximum case, but with higher dose.
The_Phase 0 and I expectation cases produce total areas of 16.66 and
70.11 km:,2respectively, above the deposition screening level of
0.2 uCi/m . In both cases, natural vegetation is the land cover receiving
the greatest contamination.
In all cases, 94.5 percent of released radioactive material is
contained in particles greater than 44 um and will be deposited within 10 km
of the accident/impact site. Atmospheric dispersion may scatter smaller
particles beyond 10 km. Particles 10 um and smaller could travel 50 km or
more; concentrations would be expected to be extremely low, as shown by the
small number of health effects.
Immediate Consequences
The deposition of plutonium dioxide from the representative accidents
does not physically alter land covers unless a particle produces enough heat
to start a fire. However, the PuO2 can affect the human use of these land
covers and could result in a change in land cover.
Contaminated areas were analyzed to determine current land cover use
and how PuO_ would react to various environmental conditions. This analysis
was used to-draw the following conclusions on immediate consequences.
There is no initial impact on soil chemistry. Most Pu02 deposited on
water bodies is not expected to react chemically with the waZer column;
therefore, no immediate consequences are expected in these waters. No
significant consequences to flora and fauna are expected from surface
' deposition and skin contact with Pu02 (Section B.6.1, Appendix B).
Lonq Term Consequences
Plutonium dioxide deposited on the soil will interact with inorganic
and organic ligands forming soluble or insoluble products. It is expected
that over 95 percent of the PuO2 will remain in the top 5 cm (2 in) of
surface soil for at least 10 to-20 years. Mitigation required for other
reasons may result in significant soil impacts (Section B.6.1, Appendix B).
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Naturalareas receivingdepositionwithin32 km (2Q mi) of_Launch !
Complex39 could range from 1.5 km_ (0.58mi_) to 32 _m_ (12 mi_. Wetland I
areas receivingdepositionrange from .13 km= (.05mi_) to 16 km= (6.2mill.
No significantconsequencesto floraare expected. Minor consequencesare
possiblethroughingestionby terrestrialand aquaticfauna and inhalation
by terrestrialCauna (SectionB.6.1,AppendixB).
Only small amountsof PuO2 will be availablein the water columns The
amountsavailableare not conslderedto have significantimpactsto the "
aquaticfauna that may ingestdissolvedor suspendedPuO2. Bioaccumulation
of PuO2 by benthicorganismsand aquaticvegetationmay occur. There is a
potentialfor the PuO_ to travelup the food chain,however,bioaccumulation
of plutoniumdecrease_with highertrophiclevels(SectionB.6.2.3,
AppendixB).
Mitigationof the impactsto flora and fauna in naturalareas could be
accomplishedthrougha combinationof monitoringand remedialactionbased
on monitoring. The amountof PuO2 resuspendedin the air in naturalareas
determinesif PuO2 concentrationswould pose inhalationhealthhazardsto
man. If levelsare determinedto pose inhalationhealthhazards,then
accessto the area could be restricteduntil monitoringindicatesthat PuO2
concentrationswill no longerpose a potentialinhalationhealthhazard.
Agriculturalareaswithin32 km (20 mi) of LaunchComplex39 include
citrusgroves and pastures. Agricultural_reas contaminatedby _ccidents_ ,
duringdifferentphasesrange from 0.43 kmc (0.17mi_) to g.I km_ (3.5mi_).
No pastureareas will be contaminated(SectionB.6.2.3,AppendixB).
If citrusexposedto depositionis consumed,it poses a potential
healtheffect to man. Contaminatedcitrusfruit surfacesare not readily
washablewith water. In contrastwith the fruit,plutoniumwas readily
washedaway from leaf surfaces(SectionB.6.2.3,AppendixB).
Mitigationof contaminatedcitrusfruit could includecollectionand
disposalof the contaminatedfruit accordingto Federaland State Regulao
tions. To preventfuturecontaminationof citruscrops and protectthe
safetyof workers,the trees could be washeddown to removePuO2 from the
leavesand soil added aroundthe trees. Futurecitruscrops could be
monitoredfor PuO2 contaminationbefore soldon the market (SectionB.6.2.3,
AppendixB).
Surfacecontaminationlevelsmay impactthe rechargeareas of the
surficialaquifer. The surficialaquiferservesas the potablewater source
for the citiesof Titusville,Mims, and Palm Bay. In additionmany wells on ,
privateland use the surficialaquiferas a sourceof water. Pu02 could
contaminatethis aquifer,but analysisof groundwaterflow and sediment
leachingindicateit is unlikely,especiallyfor any contaminationto reach °
the wellheadsof municipalwater supplies. It is highlyunlikelythat any
contaminationon the KennedySpace Centerwill reach offsitewells. Trans-
port throughthe underlyingaquatardto the lower Floridanaquiferis
consideredvery unlikely(SectionB.6.2.3,AppendixB).
Mitigationcould includemonitoringof contaminationprofilesof the
soil in _quiferrechargeareas to determineif the plutoniumdioxideis
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migratoryto the water table. If the monitoringshows a high probability
of migration,areasmay be scrapedto below the contaminationdepth and the
spoildisposedof properly. Privatewells in the area of deposition
could be monitoredand alternativewater suppliescould be developedif
water suppliesare impacted.
The areasof land cover used by man (e.g.,buildings,roads,ornamental
vegetation,and grass areas)that are contaminatedcould be monitoredto
determinethe decontaminationor mitigationactionnecessary. Mitigation
actionscould preventthe immediatereturnof the populationto their homes
and workplaces. Cleanupactionscould last from severaldays _o several
months. Historicaland archaeologicalresources,both known and unknown,
" could receivedeposition. KennedySpace Centerfacilitiesthat have his-
toricalsignificance,and are not damagedin the blast,could also receive
deposition. Presentlyunknownarchaeologicalsitescould be affectedby the
cleanupactionsundertakenin those areas. Plutoniumdioxidealso has a
long-termaffecton futureinvestigationat any archaeologicalsite (Section
B.6.2.3,AppendixB).
Plutoniumdioxideis generallyconsideredhighly insoluble,therefore
it is not expectedto reactchemicallywith the water column. As a result,
the 15 pC/l water qualitystandard(applicableto all Floridawaters,NASA
. 1986) is not expectedto be exceededfor the waters surroundingMerritt
Island. Some of the waters surroundingMerrittIslandare considered
OutstandingFloridaWaters (OFW). Waterswith this classificationare
subjectto water qualitystandardsbased upon eitherexistingwater quality
or the designatedsurfacewater standard,whicheveris higher. This level of
protectionis intendedto prohibitland and/orwater use activitieswhich
would degradethe water qualityof the resourceso designated.
Mitigationof PuO2 impactscould includemonitoringsmall and shallow
water bodiesclose to human activity,and drainingand removingsedimentif
a threatto man is identified. Largerbodiesof pondedwater could be moni-
tored and skimmedto removesurficialfilm, if necessary. Additionalmoni-
toringto determinethe need for water and/orsedimentremovalcould be
required. Recreationalwater activitiescould be restrictedin largerwater
bodiesuntil monitoringresultsindicateit is safe for them to be resumed.
The boundingeconomiccost of each representativecase accidentfor
Phases0 and I are presented. In all cases the minimumcost would be the
monitoringprogram. This programis estimatedto cost $i millionin the
firstyear, $500,000in the secondyear, $250,000in the thirdyear and
$100,000per year after the third (AppendixB, Table B-18). These numbers
may be somewhatless for Phase 0 and somewhatmore for Phase I since the
areas contaminatedin the Phase i accidentsare greater(SectionB.6.2.3,
AppendixB).
. Finally,the low probabilityof theseconsequencesmust also be
considered. For instance,consideringthe risk to be the productof the
probabilityof contaminationand the cost of cleanup,then the risk of the
largestcleanu_cost (i.e.,the most pro_ablecase For Phase I) one would
have $762 x 10v (cleanupcost) x 3 x 10"_ (releaseprobability)or a risk of
$228,000. This is the order of magnitudeof expenditurethat one would
incurto obviatethe risk. That amountis small comparedto the $800
millioninvestmentin the Galileomissionto date.
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Assessmentof GIQbal Impact@
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phases2, 3, 4
and 5. Since the exact locationof areas of depositioncannotbe
determined,locationspecificimpactsare not described. A general
discussionof the impactsand possiblemitigationmeasuresare presented.
Global impactsvary from one module impactingland for the most
probableaccidentsin Phases2, 3, and 4, and one, two, and threemodules "
impactingland in the maximumcase for Phases2, 3 and 4 respectively. For
Phase 5, three GraphiteImpactShellscould impactfor the most probable
maximumcases (SectionB.4.2,AppendixB).
A reentryaccidentduring Phases3 and 5 would involvespacecraft
failureand breakup. Atmosphericreentryspeed and spacecraftbreakuprate
will likelyresult in PuO2 modulesor GraphiteImpactShellsbeing released
at differentlocationsduring reentry. These independentreleasepoints
will result in impactareas thatmay be separatedby many thousandsof
kilometers. Except for Phase 5, the areas involvedare less than _ km2
(0.36_i_). For Phase 5, each impactarea would average4 to 5 kmL (1.4to
1.8 mi_). Mitigationwould includerecoveryand cleanupof areas
contaminatedat 25 mrem/yror greater.
Depositionfrom the Phase2 cases does not exceedthe screeninglevel
so no cleanupcosts have beenestimated. The estimatedeconomiccosts of
Phases3 and 4 are presentedin Table B-23, AppendixB. The only deposition
that exceedsthe _creeninglevelsoccurson dry land. The areas of impa_t
vary from0.06 km_ for the most probableand expectationcases to 0.1 km_
for the maximumcase. Since none of the depositionin these areas equal or
exceedthe cleanuplevel (25mrem/yror greater),no cleanupcosts are
associatedwith these phases.
The estimatedeconomiccosts of Phase 5 are presentedin Table B-22,
AppendixB. The depositionthat exceedsthe screeninglevel_occurson dry
land and inlandwater. _he areas of impactvary from 9.1 km_ for the
maximumcase to 15.03 km_ for the expectationcase. Areas which could equal
or exceedthe cleanuplevel (25 m_em/yearor greater)range from 0.2 km_ for
the most probablecase, to 1.4 km_ for the maximumcase. Costs for the
cleanupnf these areas for the expectationcase vary from $0.5 millionto
$240.5million.
4.1.4.6 AdditionalMitigationMeasuresfor Accidents
EmerqencyResponsePlanninq
For missionsinvolvingspacenuclearpower,comprehensiveradiological
contingencyplans must be developedto addressall launch/landingphase
accidentsinvolvingthe RTGs and RHUs. These plans are developedthrough
the combinedeffortsof variousgovernmentagencies,includingNASA, DOE,
the Departmentof Defense(DOD),the EPA, and the State of Florida,and
are formulatedto conformto the FederalRadiologicalEmergencyResponse
Plan (FRERP)(NASA 1985b). These planswill be updatedfor the Galileo
missionsbased on the resultsof the new FSAR and SER. Developmentand
implementationof these plans will ensurethe availabilityof appropriate
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responsepersonnel,equipment,facilities,and proceduresin the event of a I i
launchaccident.
The primaryobjectivesduringthe early phasesof an accidentare to
determinewhethera releaseof radioactivematerialshas occurred,to assess
and cha _ _erizethe extentof the release,to predictthe propagationof
the re,¢asedmaterial,and to formulate/recommendmitigatingactionsto
safeguardhumansand the environmentfrom the consequencesof the release.
- Anotherobjectiveis to locateand recoverthe RTGs. These objectiveswill
be achievedthroughthe evaluationand analysisof real-timedata provided
by mobile fieldmonitoringteams and ground air-samplingstations,airborne
monitoringand surveillanceaircraft,groundand airbornemeteorological
" stations,and computerizeddispersionmodeling.
Follow-onobjectiveswould be to isolatecontaminatedareas,recover
the fuel materials,and decontaminateand/orrecoveraffectedareas,
facilities,equipment,and properties.
Other Methodsof Limitinqthe PotentialCQnsequence_of Accident_
In additionto post-launchactivities,there are other options
availableto NASA to mitigatethe consequencesof prelaunchand launch-
ascent (Phase0 and I, respectively)accidents. For instance,further
restrictionson spectatorlocationand meteorologicallaunchcriteriacould
furtherreducethe alreadylow consequences. NASA has studiedboth types of e
restrictionand has foundthem to be unnecessary. Most spectatorlocations
are off of KSC propertyand are in publicareas,makingfurtheraccess
restrictionsdifficultwithoutlegislation.Meteorologicalconditionsare
highlyvariable,and wind conditionsclose to the surfaceare generally
differentfrom those aloft,so furthermeteorological aunchconstraints
were deemed impractical.
In general,in view of the low probabilityof adverseconsequencel,
furtherlaunchconstraintshave not been imposed.
4.1.4.7 Limitationsand Uncertaintiesof the AccidentAnalyses
The safetyanalysesperformedin supportof the launchof the Galileo
spacecraftwith RTGs and RHUs on board are unquestionablysome of the most
detailedand elaborateever performedin supportof a spacecraftlaunch.
Significanteffortwent into the analysesto ensurethat they were both
reasonableand conservative. Even so, there are stilluncertaintiesin the
estimationof the probabilitiesof releases,the amountof material
released,and the consequencesto man and the environmentfrom those
' releases. As a part of the safetyanalysisprocess,an attemptwas made to
identifythe degreeof confidencewith each of the major assumptions,the
limitationsof the analyses,and the impactsof these uncertaintiesand
: limitationson the overallprobabilitiesand consequenceestimates. This
ur,certaintyanalysisis includedas AppendixH of Vol. Ill of the FSAR (DOE i
1988b)and is summarizedin SectionB.4.2 of AppendixB.
The factorsaffectingestimatesof radiologicaIconsequencesand
missionrisks that were evaluatedinclude:
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e Accidentscenario
- Accidentenvironment
Accidentprobability
o Releasecharacterization
Conditionalsourceterm probability
Sourceterm
Medificationsto the sourceterm and particlesize
distributionbecauseof mechanical,chemicaland physical
interactionprior to deposition
- Particlesizedistribution
Initialclouddimensions
•. Verticalsourceterm distribution
Releaselocation
• Meteorologicalconditions
- Atmosphericstability
Wind speedand direction
- Mixing height
- Sea-breezerecirculation
- Fumigation
- Space and time variation
• Exposurepathwayparameters
Populationdistribution
Resuspensionfactor
Depositionveloclty
Vegetableingestion
Protectiveaction
• Radiationdose and healtheffects
Internaldose factors
Healtheffectsestimator.
Estimateswere made of the uncertaintyof each of these factorsand
then combinedto determinethe overalluncertaintyassociatedwith the
varioustypes of radiologicalconsequencesand missionphase risks. Table
4-10 presentsthe overallmean uncertaintyfactorsand the associatedranges
for both the consequencesand missionrisks. The uncertaintyanalys_s
implies,for example,that the best estimatefor the mean total population
dose for the _xpectationcase is actuallyabout 23 percentof the value
quotedearlierin Table 4-7. Referringto Table 4-7, the populationdose
for MissionPhase I was 203 person-rem. The best estimatesmean total
populationdose utilizingthe uncertaintyfactorfromTable 4-10 then
becomes0.23 x 203 - 46.7 person-rem,or 23 percentof 203 person-rem. The
5 percentto 95 percentuncertaintyrange for thatmean total population
dose best estimatevaries from0.67 percentto 790 percent(i.e.,the
0.0067-7.90rangenoted in Table 4-10),of the value quotedearlier(203
person-rem). For Phase I missionrisk, the uncertaintyrange is lar_erwith
the mean total populationdo_e from Table 4-10 being 39 percentof the
estimationcase estimate,and the range varyingfrom 4.5 percentto 430
percentof that estimate. In termsof missionrisk for Phase0 and Phases2
through5, the mean totalpopulationdose is 23 percentof the estimation
case estimate,and the range varyingfrom 2.9 percentto 180 percentof that
estimate.
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TABLE 4-10. OVERALLUNCERTAINTYANALYSISRESULTS !
l
OverallUncertaintyFactor
ResultType Mean Rangeb
e Radiologicalconsequencesa _'
- Short-termpopulationdose 0,25 0.013-4.6
- Long-termpopulationdose 0.22 0.0042-1,4
- Total populationdose 0,23 0.0067-7.9
- Healtheffects 0,23 0.0063-8.5
- Surfacecontaminationarea 0.75 0.051-5.2
• Missionphase riskb
Phase I
_ - Short-termpopulationdose 0.42 0.061-2.9
r - Long-termpopulationdose 0.37 0.024-5.7 '
Total populationdose 0.39 0.035-4.3
Healtheffects 0.39 0.032-4.8 _
Surfacecontaminationarea 1.3 0.22-7.8
Phase_____sO_Q=__2z5.2-5
Short-termpopulationdose 0,25 0.55-1.1
Long-termpopulationdose 0.22 0.019-2.5
Total population_ose 0.23 0,029-1.8
Healtheffects 0.23 0.026-2.0
Surfacecontaminationarea 1,75 0.20-2.9
a. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor radiologicalconsequencesmultiplies
the expectationcase results(Table4-7) to yield a best estimatemean
of the expectationcase results. The best estimatemean resultfor the
expectationcase shouldbe multipliedby the uncertaintyfactorrapge
to yield a bestestimateof the 5- and 95-percentilevaluesof the
rangeof radiologicalconsequences.
b. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor missionphase risk multipliesthe
missionphase risk results(Table4-8) to yield a best estimatemean of
missionphase risk (definedas total probabilitytimes expectationcase
: results). The best estimater_sultfor missionphase risk shouldthen
be multipliedby the uncertaintyfactorrange to yield a best estimate
of the 5- and 95-percentilevaluesfor the missionphase risks.
4-35
1990012832-125
Dr_
These uncertaintyestimatesimplythat the overallmissionrisk is still
low even when the 95 percentileuncertaintyestimatesare included.
Table 4-10 impliesthat at the 95 percentconfidencelevel,the overall
consequenceand risk estimatespresentedin these sectionsare unlikelyto
be low by much more than a factorof 10.
In additionto the uncertaintyanalysisconductedin the FSAR, there
are ongoinganalysescurrentlybeing conductedby the NASA/DOEproject,
NASA/DOEinternalreviewgroups,and INSRPwhich could broaden(or narrow)
the uncertaintyrange of accidentconsequences. The currentlyknown areas
of furtheranalysesinclude: (I) probabilityof variousaccidentscenarios,
(2) SRB fragmentvelocities,(3) fragment/structuralinteractions,(4) RTG
impactresponsemodels,(5) RTG responseto VEEGA re-entry,and (6)
radiologicaltransportmodels. It is impossibleto quantifythe resultsof
these furtherassessments,a priori,but it is likelythat there will be
somechangeto the uncertaintyresultsin the Final EIS.
4.2 ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCESOF DELAYINGCOMPLETIONAND OPERATIONOF THE
GALILEOMISSIONUNTIL 1991
4.2.1 Delay to 1991 and Use of STS/IUSas LaunchVehicle I
The types of consequencesassociatedwith a normal launchof the
_i GalileoMissionon the STS/IUSin 1991 are not expectedto differfrom those
_ describedfor the proposedaction (4thQuarter1989 launchaboardthe _
STS/IUS)in Section4.1.2. Given that a 1991 launchwould most likelyoccur
in May, the ground cloud (launchexhaustemissions)would initiallybe
forcedto the north by the configurationof the launchpad structure,and _
thenwould probablydrift towardsthe northwestand west due to the
prevailingspringwinds (seeSection4.1.2).
In 1991,the VEEGA fly-byaltitudeswould be greaterthan_in1989,but
the probabilityof inadvertentre-entrystill remainsat 5xi0-I.
4.2.2 Delay to 1991 and Use Titan [V/IUSas LaunchVehicle
The U.S. Air Force (USAF)has informedNASA that a Titan IV launch
vehiclewill not be availablefor the May 1991 launchopportunity.
Consequently,the Titan IV/IUSlaunchconfigurationis no longera
reasonablealternativeto the STS/IUSin the delay alternative.
Nevertheless,since the analyseswere done, the data on the Titan IV/!USare
presentedin AppendixC to this document,and thuswill be availableto
decision-makers.
4.3 NO-ACTIONALTERNATIVE
There are no environmentalimpactsassociatedwith the No-Action
alternative;however,there are major economic,programmatic,and geo_
politicalconsequencesof such a cancellation. ThroughFY 1988 (i.e.,
throughSeptember30, 1987),NASA will have expendedapproximately$800
millionon the Galileoprogram. Cancellationwould mean the abandonmentof
that investmentand a lossof the anticipatedscientificgains.
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Currently,the UnitedStateshas a clear lead in the explorationof the
outer planets. Programmatically,there are currentlyno back-upmissions
that could achieveGalileo'sscientificgoals withinthis century,as
there are no other approvedU.3. missionsto the outer planets. Thus, the
UnitedStateswould foregodetailedscientificknowledgeof the unique
environmentsof Jupiter.
Galileowas startedin 1977 and many scientists,engineers,and
- technicianshave devoteda large share of their professionallivesworking
on this project. From a human standpoint,it would be unfortunateto canceI
the programwhen there is no clear evidenceof adverseenvironmentalimpacts
that would justifysucha cancellation.
4.4 SUMMARYOF ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
The environmentalconsequencesthat could resultfrom the implementa-
tion of each of the programmaticalternativesavailableto NASA are expected
to be similar. The specificact of implementingany of the choiceshas no
near-termenvironmentalimpact. However,there are significantprogram-
matic,economic,scientific,and geopoliticalconsequencesassociatedwith
the alternatives.
If the modificationsof the spacecraftwere delayeda year or more
until the 1991launchopportunity,therewould be maje- programmaticimpacts.
Attemptingto retaincriticallyskilledpersonnelon a standbybasis would
be inordinatelyexpensive. On the other hand, releasingsuch personneland
later attemptingto hire replacementsundoubtedlywould lead to delays that
would threatenthe 1991 launchopportunity.AlthoughNASA could regainthe
skills,NASA would losethe experiencebase of the currentstaff.
The only significantpotentialenvironmentalconsequencesare expected
to be associatedwith launch. The environmentalimpactsof normallaunches
are associatedwith the STS or Titan IV vehiclesand would be similarto
otherNASA launchesof non-RTGmissions.
4.5 ADVERSEENVIRONMENTALEFFECTSTHAT CANNOTBE AVOIDED
Duringthe normallaunch,hydrogenchloridewill be producedby the
solid rocketboosters. This will producesome acidconditionsin the ponds
near the launchpad and depositionon nearbyvegetation. The concentrations
will be below levelsof exposureconsideredhazardousby the National
Academyof Sciences. The depositioncould result in some vegetationdamage
near the launchpad, and possiblefish kills in onsiteponds near the launch
pad.
In the event of an accident,it is possiblethat some areas could be
contaminatedby plutonium. The probabilityof this occurringis predicted
to be less than I in 10 million. If such an accidentdid occur,
' decontaminationof land,vegetation,and buildingscould be required,and
costswould be incurred.
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4.6 RELATIONSHIPBETWEENSHORT-TERMUSES OF MAN'S ENVIRONMENTAND THE
MAINTENANCEAND ENHANCEMENTOF LONG-TERMPRODUCTIVITY
4.6.1 Short-TermUses
The affectedenvironment,for the short-term,includesthe KSC and
surroundingareas. The short-termuses of the area includeNASA operations,
a fish and wildliferefuge,citrusgroves,residentialcommunities,and
recreationalareas. The proposedactionwill be conductedin accordance
with past and ongoingNASA proceduresfor operationsat the launch site.
4.6.2 Lonq Term Productivity
The KSC regionwill continueto supportcitrusgroves and wildlife
habitat,as well as human activities. The proposedactionshouldhave no
long-termeffecton such uses. Successfulcompletionof the project,
however,may have an impacton the futureof the space programand the
continuedeconomicstabilityof MerrittIslandand the surroundingareas.
Both the human and bioticecosystemsare expectedto maintaintheir
harmoni9usproductivity.
A potentiallylarge benefitto be gained from successfulcompletionof
this projectis a betterunderstandingof Earth throughexplorationand
study of the environmentsof other planets.
4.7 IRREVERSIBLEAND IRRETRIEVABLECOMMITMENTOF RESOURCES
4.7.1 Iridium
A total of 270 troy ouncesof iridiumare containedin the two Galileo
RTGs. This amountrepresentsapproximately0.0001percentof the discovered
reservesof this metal in the world. Based on a cost of $600 per troy
ounce,the 1982marketprice of iridium(DOI 1982),approximately$162,000
worth of iridiumwould be irreversiblycommittedto the Galileoand Ulysses
missions.
Essentiallyall platinum-groupmetals,includingiridium,are recycled
in domesticuse, resultingin a smallpercentageloss. Consequently,the
total supplyavailabledoes not appreciablydecreasewith time, as is the
case with lesspreciousmaterialsthat are not aggressivelyrecycled. The
United Statesmaintainsa strategicstockpileof iridiumand, at the end of
1973, had an inventoryof 17,000troy ounces (NASA 1985b). Althoughthe
amountof iridiumlost in the successfulimplementationof the missions
would representabout 1.6 percentof the currentU.S. stockpile,this amount
could easilybe replacedfromthe world supplythroughcurrentsources.
4.7.2 Plutonium-_38
Each RTG containsapproximately17.8 poundsof plutonium-238in the
form of plutoniumdioxide. Successfulimplementationof the Galileomission
thereforewould resultin the lossof approximately35.6 poundsof
plutonium-238.
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The elementplutoniumis producedin nuclearreactorson an as needed
basis by DOE. Therefore,althoughthe launchingof the RTGs representsa
commitmentof plutonium-238resourcesthatwill never be recovered,addi-
tionalplutonium-238can be manufacturedin nuclearreactors.
4.7.3 Other Materials
The total quantitiesof othermaterialsin the payloadsthat would be
irreversiblyand irretrievablycommittedto the Galileomissions
are relativelyminor. These materialsconsistprimarilyof steel,aluminum,
titanium,iron,molybdenum,plastic,glass,nickel,chromium,lead, zinc,
and copper,as well as small quantitiesof silver,mercury,gold, and
platinum.
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5. CONTRIBUTORSTO THE EIS i
This EIS was preparedby Code EL of the Officeof Space Scienceand
Applicationsof the NationalAeronauticsand Space Administration(NASA).
The organizationsand individualslistedbelow contributedinputsfor use by
NASA Code EL in the preparationof thisdocument. Table 5-I summarizes,for
each contributor,the sectionsof the EIS for which inputswere prepared.
PREPARER
NationalAeronauticsand Space Administration
DudleyMcConnell,Ph.D DeputyDirectorfor AdvancedProgram
Studies,Code EL
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
NationalAeronauticsand SpaceAdministration
LewisAndrews NASA NEPA Coordinator,Code NXG
Jet PropulsionLaboratory
M. JosephCork Manager,LaunchApprovalEngineering
Reed Wilcox Supervisor,LaunchApprovalPlanning
Group
RobertMitchell Manager,MissionDesignSection
MaxwellClayton Member,TechnicalStaff
LawrenceReinhart,Ph.D. Member,TechnicalStaff
KennedySpace Center
Mario Busacca EcologicalAnalyst
U.S. Departmentof Enerqy
James Turi Director,Officeof SpecialApplications
AlfredMowery,Ph.D SafetyProgramManager
ScienceApplicationsInternationalCorporation
MauriceHale SAIC ProjectManager
DouglasOutlaw,Ph.D SeniorEnvironmentalScientist
, Barry Nichols SAIC DivisionManager,Environmental
Scientist
DennisFord, Ph.D SeniorEnvironmentalAnalyst
JeffreyWeiler SeniorEnvironmentalAnalyst
NUS Corporation
Eric Schweitzer NUS ProjectManager
RichardEngelhart,Ph.D SeniorExecutiveConsultant
Bart Bartram SeniorExecutiveConsultant
Kurt Eckerstrom EnvironmentalScientist
James Steckel EnvironmentalScientist
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Responsibie Chapter Appendix
Person Summary I 2 3 4 5 6 Z 8 A B C O
, NASA
DUDLEYMcCONNELL X X X X X X X
Ph.D. Aerospace
Science
LEWIS ANDREWS X
M.S. Mathematics
SAIC
MAUR[CE HALE X X X X X X
M.S, Engineering
Management
M.S. Engineering
Phys i cs
DOUGLASOUTLAW X X X
Ph.D. NucLear
Physics
BARRYNICHOLS X X X X
B.S. Natunal +
Sc i ence
DENNlS FORD X X X X
Ph.D. Zoology I
JEFFREYWEILER X X X X X X X X X
M.S. Resource i
Economics/
Environmental
Management
HU._._S
ERIC SCHWEITZER X X X
M.A. Urban and
Regional Planning
RICHARD ENGELHART X X X
Ph.D. Nuctear
Engineering
BART BARTRAN X X X
M.S. Mechanical Engineering
M.S. Physics
KURT ECKERSTRON X X
B.A. Envi ronmenta t
Conservation
l
JAMESSTECKEL X X X
B.S. Biotogy
JPL
N.JOSEPH CORK X X X X
M.S. Aeronautical
Engineering
REEDWILCOX X X X X X
N.S. City and
Regional PLanning
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Responsibte Chapter Appendix
Person Summary I 2 3 & 5 6 7 B A B C O
JP__k
ROBERT MITCHELL X X X X
M.S. Mathematics
M.S. Electrical Engineering
MAXWELLCLAYTON X X X X :
B.S. Aeronautical Engineering
LAWRENCEREINHART X X X
Ph.D. Mechanical Engineering
KS..__C
MARIO BUSACCA X X
M.S. Marine BioLogy
JAMESTURf X X X X
M,S. NucLear Engineering
ALFREDKOWERY
Ph.D Physics X X X X
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6. AGENCIESAND INDIVIDUALSCONSULTED
This Draft EnvironmentalImpactStatement(EIS)will be available
for reviewfor a periodof 45 days by Federal,state,and local agenciesand
the public,as applicable. All informationreceivedwill be considered
duringpreparationof the Final EIS. Commentsare solicitedfrom the
following:
FederalAgencies:
Councilon EnvironmentalQuality
FederalEmergencyManagementAgency
NationalAcademyof Sciences
NuclearRegulatoryCommission
Officeof Managementand Budget
U.S. De)artmentof the Air Force
U.S. De)artmentof Commerce
U.S. Departmentof Defense
U.S. Departmentof Energy
U.S. Departmentof Healthand Human Services-Centerfor DiseaseControl
U.S. De)artmentof the Interior
U.S. Departmentof State
U.S. De)artmentof Transportation
U.S_.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
StateAgencies: _
FloridaDepartmentof EnvironmentalRegulation ;
East CentralFloridaRegionalPlanningCouncil
IntergovernmentalCoordination--Officeof the Governorof
California
State of Florida,Officeof the Governor
State of New Mexico
LocalAgencies:
BrevardCounty: Boardof Commissioners
EconomicDevelopmentCouncil t
Planningand ZoningDepartment
CanaveralPort Authority
Cape Canaveral,City of
Cocoa,City of
, Titusville,City of
:I
Organizations: ,i
= Air PollutionControlAssociation
Center for Law and SocialPolicy ,:
ChristicInstitute I_
CommonCause
Concern,Inc.
EnvironmentalPolicy Institute
Federationof AmericanScientists
Friendsof the Earth
6-I
• ¥
1990012832-133
FloridaDefendersof the Environment
NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil
NationalWildlifeFederation
Physiciansfor SocialResponsibility
The Committeeto Bridgethe Gap
The PlanetarySociety
SandiaNationalLaboratory
SANE
SierraClub
SierraClub, FloridaChapter
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: Abbreviations,A-I
Abort
landingsites,2-17
launch,2-17
Accident
Challenger,1-1,4-7
general,4-4
' impactof, 4-10, 4-13
launch,4-10
mitigation,4-26
RTGs,2-11
RHUs,2-11
scenarios,4-4
shuttle,I-I,4-4
Acronyms,A-I
Alternative
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to launchvehicle,2-I, 2-19
to proposedaction,2-I, 2-18,4-36"
AtmosphericEntry Probe,1-2, 2-_,2-3, 2-5
-B-
Benefits,I-I, i-3
-C-
CapeCanaveralAir Force Station,3-I, 3-13 _
Centaur,1-I,
Challenger,I-I, 4-7
Consequence
of accident,4-10, 4-13 ':
environmental,4-I, 4-4, 4-10
J
-D-
Deep SpaceNetwork,2-3, 2-27
Departmentof Defense,2-27,4-9 _
, , Departmentof Energy,2-6, 2-13,4-10
EasternSpace and MissileCenter,2-14
I
EdwardsAir ForceB_se, 2-17,4-4, 4-11 ,_
EnvironmentalConsequences,4-I
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,4-10, 4-16, 4-20
Expendablel_unchvehicle,2-I, 2-19,4-36
ExternalTank, 2-11,2-14, 4-11,4-14 •
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Federal Radiological EmergencyResponsePlan, 4-32 )
Final SafetyAnalysisReport,4-8, 4-9, 4-I0
Fueled Clad, 2-6, 2-9, 2-10
-G-
GalileoMission
atmosphericentry probe, I-2,2-1, 2-5
missiondescription,I-I,2-I
missionmodifications,2-19,4-i
spacecraft,2-3
GeneralPurposeHeat Source(GPHS),2-6, 2-9, 4-13
Graphiteimpactshell,2-6, 2-9, 4-13
-H-
High gain antenna,2-3
"% " I - t
InertialUpper Stage,I-I, 2-I, 2-19,4-I
In_eragencyNuclearSafetyReviewPanel,4-9, 4-10
-J-
Jet PropulsionLaboratory(JPL),4-5, 5-I
JohnsonSpace Center,2-17,
Jupiter
Jovian atmosphere,]-2, 2-I
Jovian system,1-2
-K-
KennedySpace Center,2-14, 2-17,3-I, 3-13, 4-I, 5-]
-L" _
i
LaunchVehicle
externaltank (ET), 2-11,2-14, 4-11 _,
inertialupper stage,I-I, 2-I, 2-19, 4-I
modifications,1-I
Shuttle/CentaurG-Prime,I-I
solidrocketbooster(SRB),2-11,2-14, 4-I
LightweightRadioisotopeHeaterUnit, 2-6
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Mission Phases, 4-5, 4-14
Monomethyl hydrazine, 2-14
-N-
- NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct, i '
Nuclear
federalradiologicalemergencyresponseplan, 4-32
fuel, 2-6, 4-20
plutonium,2-6, 2-9, 2-10,4-13
radiologicalconsequencesof accident,4-13
NUS Corporation,5-I
-O-
Office of Scienceand TechnologyPolicy,4-9
OrbitalManeuveringSystem,2-14
Orbiter,1-2, 2-3
i
-P- i
PatrickAir Force Base, 2-14
Plutonium,2-6, 2-9, 2-10,4-13
Proposedaction
alternativesto, 2-I, 2-19,4-I, 4-36 '
descriptionof, 1-i, 2-1, 4-I,
environmentalconsequencesof, 2-19, 4-I
-R-
RadioisotopeHeaterUnits, I-I,2-6, 2-10, 2-11, 4-13
RadioisotopeThermoelectricGenerators,I-I, 2-6, 2-7, 2-11, 4-13
-S-
Safety CI
abort landingsites,2-17
RTGand RHUevaluation, 2-11 _'
range, 2-14
Science Applications International Corporation, 5-i
Solar System Exploration Program, 1-I
• Solid rocket booster, 2-14, 3-I, 4-5
Sonic boom, 4-2
Space Shuttle
Challenger,1-I,4-7
Shuttle/CentaurG-primeconfiguration,1-I
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Spacecraftconfiguration/missionmodifications,2-19, 4-I •
SpacecraftPropulsionSubsystem,2-14
"T" (
Trajectory
Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist(VEEGA),1-i,2-I, 2-3
--U- % l
Ulyssesmission,i, 1-I
Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist,1-I,2-I, 2-3
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APPENDIXA [
GLOSSARYOF ABBREVIATIONSAND ACRONYMS
AFO Abort FromOrbit
_ AOA Abort Once Around
i
ATO Abort To Orbit
•- ASE airbornesupportequipment
BOM beginningof mission
BACT best availablecontroltechnology
'- CCAFS Cape CanaveralAir ForceStation
CELV ComplementaryExpendableLaunchVehicle,or Titan IV
CEQ Councilon EnvironmentalQuality
CFR Code of FederalRegulations !
&
Ci Curie
cm centimeter
DEIS Draft EnvironmentalImpactStatement
DOC Document
DOD Departmentof Defense
DOE Departmentof Energy
EA EnvironmentalAssessment
EIS EnvironmentalImpactStatement _
ELV Expendablelaunchvehicle
EOM End of mission
EPA EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
ESA EuropeanSpace Agency
ESMC EasternSpace and MissileCenter
FAST Failure/AbortSequenceTree
FC Fueledclad
A-I
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iFEIS Final EnvironmentalImpactStatement I
FDER FloridaDepartmentof EnvironmentalRegulations
FR FederalReqister
FRERP FederalRadiologicalEmergencyResponsePlan _,
J
f/s feet per second
FSAR Final SafetyAnalysisReport
FTS flightterminationsystem
FWPF fineweave, piercedfabric
g gram
GGS GlobalGeospaceScience
GIS Graphiteimpactshell
GPHS Generalpurposeheat source
(
HGA High gain antenna
lIP InstantaneousImpactPoint
IP ImplementationPlan
INSRP InteragencyNuclearSafetyReviewPanel
IUS InertialUpper Stage
JOI Jupiterorbit insertion
JPL Jet PropulsionLaboratory
JSC JohnsonSpace Center
C
KSC KennedySpaceCenter
km/s kilometersper second
LANL Los AlamosNationalLaboratory
Ibf poundsof force
LES 8/9 LincolnLaboratoryExperimentalSatellite8 and g
LWRHU Light WeightRadioisotopeHeaterUnit
MECO main enginecutoff
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MET Missionelapsedtime
MHW MultihundredWatt
mi/s miles per second
MMH Monomethylhydrazine
?
m/s meters per second
t
N Newton
i °"
, NAAQS NationalAmbientAir QualityStandards
NAS NationalAcademyof Sciences
NASA NationalAeronauticsand SpaceAdministration
NEPA NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct
NOAA NationalOceanicand AtmosphericAdministration
NOI Noticeof Intent
NRC NuclearRegulatoryCommission
NSTS NationalSpace TransportationSystem
OMS OrbitalManeuveringSystem
OSTP Officeof Scienceand TechnologyPolicy
PAM PayloadAssistModule
ppm parts per million
PSAR PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport
psi poundsper squareinch
Pu Plutonium
, RCRA ResourceConservationand RecoveryAct (1978)
RHU Radioisotopeheaterunit
- Rj Jovianradii
ROD Recordof Decision
F
RPM Retropulsionmodule
RSO Range SafetyOfficer
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RTG Radioisotopethermoelectricgenerator
RTLS Returnto LaunchSite (abort)
SAR SafetyAnalysisReport
SER SafetyEvaluationReport
%
SNAP Space nuclearauxiliarypower
SRB Solid rocketbooster
SRM Solid RocketMotor
SSME Space Shuttlemain engine
STS Space TransportationSystem
TAL TransoceanicAbort Landing
USAR UpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport
VAFB VandenbergAir ForceBase
VEEGA Venus-Earth-Ear*_ _ravity-Assist
VEGA Venus-Earth-Gravity-Assist
VOC volatileorganiccompounds
W Watt
WIND WeatherInfor_lationNetworkDisplay
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APPENDIXB
LAUNCHVEHICLEACCIDENTANALYSISAND RTG _CCIDENT
ANALYSIS/CONSEQUENCESA SESSMENTFOR THE STS
B.I LAUNCHVEHICLEAND PAD DESCRIPTION
B.I.I GeneralDescriptionJ
The Galileospacecraftis plannedfor launchby the Space
TransportationSystem/two-stageInertialUpper Stage (STS/IUS)combination.
. The STS configurationconsistsof the ShuttleOrbiter,its main external
tank and two solid propellantrocketboosters(SRBs)(seeFiguresB-I and
B-2). The main ExternalTank (ET)containsliquidoxygenand hydrogen
propellants. The STS configurationproducesapproximately6,925,000pounds
of thrustat sea level.
The shuttleorbiteris launchedfrom pad 39A which is locatedin a
wetlandsenvironmentat the KennedySpace.Center (KSC)in Florida. (See
Chapter3 for a detaileddescriptionof the launcharea environment.)As
shown in FiguresB-3 and B-4, the launchpad is borderedby a paved,roughly
circularroadwayapproximately1,200feet from the centerof the pad. The
surfaceof the launchpad is constructedof concreteand stands
approximately48 feet above the ground. An approximately14,000squarefoot
steel_aunchplatform,calledthe servicestructure,supportsthe shuttle.
This structureconsistsof a fixed portion(calledthe launchtower)and a
movableportionwhich rotatesclearof the shuttleduringpre-launch
operations. Two steelstructures,the liquidhydrogenand oxygen
facilities,are locatednortheastand northwestof the pad, respectively.
Insidethe 1,200-footradiusroadwaysurroundingthe pad are a seriesof
concreteroads and supportbuildingsthat extendradiallyfrom the pad. The
remainderand majorityof the launchcomplexareaconsistsof sand.
A flame trenchand exhaustchannelare locatedunder the launch
platformand terminateat an exhaustdeflectorstructure(see FigureB-4).
To the northeast,approximately300 feet fromthe pad, lies an elevated
water tank. This tank supplieswater to protectthe pad fromthe high
temperaturesgeneratedduringmain engineand SRB ignitions.
B.I.2 Launch/FliqhtSequence
The Shuttleorbiter,alongwith its ExternalTank and two SRBs, are
launchedin the followingsequence. At 6 secondsbeforelaunch-- denoted
"T-6"or "T-6 MET" (MissionElapsedTime) -- the main engineswill be
ignited. At T-40 milliseconds,the two SRBswill be ignited. At T+7
secondsthe Shuttlewill clear the launchtower. The SRBswill burn out and
.. separatefrom the ExternalTank at T+128 seconds.
The main engineswill continueto providethrustuntil T+500 seconds
at which time theywill shut down. After the ET is released(at
approximatelyT+528 seconds),the Shuttle'sOrbitalManeuveringSystem (OMS)
engineswill be fired to establishand circularizethe Shuttlein orbit.
Approximatelyg hours after launchand in approximatelythe sixth orbitof
Earth,the Galileospacecraftand its IUS will be deployedfrom the Orbiter.
B-I
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Once the Orbiterhas moved a safedistanceaway, the IUS will be ignited. "
The sequentialignitionand burn of the two stagesof the IUS will take the
Galileospacecraftout of Earth orbit and placesit on a trajectoryfor
Venus. Once the RadioisotopeThermoelectricGenerator(RTG)booms have been
deployedand the spacecraftstabilized,the Galileospacecraftwill separate
' from the IUS and continueon its trajectory.
1
Table B-I liststhe normalsequenceof eventsthat lead to placementof
i the Galileospacecrafton its plannedinterplanetarytrajectory;with
referenceto the missionphasesused for accidentanalyses.
TABLE B-I. NOMINALMISSIONSEQUENCE(CONDENSED)
Phase Sequence Time
Start PropellantLoading T-8.5 hours
Auto LaunchSequenceBegins T-3! seconds
: 0 OrbiterMain EnginesIgnition T-6.6 seconds
i SRBs Ignition T-40 milliseconds
Launch T-O seconds
OrbiterClearsTower T+7 seconds
I OrbiterOver Water T+34 seconds
SRBs Burnout T+119 seconds
SRBs Separation T+125 seconds
___Z.__OrbiterMain EngineCutoff T+514 seconds
,:irstOMS Burn (ToOrbit) T+634 seconds
3 Begin AscentCoast T+802 seconds
SecondOMS Burn (OrbitCircularization) T+2,770seconds
Spacecraft/IUSDeployment T+6 hours,40 minutes
InterplanetaryInjection T+7 hours 28 minutes
5 2nd Earth Flyby T+38 months
B.1.2.! Trajectory/FlightCharacteristicsto Orbit
The Shuttleorbitercontainingthe Galileospacecraftand its IUS will
be launchedwith an approximate70-degreeazimuth. This means that the
Shuttle'sinitialground-track(i.e.,the path it flies over the surfaceof
the Earth)will be 70 degreesfrom true north. A 70-degreelaunchazimuth
will give the Shuttlean orbitalinclinationof approximately34 degreesas
measuredfrom the equator;in otherwords,the 70-degreelaunchazimuthwill
allow the Shuttleto fly as far north as pointsalongthe 34-degreenorth
parallel(i.e.,Cape Canaveral'slatitude)and as far southas pointsalong
they34-degreesouth parallel.
B.I.3 Ranqe Safety
The primaryrange safetyobjectiveis to precludethe ground impactof
intactlaunchvehiclesor their componentpartswhich could endangerhuman
B-6
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life or causedamage to property. All Shuttlelaunchescarry a flight .'
terminationsystemwhich allowsthe Range SafetyOfficerthroughmonitoring
systems,groundtransmitters,and trackin§systemsto determinewhetherthe i
launchvehicleposes an imminentthreatto peopleor property. In the event
that the launchvehicleviolatesestablishedflightsafetycriteria,the
Range SafetyOfficercan controlthe launchvehicle'sflightpath by
destroyingthe vehicle.
-" B.I.3.1 FlightVehicleRange SafetySystem i
The Space ShuttleFlightTerminationSystem allowsthe intentional
: destructionof the SRBs and externaltank if the flightdeviatestoo far
"- outsidethe nominalor establishedflightlimits. On radio commandfromthe
Range SafetyOfficer,linearshapedchargesrupturethe two tanks in
the ExternalTank ,_ well as the cases of the SRBs. The onboardsystemsfor
the three elements_oneexternaltank and two SRBs) are all interconnected
so that, if eitherSRB receivesa destruct,all three receiveit.
Based on past experienceand the combinedfunctioningof the ground and
flightportionsof the SafetySystem,a delay of at least 4 and I/2 seconds
will occur betweenthe time a Shuttlevehiclecould requiredestructaction
and when the destructevent actuallyoccurs.
B.2 MISSIONACCIDENTS
B.2.1 AccidentScenarioDefinitionApproach
E
I A systematicapproachwas utilizedto identifythose credibleaccident
scenariosthat might occur. The Shuttlesystemwas dividedinto its major
elements: LaunchSupportEquipment,Payload,Orbiter,ExternalTank, Solid
RocketBoosters,Space ShuttleMain Engine(SSME)/LiquidPropellantSystem,
; and Range SafetyDestructSystem. Each of these elementswas further
dividedinto its major failurecomponents. Crediblefailuremodes referto _:
thosewhich generallycause loss of the vehicleand may producean
environmentwhich is a potentialthreatto the RTG(s). These are generally
singlepoint failuresin systemsor subsystemswhich cannotbe mitigatedby
astronautinterventionor other pre-plannedsystemoverrides. These failure
modes representexceptionsto the programrequirementof single-failure
tolerance. They have been acceptedby NASA technicaland programmanagement
and by the contractor,after extensivereview indicatingthat they were
impracticalor impossibleto eliminate. Representativeaccidentscenarios
, were definedby groupingsimilarvehicleresponseswhich resultedfrom each
' of the crediblefailuremodes for the six major phasesof the STS/Galileo
mission. The potentialaccidentscenariosare listedin Table B-2 and
' describedbelow as summarizedfromNASA 1988.
; B.2.2 Phase 0 AccidentScenarios(Pre-Launch)
i
Phase 0 accidentscan occur betweenpropellantloadingand launch,
typicallyfrom To8 hoursto T-O secondsor launch. A pad fire or a pad i
explosionare the primaryaccidentsof concern. The causesfor either
accidentare the same, being linkedto failuresin launchsupportequipment,
vehiclestructuralfailures,propellantcontamination,and inadvertent
destructactivation. The latteraccidentcouldoccur only afterdestruct
armingin the last 20 secondsbeforelaunch.
B-7
t
_L
1990012832-156
ri .,+_
!
!
TABLE B-2. VEHICLECATASTROPHICACCIDENTSEVALUATEDIN SAFETYANALYSIS 1
i Phase Description Accident
i
b
-7
i 0 Prelaunchto Launch InadvertentRange SafetySystemdestruct
Fire/explosion
1 Ascent Solid RocketBoosterfailure
Range SafetySystemdestruct
Aft compartmentexplosion
: Vehiclebreakup
Crash landing
Ocean ditching
2 SecondStage Orbiterfailure
ExternalTank failure
J
Space Shuttlemain enginefailure
Payloadfailure
Range SafetySystemdestruct
Crash Landing
Oceanditching
_ 3 On-orbit Orbiterfailureand reentry
J
4 PayloadDegloy IUS Solid RocketMotor Case burst
IUS Solid RocketMotor no ignition,
low impulse
IUS Tumblingfrom separationor
recontact
IUS misalignedburnsdue to guidance
failure
IUS erraticburns
5 Venus-Earth-Earth High-speedreentryof the spacecraft
GravityAssist •
Maneuver
e
I
l
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B.2.3 Phase I AccidentScenarios(SRBBurn) i
i
Phase I accidentscenariosrepresentthe period in which the SRBs are a
primaryfailurethreat,and the externalenvironmentswhich may be seenby
the RTG can be affectedby groundsurfaceinteractions.A failureof the
_ left SRB in the first2 secondscan cause vehicleimpactwith the launch
tower. Between0-10 seconds,a releaseof ET propellantscan cause a ground
surfacepool explosionwhich is explainedin the followingparagraphs.
" After about20 seconds,the trajectoryof the launchvehicle,if thrustwere '
stopped,would lead to water impactratherthan land impact.
. In additionto vehiclebreakupby instantaneousfailuresof the SRBs
or SSME'saft compartmentexplosions,Range SafetySystemdestructis an
intentionalabort actionby the Range SafetyOfficerin the event the
Shuttlevehicletrajectorycould resultin endangeringpopulatedland areas.
Automaticshutdownof o_:eof the Space ShuttleMain Enginesduring
Phase I can lead to a Returnto LaunchSite (RTLS)intactabort mode. After
SRB separation,the vehiclereversesthe directionof flighttill such a
timewhen main enginecutoff (MECO)point is reachedwhich allowsacceptable
Orbiter/ETseparationconditions,acceptableET impactlocation,and an
acceptablerange for the Shuttleto glide back to the KennedySpace Center.
l
If a combinationof failuresoccurswhich does not allow the Shuttleto
safelyreturnto KSC, the contingencyabort plan of crew bailoutwill occur,
leadingto ocean ditch. A Shuttlefailureon touchdowncan result in a
crash landing.
B.2.4 Phase 2 AccidentScenarios(SSMEBurnto MECO)
This phase of flightstartswhen the SRBs separatefrom the vehicle
untilSSME cutoff (MECO).The primaryvehiclecatastrophicaccidentsduring '
thisperiodresultin vehiclebreakupor in failureto achieveorbit,
leadingto uncontrolledre-entry.
At altitudesexceeding150,000feet, explosionsand fragment
environmentsare no longera threatto the RTGs. The SRBs are no longer
attachedand formationof explosivemixturesof liquidoxygen and liquid
hydrogencannotresultin explosionoverpressures,consideringthe rarefied
atmosphere. Ballisticre-entryof the spacecraftwill resultin breakupof
the vehicleand releaseof the RTGs.
Non-catastrophicshutdownof one or more SSMEs duringthis phase can _:
' leadto a varietyof intactor contingencyabortmodes. The Trans_eanic
Abort-Landing(TAL)abortmode is used if a SSME shutdownplacesthe
.. vehiclebeyondthe trajectorylimitsof a RTLS abortyet prior to attaining _
an Abort Once Around (AOA)or Abort to Orbit (ATO)capability. After
selectionof this abortmode, the vehiclewill continueto accelerate :i
downrangeto the TAL MECO target. After ET separation,the onboard I
computersare loadedwith _he entry flightsoftwareand the Orbiterglides
to the designatedlandingsite. TAL sites for NSTS-34(Galileo)are: i
e Primary Ben Guerir,Morocco
e Alternate Moron,Spain.
B-g
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If a SSME shutdownoccursafter the vehicleexceedsthe parametersfor I
a TAL, the Shuttlewill attemptto reachthe nominalMECO target. A 1
combinationof OMS engineburns and propellantdumps can be performedto i
increasepoweredflightperformance.AfterMECO, the OMS fuel, vehicle
velocity,and velocityrequiredfor orbit are evaluated. If performance
marginsdo not exist for orbit insertionand a subsequentdeorbit,an AOA
maneuverwill be performedwith the OMS engines. The followingAOA landing
siteshave been identifiedfor NSTS-34:
e Primary EdwardsAir ForceBase, California
• Alternate White SandsSpace Harbor,New Mexico
e Alternate KennedySpace Center,Florida.
An ATO generallyinvolveslossof propulsionlate in the ascentwhere
the vehiclevelocityis adequateto achievea safe,yet lower than planned
orbit. Since the Shuttlemust achievea specifiedorbitto performthe
initialconditionsfor IUS injection,it is likelythat an ATO will result
in transitionto an Abort fromOrbit.
Contingencyabortconditionsare definedwhen two Space ShuttleMain
Enginesfail prior to singleengineTAL capability,or when three engines
fail prior to achievingan AOA capability. These resultsin a crew bailout
and subsequentoceanditch of the Orbiter. There is a possibilityof
performingan RTLS abort if two or threemain enginesfail within20 seconds
afterlaunch,or a TAL if three enginesfailduring the last 30 secondsof
poweredflight. However,duringthe remainderof the ascentphase,two or
threemain enginefailuresresultin a contingencyabort scenario,
B.2.5 Phase 3 AccidentScenarios(MECQto IUS deployment)
Accidentsin this phase wouldoccur aftervehicleorbit has been
achievedbut prior to deploymentof the Galileo/IUS.The accidentsof
primaryconcernare those associatedwith the Shuttlefailuresthatwould
resultin orbitaldecay and eventualuncontrolledre-entry. The entry would
be very shallowat a velocityof 26,000feet per second.
If problemsare foundwith eitherorbitalparameters,the Galileo
spacecraft,or the IUS that clearlyindicatedeploymentfrom the Shuttle
would not resultin a successfulEarthescapetrajectoryinsertion,then two
optionsexist. If safe returnof the Shuttleis threatened,thecargo will
be jettisonedin low Earthorbit. However,if it is determinedno threat
existsto a safe landing,the Shuttlewill returnwith the cargo. The
primaryand alternatelandingsitesgiven in the AOA sectionabove may be
employedin this abortmode. '
Althoughabort landingaccidentsare theoreticallypossiblefromAbort
FromOrbit (AFO),the probabilitywas consideredto be very small compared
to RTLS,TAL, or AOA relatedaccidentsbecausethe SSME does not affectAFO,
and time pressuresare much reduced. Becauseof these considerations,and
since the consequenceswould be no different,a separatetreatmentwas not
included.
As pointedout in Section2.2.5,if a healthyspacecraftis left in
Earthorbit,the spacecraftpropulsionsystemcan be used to boost the
spacecraftto a long-lifeorbit in excessof 2,000years.
B-IO
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B.2.6 Phase 4 AccidentScenarios(IUSDeplopymentto Earth Escape)
Accidentsin this phasewould occur betweenGalileo/IUSseparationfrom
the Shuttleand Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectory
insertion. The accidentsof primaryconcernare IUS propulsionor guidance
failureswhich could resultin vehiclebreakupand/or in re-entryfrom
orbit.
Re-entryconditionscan rangefrom speedsof 14,000to 36,000ft/secat
anglesof -0.5to -36.0degrees.
B.2.7 Phase 5 AccidentScenarios(VEEGA)
A detailedGalileoEarthAvoidanceStudy (JPL 1988)of possible
spacecraftand missionfailureshas determinedonly three failuretypes
, which representeven a remotethreatof Earth impact: retro-propulsion
module penetrationby a micrometeroid,a small numberof lesserprobability
spacecraftfailures,and multipleserialfailuresin the groundcommand
system.
: _h_ total probabilityof spacecraftre-entryand impactis less than5 x I . In the remoteevent that any of these accidentsresultedin the
spacecraftbeing placedon an Earth-impactingtrajectoryand recovery
'" attemptsfailed,the spacecraftwould breakup as it re-enteredthe
atmosphereat a velocityof 45,600to 49,300ft/secat anglesof 0 to 90o.
The resultingthermaland dynamic_nvironmentwould be very severewith peak
heating_ratesaround11,000Btu/ft_-secand peak dynamicloads of 17,700
lb./ft.Z at decelerationsof approximately600 g's.
B.3 ACCIDENTENVIRONMENTS
The followingparagraphssummarizethe key accidentenvironmentswhich
were addressedin the Departmentof Energy (DOE)safetyanalysisof Shuttle
accidentsand the possiblethreatto the RTGs and RadioisotopeHeaterUnits
(RHUs).
B.3.1 SRB FraqmentEnvironment
Duringoperationof a SRB, fragmentswill be producedcpon ruptureof
the steel pressure-containmentmotor case eitherby randomfailureor by
rangedestructaction. These substantialfragmentsmay damagean RTG or
propelit intoanotherstructure. The size,velocity,and directional
, distributionsof SRB fragmentsare based in part upon analysisof films and
recovereddebris of the destructedsolid rocketboostersfrom the Challenger
(STS51-L) and the Titan 34D-9 accidents. To supplementthese empirical
data and to fillgaps not representedby the two accidents,analytical
modelingwas performedand calculationswere made using a computercode
capableof predictingthe very fast structuralbreakupof the rocketmotor
case and the ensuingfragmentmotionaway fromthe centerlineof the motor.
The characteristicmechanismfor fragmentformationis a rapid release
of the operatingmotor pressurethrougha fracturein the case causinq
furtherextensivebreakupof the case and rapid accelerationof the pieces
to velocitiesof hundredsof feet per second. The peak velocityof case
B-11
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wall fragmentsdependson motor pressureand volume. The mass of propellant
remainingattachedto a case wall fragmentis also a major determinantof
the final fragmentvelocity. In additionto velocity,the fragmentalso
rotatesor spins as it travels. Since all theseparametersvary with
missionelapsedtime,the spectrumof SRB fragmentcharacteristicsis highly
dependentuponMET at the time of initialcase fracture.
Typicalestimatedpeak SRB fragmentcharacteristicsfor SRB random ..
failureare shownas a functionof MET in Table B-3. This table also shows
estimatesof the probabilityof a large fragmenthittinga RTG and the
effectsof interveningOrbiterstructureon fragmentsflyingtowardthe
Shuttlecargo bay. The peak fragmentvelocitiesfor range destructare
comparableto the randomvalues,but the high velocityrange destruct
fragmentsrepresenta lessorthreatto the RTGs becauseof their location
near the motor destructcharge.
TABLE B-3. PEAK SRB FRAGMENTENVIRONMENTS:
SRB RANDOMFAILURE
Intervening
Maximum Fragment Structure
Fragment Spin Hit Velocity ,
MET (s) Velocity(fps) Rate (HZ) Probability Reduction(%) i
0-20 135-370 12 -.17 10-19
20-70 135-340 11 -.17 10-19
k
70-105 180-365 13 -.17 10-19
105-120 265-765 21 -.17 6-18
) 8.3.2 ET PropellantExplosionEnvironments
B.3.2.1 Blast Environments
The hazardsimposedby explosionscan be characterizedfor purposesof ,
safetyanalysisby specifying,in probabilisticterms,valuesfor the blast
wave parameters,peak overpressure,overpressureimpulse,peak dynamic
pressure,dynamicpressureimpulse,and peak reflectedpressure. The
definitionof these blast loadingparametersare:
StaticOverpressureis definedas the peak crushingpressure,exceeding ,!
the ambientpressure,which occurs in the blast pulse from an
explosion. The variationof the overpressurewith time at a fixed t
distancefrom the explosiondependslargelyon the amountand rate of
the energyreleaseof the explosion. The peak overpressureat a
fixeddistanceis the maximumvalue sensedat that locationand is
B-12
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experiencedat the instantthe frontof the blast pulse just passes
the location.
StaticOverpressureImpulseis definedas the area under the curve of
overpressurevers,stimeover the intervalbetweenthe time of arrival
of the blast front at the fixedlocationto the time at which the
overpressurereturnsto zero at the same location.
Peak ReflectedPressureis definedas the magnitudeof the reflected
blast wave frontthatwould resultupon strikinga rigid body placed
in the path of a blast front. Sincethe peak reflectedpressurecan
- be quite high, it can deformthe body and accelerateit.
DynamicPressureis a measureof the strengthof the "wind"following
the frontof the blast pulse. Peakdynamicpressureoccursjust
behindthe front and decaysrapidlywith distancebehindthe front, i]
DynamicPressureImpulseis definedanalogouslyto staticoverpressure !
impulse. Peak.dynamicpressureand dynamicpressureimpulsecontrol
the drag of the blastwind and alongwith body shape and weight ideterminethe finalvelocityof a body if it is free to move.
Pre- and Early-FlightGroundPool Explosions )
A significantexplosionsourcefor the Shuttleis from the possible i_
massivespill of the liquidoxygenand hydrogenET propellants. Spillsof it
these propellantsas a resultof ET structuralbreakup,Shuttleimpactwith _.
the launchtower,early rangedestruct,SRB case ruptureor Orbiter aft-
compartmentexplosionscould lead to collection,mixing,and ignitionof
significantportionsof the propellantson launch-padsurfaceswhile the
Shuttleis stillessentiallyat the pad. The resultingblast wave
subsequentlysweepspast the Orbiter,actingon the exteriorsurfacesin a
mannerto implodeor crush the structureintothe RTGswithinthe Orbiter.
It is also possiblethat, as the blastwave failsthe structu:'e,the RTGs
will be directlyexposedto the blast environment.Thus, not only Orbiter
fragmentationbut also blast loading(acceleration)hazardsare presentedto
the RTGs.
There have been no pad accidentsinvolvingthe spillageof ET
propellantsfromwhich to base estimatesof potentialexplosion
environments,thereforeenvironmentsare based on resultsfrom a 1
hydrodynamiccomputercode capableof predictingthe blast loading ,_
parametersof a fastmovingplanarblastpulse as it travelsthroughthe !)"m
air abovethe pad. The behaviorof the explosionenergyreleaseitself i-
(sourcecharacteristic)is variedover a wide range to includethe range I;
of uncertaintyin the initialcollection,mixingand ignitionof the !
• propellants. Sincethe explosionsourcecharacteristicontrolsthe blast i
pulse loadingparameters,a probabilisticomputationaltreatmentof the
sourcecharacteristicyieldsa probabilisticestimateof blast loading
parametersat specifiedheightsabove the pad. Applicationof these _
loadingparametersto an analyticalfragmentaccelerationmodel for the
O_hitercargo bay doo_ yieldsa probabilisticestimateof fragmentvelocity
for this closestcomponentto the RTGs.
B-13
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yTypicalblast and Orbiterfragmentationenvironmentsestimatedto '_
resultfrom theseground-poolexplosionsat severaldistancesabove the pad
surfaceare shown in TablesB-4 and B-5, respectively.
TABLE B-4. BLAST ENVIRONMENTS*DUE TO DESTRUCT
OR GROUNDPOOL EXPLOSIONSSTS/IUS
%
Pressure(psi) Impulse(psi-s)
Over-
Height (ft) Pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
In-pool 2,075 810 5,300 0.58 0.058
Just Above
Pool 659 1,720 5,169 2.01 0.33
20 106 123 552 0.71 0.19
100 21 18 78 0.41 0.20
(
*Upper10 percentileestimatesfor on-padexplosionsof respectiveliquid
bipropellants(exceptfor in-pooland just above pool).
TABLE B-5. FRAGMENTVELOCITIES*FROM DESTRUCT
OR GROUNDPOOL EXPLOSIONS: STS/IUS
Height (ft) Flyer PlateVelocity(fps) ShrapnelVelocity(fps)
In-pool 679-2,186 1-92 :
Just Above Pool 1,079-2,661 2-122
(
20 429-1,096 0-70 ;
i
100 184-356 0-58 ,,
*Upper 10 percentileestimatesfor on-padexplosionsof respectiveliquid
bipropellants(exceptfor in-pooland just above pool).
In-FliqhtExDlosions
A secondexplosionsourceinvolvingthe ET propellantsis possiblefor
a short time after the Shuttlehas clearedthe tower. Aerodynamic
B-14
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conditions through the next 20 seconds (up to an METof 30 seconds) are such
that failures of the E_ _tructure can lead quickly to its breakup and the
consequent airborne dumpof liquid hydrogen and oxygen propellants. The
hydrogen quickly vaporizes and mixes with air to form an explosive mixture.
The burning SRBsprovide an ignition source to ignite the mixture. A
hydrodynamic computer code is used to compute the blast loading parameters
of a fast-moving, spherically-expanding, blast pulse.
, The estimatedblastenvironmentfrom thisexplosionis shown in Table
B-6 for the breakupstartingat two differenttimes as the Shuttle
acceleratesduringits early launchtrajectory. As the ET breakup,
propellantdump, and mixingrequirean elapsedtime on the order of a
second,the increasedspeed of the Shuttlebetweenthe two initiatingtimes
shown in Table B-6 has allowedan increaseddistance(Shuttleinertia)to
developbetweenthe Orbiterand the centerof explosionfor the later
occurringbreakup. Hence,the potentialblastenvironmentfor airborne
explosionsrapidlydiminishes. BeyondMET 30 seconds,changingatmospheric
and aerodynamicconditionswill precludesignificantairborneexplosions.
The potentialOrbiterfragmentvelocitiesassociatedwith the airborne i
blast environmentsin Table B-6 are shown in Table B-7.
TABLE B-6. BLAST ENVIRONMENTSDUE TO IN-FLIGHTEXPLOSIONSFROMDESTRUCT
OR MASSIVESTRUCTURALFAILURES: STS/IUS
f
MET (s) Pressure(psi) Impulse(psi-s)
Over-pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
I0 298 122 1,991 3.23 1.60
30* 14 5 53 1.13 0.48
*Over-waterthreshold.
TABLE B-7. FRAGMENTVELOCITIESFROM IN-FLIGHTEXPLOSIONSDUE TO
DESTRUCTOR MASSIVESTRUCTURALFAILURES:
i
I
MET (s) Flyer PlateVelocity(fps) ShrapnelVelocity(fps)
10 958 - 1949 6 - 354
30* 200 - 285 2 - 83
*Over-waterthreshold.
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B.3.3 Fireball Environment FromET Propellants
The updraftsand high temperatureswithin the fireballproducedby a
large liquidpropellantgroundfire are hazardsif the exposedRTG fuel
clads have been breachedearllerby severemechanicalimpactloads. The
releasedfuel fines in thiscase can be vaporizedand dlspers_dintothe
atmosphereby the fireballenvironment.
The fireballcharacteristicsand thermalenvironmentthat would result
from a massivespill of ET propellantsat the launchpad can be specified
by: (I) maximumfireballdia-eter,(2) fireballlift-offtime,
(3) durationof the fireball,(4) temperatureinsidethe fireball,and (S)
total heat flux producedwithinthe fireball.
Using av'ilableexperimentaland analyticalinformation,and assuminga
full ET load oF propellantis involved(I,Sg5,o00pounds),a maximum
fireballdiameterof 1,000feet is predicted. The fireballis alse predicted
to have a total durationof 30 secondsand to lift completelyoff the ground
after about I0 seconds.
The temperaturesto which an RTG could be exposedrange from
approximately4,000 degreesFahrenheitat fireballinceptiondown to 3,500
degreesFahrenheitat fireballl_ftoff. The total heat flux rangesfrom
I about300 to I00 Btu/second/feetL over the same time span.
B.3.4 Abort Crash Environments
Duringthe latteraerodynamicflightportionof a returnfrom a mission
abort,the Orbiterflieswithoutenginethrustand exhibitsthe samegeneral
flightcharacteristicsas a conventionalheavy aircraftduring a final
landingapproach. Assumingthat the orbiterhas enteredthis final phase
of the abortreturnunder normalcontrol,a crash could ensue due to
controlerror,or mechanicalfailuresof the flightcontrolsystemor
landinggear.
Examinationof the Orbiterflightprofileand flyingcharacteristics
leads to a set of four abortcrash accidentsthat are deemedcredible: two
landingscenariosand two oceanditch scenarios. In each case, crasheswith
and withoutthe final landingflare are consideredin estimatingthe
resultingrelative-impactvelocityof the RTG with the surroundingOrbiter
structure. The estimatedupper and lower boundsof these impactvelocities
are shown in TableB-8.
TABLE B-8. RTG IMPACTVELOCITIESDUE TO ABORT CRASH: SYS/IUS
Crash Scenario RTGImpact Velocity {fps)
Ditch No Flare 65-125
Ditch With Flare 50-110
LandingPre-Flare 60-120
LandingPost-Flare 50-65
B-16
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B.3.5 {nvironment_For Re-entryFromOrbi! !
i
Aerodynamicand heat transferanalysisof the uncontrolled,accidental
re-entryof the Shuttleprior to the deploymentof the upper sta(_a nd
payloadshows ti,atthe RTG conditionjust prior to earth surfaceimpact
varieswith the time of launchfailure. For the time intervalof interest
betweenSRB separation(MET- 128 seconds)and the achievementof the
parkingorbit (MET- 510 seconds),the predictionsare:
I) The Orbiterand IUSwill alwaysbreak up duringre-entryand wi!! not
reachthe surfaceintact.
j-
2) For MET lessthan 495 seconds,the RTGs or GeneralPurposeHeat Source
(GPHS)modulesreach the surfaceover the AtlanticOcean.
3) For MET between128 and 155 seconds,the RTGsreach the surfaceintact
and withoutcasc melting.
4) For MET between155 and 210 seconds,the RTGsmay reach the surface
withoutcase melting,or the GPHSmodulesmay be releasedprior to
reachingthe surface.
5) For MET greaterthan 210 seconds,the GPHS modulesare releasedprior
to surfaceimpact.
(
B.3.6 InertialUpper Staqe and PayloadEnvironments
The IUS vehicleitselfdoes not significantlyadd to any of the
accidentenvironmentsproducedby the main launchvehicle. The solid
propellantis not detonableunder credibleaccidentconditionsFor the
Galileomission. AlthoughIUS propellantimpactingthe groundas ejecta
from othereventsmay reactvigorouslyas an explosion,these events
produceonly localizedblast effects. In addition,the propellantdoes not
cont-ibutes!gnificantlyto fireballenvironmenLs,since the burn is
relativelyslow and occursat ambientpressure.
Some IUS failuresafterthe deploymentof Galileo/IUSf_o,nthe Orbiter
resultin errantre-entrywithinthe designcapabilityof the RTGs. Earth
impactconditionsare similarto thosefor re_entryfromorbit.
The only IUS failurethat can cause a directthreatto the RTGs is a
motor case ruptureduringthe secondfiringof the IUS. (h_dominantthreat
, from this failureis the productionof fragmentsof solidpropellant
estimatedto be travelingat velocitiesin the rangeof 92 to 728 feetper
secondand weighingfrom 2 to 8 poundsper fragment.
The Galileospacecraftalsodoes not significantlyadd to any of the
accidentenvironmentsproducedby the lau,chvehicleaccidentscenarios.
B.4 RADIOLOGICALASSESSMENT
The use of plutonium-238dioxide(Pu02)fuel, a radioactivematerial,
in the two GeneralPurposeHeat Source- RadioisotopeThermoelectric
&enerators(RTGs)and the 13! LightWeightRadioisotopeHeaterUnits
B-17
ii
1990012832-166
p:n
(LWRHUs)on the Galileospacecraftnecessitatesevaluationof the
radiologicalrisks to personsin the launchsitevicinityand the general
populationworldwideresultingfrompostulatedaccidentsoccurringduring
the mission. The inventoryof plutoniumdioxidefuel is 132,200Ci in each
RTG (264,400Ci total)end 33.6 Ci in each LWRHU (433_Ci total). The RTGs
and LWRHUsare describedin Section2.2 of this EIS.
FinalSafetyAnalysisReportshavebeen preparedby the U.S. Department
of Energy(DOE)addressingthe safetyaspectsof the RTGs (USDOE1988a,
USDOE 1988b,USDOE 1988c)and the LWRHUs(USDOE1988d,USDOE 1988e,USDOE
.- 1988)on the Galileomissionusingthe Space Shuttleas a launchvehicle.
The FinalSafetyAnalysisReportspresentthe resultsof safetyassessments, ..
includinganalysesand testing,of launchand deploymentof the RTGs and
LWRHUfor the Galileo_ission. The objectiveof this sectionis to
summarizethe resultsof the Final SafetyAnalysisReportsin terms of
potentialaccidentsand resultingradiologicalconsequencesand risks.
The RTG FinalSafetyAnalysisReportconsistsof three volumesas
follows:
i Volume1: ReferenceDesignDocument
Containsreferencedesigninformationthat providesa basis for Volumes
II and Ill. It containsdescriptionsof the RTG, the Galileo
• spacecraftand missionprofile,the Space Shu;tle,the InertialUpper
Stage (IUS),the trajectoryand flightcharacteristics,and the launch
site.
VolumeII: AccidentModelDocument
Summarizesthe potentialaccidentenvironmentsand associated
probabilitiesas describedby NASA in the ShuttleData Book (NASA 1988). .
Presentsa summaryof failuresequencesand any resultingfuelreleases
(sourceterms)basedon analysesand test data characterizingthe
resporseof an RTG to differentaccidentenvironments.
VolumeIIi: NuclearRiskAnalysisDocument
Summarizesthe radiologicalconsequencesof postulatedaccident
scena:iosby missionphase. Missionrisks,by missionphase,are a]so i
quantified.The radiologicalconsequencesand risks are reportedin
terms of the radiationdose and healtheffectsincurredby the affected
population,and levelsof depositionof radioactivematerialon the .
ground. '
The analysisis supportedby a seriesof appendiceswhich presentin
detailthe methodologyutilizedin risk assessment;biomedical.aspectsof
Pu02;meteorologicaldata; land use, oceanographicand water characteristics
at the KennedySpaceCenter; worldwidedemographic,land use, and
oceanographicdata;particlesizeconsiderations;and an uncertainty
anP!ysis.
The processof informationflow and analysesused in the RTG Final
SafetyAnalysisReportis summarizedin FigureB_5. The LWRHUFinal Safety
AnalysisReportconsistsof an analogousthreevolumeset.
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The remainderof this sectionsummarizesthe sourceterms based on the Ii
AccidentModel Document(SectionB.4.1),the radiologicalconsequences
methodology(SectionB.4.2),the accidentconsequences(SectionB.4.3),and
integratedmissionrisks (SectionB.4.4)basedon the NuclearRiskAnalysis
Documentand its appendices.
B.4.1 SourceTerms
[his sectionsummarizesthe accidentscenarioand accidentenvironment
that could result in a fuel releasefrom the LWRHUs. The accidentscenarios
and accidentenvironmentsthat could result in fuel releasefrom the RTGs
are presentedin Sectionsg.2 and B.3. Considerationsand conclusionsof ..
evaluatingthe damageto fuelcontainmentstructuresare summarized.
The fuel releasefrom an accidentis calleda sourceterm. A source
term consistsof the quantityof fuel released(expressedin curiesof
PuO_),the locationof the release,the particlesizedistributionof the
_el_asedPuO_, and the probabilityof release. The methodsfor developing
he sourcet_rms are described.
The radiologicalconsequencesof an accidentare dependenton several
: variables. These are the accidentscenario,releasecharacterization,
exposurepathwayparameters,and meteorologicalconditions. Each accident '
case is a combinationof the variables. The total numberOf combinationsis
very large,makinganalysisof all accidentcases impractical.Three cases !
for each missionphase are developedand analyzed. The method of selection
and the sourceterm for the selectedcases are described.
For the accidentscenariosand the associatedenvironmentsspecifiedby
NASA, the considerationsand conclusionsof evaluatingthe damageto fuel
containmentare summarizedas follows:
I) Explosionof externaltank propellantson or near the launchpad,
with the subsequentimplosionof the Orbiterpayloadbay walls
aroundthe RTGsdo not resultin breachof the FueledClads.
Distortionsof the clads generallyare lessthan the thresholdfor
breach.
2) In a smallpercentageof cases,externaltank propellant
explosionscould resultin releaseof FueledClads. The secondary
impactof the FueledClads on the concreteand steel surfaces _
aroundthe launchpad could resultin breachof so_,eclads.
3) Based on tests simulatingrangedestructor Solid RocketBooster
case rupture,Solid RocketBoosterfragmentsat velocitiesup to
695 ft/secin the face-onimpactattitudewill not breachthe
FueledCladswhen struckin the full RTG configuration.
4) The resultsof Solid RocketBoosterfragmentinteractiontests
with Orbiterstructureindicatethat attenuationby passage
throughthe wing and payloadbay wall can reducefragmentvelocity
up to 46 percentand spin rate up to 100 percent. Passagethrough
only the payloadbay wall can reducevelocityup to 20 percent.
These data, coupledwith the resultsof the large Solid Rocket
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Boosterfragmenttests,indicatethat Solid RocketBooster
fragmentsin the face-onattitudeat impactduring the first 105
secondsof missionelapsedtime will not cause a breachof the
FueledClads. A rangedestructof the vehicleduringthe 105-128
secondsof missionelapsedtime are of the face-onimpacttype.
5) Solid RocketBoosterfragmentsimpactingin an edge-onattitude
can breachthe fuelclads at velocitiesin the range of 130-370
ft/secdependingon the fuel and iridiumcharacteristics,and the
locationof impactwith respectto the clads,and the positionof
the FueledClads in the stackof modules.
p,
6) If re-entryoccursas a resultof a spacecraftfailureduringthe
VEEGAManeuverphase,the aeroshellsare expectedto fail and
releasethe GraphiteImpactShellwith FueledClads. The iridium
cladswill fail fromeutecticformationwith the graphitein the
GraphiteImpactShell. Impacton a hard groundsurfaceis then
L assumedto releaseall the fuel in the GraphiteImpactShell.
T 7) Both intactand damagedFueledClads and modulesmay have some
T residencetime in the fireballfrom liquidpropellantexplosions.
The effectsof the fireballwill not resultin breachof the
clads;the fireball,however,will modifythe particlesize
distributionor locationof any fuel releasedin the fireball.
8) ModulesreleasedduringOn-Orbitor PayloadDeployphase accidents
may releasesmall amountsof fuelupon impacton a rock or other
_" hard surfacesfor cases involvingland impactfollowingreentry.
The LWRHUsaboardthe GalileoSpacecraftcan be subjectedto a number
of hostileenvironments.A systematicassessmentof the responseof LWRHUs
to these environmentsshows that fuel releasewould occur only in certain
instancesduringa VEEGA superorbitalreentry(USDOE1988d,USDOE 1988e).
The probabilityof a releaseis 1.00 x 10TM forothemost probablecase,
5.00x 10-9 for the maximumcase, and 1.50 x 10TM for the expectationcase.
Accidentswith a probabilityof releaseof less than 1.00x 10"_ have been
droppedfrom consideration.Since the probabilitiesof releasefor the
LWRHUsare lessthan this cut off limit they are not consideredfurther.
Shuttlerelatedlaunchand ascentsourcetermswere calculatedusing
the LASEP-2program. LASEP-2uses a Monte Carlo approachto simulateRTG
responseto a given accidentenvironment.This is done using a minimumof
, 10,000trialsfor each scenarioor sub-scenarioconsidered,representing ";
variationson accidentenvironmentseverityand RTG componentresponses
determinedby probabilitydistributionsof conditionsbased on the accident
environments,hydrocodemodeling,and componenttest results. The LASEP-2
model dire,ts the calculationsto arriveultimatelyat FueledClad
distortion. Correlationsbased on RTG componenttestdata are then used by
LASEP-2to determineFueledClad crack size,the fuel releasequantityand
particlesizedistributionof the release(USDOE1988b).
The averageand maximumsourceterms are calculatedfor each accident
_ scenarioconsidered. One most probableand one maximumaccidentscenario
fromeach missionphase are analyzedin the NuclearRiskAssessmentDocument
• B-21
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(USDOE1988c). In addition,an accidentexpectationcase,which [
incorporatesall probabilitiesand sourceterms,is presentedfor each
phase. The definitionsof thesecases follow:
Most ProbableReleaseCase
J
The Failure/AbortSequenceTrees for each missionphase are examined
and the singlereleasehavingthe highestprobabilityof occurrenceis _ .
selected.All associatedreleaseswithinthe selectedsequencebranch(e.g.,
projectilebreachand impactson variousmedia of both breachedand
, unbreachedFueledClads)comprisethe sourceterm (USDOEIg88c).The
radiologicalconsequenceof the sourceterm for each of the 42 setsof daily ..
meteorologicaldata, which representthe 42 days of the launchwindow,are
then calculated. The resultsare rankedaccordingto populationdose, and
the case that representsthe 50th percentileof the rankingis selectedas
the most probablecase.
MaximumReleaseCase
Withina missionphase,the maximumfuelreleaseand the meteorology r
, that maximizespopulationdose throughinhalation,ingestion,and external
pathwaysis selected. The singlereleaseand all relatedreleasesin the
sequencebranchcomprisethe sourceterm (USDOE1988c).
f
E).pectationCase _
The expectationcase uses all of the averagereleasesand their _
probabilitiesto define a probability-weightedsourceterm, consideringall i
of the scenariospostulatedin a missionphase. The radiological _
consequencesof the sourceterm for each of the 42 meteorologicalsets are
calculated. The resultsare averagedto developthe expectationcase. The _
purposeof the expectationcase is to developthe componentsof a risk
analysisconsideringthe whole phase duration. It representsa
probabilisticombinationof all accidentscenarios(USDOE1988c). _.
The range fromzero to most probableand maximumcases presenta
representativerangeof releasesthat could occur. The most probableis the
releaseof highestprobability,but could be differentconsideringit is
representativeof only one set of the variables- quantityof release,
locationof release,particlesizedistribution,probabilityof accident
occurrence,and meteorologicalconditions. A change in any one of these,
exceptprobabilityof occurrence,could resultin a differentset of i
consequences.The maximumcase, presentingthe highestconsequences,is
'
developedprimarilyfor emergencyplanningpurposes. %
The most probable,maximum,and expectationsourceterms for each
missionphase are presentedin TablesB-9 throughB-11,respectively. Each _,
case is describedby type of accident,the curiesthat are estimatedto be i
released,the probabilityof release,categoryof release,and description _
of the accident. For example,in the Phase0 most probableaccident,the
type is a fire and explosionwhich resultsin releaseof 44 curiesof PuO2.
The releasehas a probabilityof 5 in I0 million,and will occur in the
fireballof the explosionwhile the Shuttleis sittingon the launchpad.
The PuO2 will come from FueledClads that are breachedby impactwith
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steel. Eachof the other phasesfor the most probableand maximumcases
presentedin _ablesB-g and B-tOcan be similarlydescribed.
Additionalexplanationof the Phase I most probablecase is necessary.
The accidenttype is a Solid RocketBoosterfallureresultingin the loss of
thrust. The releaseof PuO_comes from two categories,I) FueledClads
breachedby concretefragmefitsin the Fireball,and 2) FueledClads breached
by impactwith concreteoutsidethe fireball. The total sourceterm is 921
curieswith a probabilityof occurrenceof 3 in 10,000. The accidentoccurs
on the launchpad.
The expectationcases (TableB-11)are presentedin terms of accident ..
type, the categoryof release,the probabilityof release,and the amountof
PuO2 released. For example,for Phase0 only one accidenttype, a fire and
expTosion,make up the expectationcase. The releaseoccurs in the fireball
with a probabilityof occurrenceof 5 in 10 million. The Phase I
expectationcase is made up of seven accidenttypec, All have releasesin
the fireball,six alsohave releasesat groundlevel outsidethe fireball,
and two also have releasesat an altitudebut outsidethe fireball.
The particlesizedistributionsassociatedwith thesereleasGsare
basedon aeroshellmoduleand FueledClad impacttests conductedat Los
AlamosNationalLaboratory(USDOE1988c). For the most probableand
expectationcases,the averageof the particlesizedistributionsfor the
testsconsideredwas used as a startingpoint. Basedon the FueledClad
crack sizescalculatedby LASEP-2,the particlesizedistributionswere cut-
off at a particlesizeequal to one-halfthe maximumcrack size, and then
renormalized.A similarapproachwas taken for the maximumreleasecases
exceptthat the particlesize distributionfromthe testdata that would
maximizeradiologicalconsequenceswas selectedas the startingpoint. The
particlesize distributionswhich are the bases fcr both cases are
summarizedin FigureB-6.
A detaileddiscussionof the particlesizeconsiderationsis presented
in AppendixD of the FinalSafetyAnalysisReport,Volume Ill (USDOE1988c).
The resultsof this analysisshow:
I. Stratificationof the particlesin an explosionplume is very
rapid,usuallyoccurringwithinthe first kilometer(.6 mi) of
plumemovementafter an explosion.
2. The vaporizedPuO? is a significantcomponentof dose (86 percent
of the short-term-doseand 69 percentof the long-termdose).
e
3. The p_imarycontributorto surfacecontaminationabove the 0.2
uCi/m* screeninglevel are particlesin the 10 to 20 micronrange.
B.4.2 RadioloqicalConsequencesMethodoloqy
This sectionsummarizesthe methodused to determinethe radiological
consequencesresultingfromthe most probableand maximumcases for each
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missionphase. The evaluationof the radiologicalconsequencesof fuel
releasesfrom postulatedaccidentsincludethe followingsteps.
I. Identificationof the postulatedaccident,fuel release
probability,and releaselocation.
L
2. Sourceterm characterizationin terms of quantity,particlesize
distribution,and volumedistribution.
3. Analysisof the dispersionof the releasedfuel in the environment
to determineconcentrationsin environmentalmedia (air,soil, and
water)as functionsof time and space.
4. Analysisof the interactionof environmentalradioactive
concentrationswith peoplethroughinhalation,ingestion,and
externalexposurepathways.
5. EvaluationoC resultingradiologicalconsequencesin termsof
populationdoses and contaminatedenvironmentalmedia.
The types of radiologicalconsequencesfor the most probableand
maximumreleasecases include:
I. The "shortterm" radiationdose that resultsFrom the initial
!
exposure. The doses are 70-yeardose commitmentsresultingfrom
the extendedretentionof materialin the body.
2. The "long-term"radiationdose which would resultfrom continuing
exposureto materialsin the environmentover an extendedperiod
followingrelease. Long-termdoses includethose to offsite
KennedySpace Centerand worldwidepopulationsdue to inhalation +
of resuspendedmaterialand ingestionof contaminatedood over a
70-yearperiod. In additionlong-termdoses to onsiteKennedy
Space Centerworkersdue to inhalationof resuspendedmaterialis
calculatedfor an exposureperiodof 35 years based on 40 hours
per week.
3. Estimatesof land-and water-surfaceareascontaminatedcausedby
depositionof radioactivity.
This informationis presentedin the followingterms For each
representativecase:
I. Numbersof personsestimatedto be subjectto greaterthan
specifiedlevelsof both short termdoses and long term doses.
The launcharea populationdata, and worldwidepopulationdensity
data describedin Section3 are used as the basis.
2. Total short-termand long-termpopulationdoses. In calculating
populationdoses, the conceptof de minimishas been used,meaning
a dose level belowconcernand fromwhich no healtheffectsare
calculated. The de minimisdose (Davis,]g88)was taken to be I
mrem/yearand 50 mrem totaldose commitment.Total population
doses are reportedbothwith and withoutde minimis.
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3. The maximumshort-term and long-term doses to individuals.
4. Estimatesof land and surfacewater areascontamin_teaabove
specifiedlevels. The screeninglevel of 0.2 Ci/m_ established
by EPA, belowwhich no furtherconsiderationneed be given,has
been used (USEPA1977).
: The radiologicalconsequencesfor each missionphasewere calculated
for the most probable,maximum,and expectationcases using the KSC-EMERGE,
LOPAR,and HIPAR computermodels. Releasesin the troposhereare treated
using KSC-EMERGEand high altitudereleasesare treatedusing LOPAR for
- smallparticles(lessthan 10 micronsin diameter)and HIPAR for large
particles(greaterthan 10 micronsin diameter). The resultsfor the
maximumand most probablecases clearlyidentifyspecificcases intendedto
be representativeaccidentscenarios,while the resultsfor the expectation
case are used in the calculationof risk. Key featuresand assumptionsof
the analysisare summarizedbelow. Detailsof the methodologyare presented
in the Final SafetyAnalysisReport(USDOE1988c).
The sourceterms with their particlesize distributionsare given an
initialspatialdistributionappropriateto the conditionsfor release•
Releasesin the launcharea from surfaceimpactsoutsidea fireballare
given an initialclouddiameterof 10 metersat a heightof S meters.
Materialreleasedinto a fireballstartingout at groundlevel is given a
distributionin which 80 percentof the materialis in an elevatedcloud and
20 percentis in a verticalstem reachingtowardground.
The plume configurationresultingfrom liquidpropellantexplosionsand
fire has been estimatedbasedon resultsof highexplosivefield tests
involvingboth liquidand solidhigh explosives. The centerreleaseheight
and the diameterof the stabilizedcloud resultingfrom the explosion
fireballare correlatedto the TNT equivalentyield of the explosion.
Of the thermalenergyassociatedwith the completecombustionof liquid
propellants,it is estimatedthat 50 percentcontributesto the thermal
buoyancyof the initialfireball. The resultingcenterreleaseheight and
diameterof the cloudwere assumedto be representativeof the most probable
case of launchpad accidents. Since lower releaseheightsand smallercloud
dimensionsresultin increasedradiologicalconsequences,the cloud
specificationfor the maximumcase are based on a thermalreleasethat is 10
percentof that used in the most probablecase. This is withinthe range of
observedvariationsin verticalplumeconfigurationsfor a given energy
release(USDOE1988c). •t
Launcharea groundlevel sourceterms resultwhen FueledClads impact
hard surfacesat speedsabovetheir failurethresholdsor when previously
breachedFueledClads impactany surfaceoutsideof the initialfireball.
• Impactpointswoul_ be distributedaroundthe launchpad. All of these
distributedreleaseshave been assumedto be at the launchpad with an
initialheightof 5 m and an initial10 m cloud diameter• Populationdoses
shouldnot be significantlyaffected. The atmosphericdispersionof the
sourcetermmaterialwith the initialcloud specificationsdeterminedas
describedin _he precedingparagraphsis then calculated,usingmodels
describedbelow.
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The atmospheric dispersion of postulated releases in the troposphere
(altitudes less than about 10 km) in the vicinity of KennedySpace Center is
treated using the KSC-EMERGEmodel. KSC-EMERGEis a Gausstan puff-
trajectory model that treats meteorology that varies in time and space
(vertically) and accounts for verttcal plume configuration; particle-size-
,, dependent transport, deposition, and plume depletion, and sea-breeze
recirculation.
Meteorologyfor the launchwindow (October-November)is treatedin
terms of 24-hourhistoricalsequencesof meteorologicaldata. The launch
windowmeteorologyis representedby 42 such sequentialdata.
Releasesat high altitude_re treatedby a particletrajectorymodel
(HIPAR)in the case of large particles(greaterthan 10 microns)and by an
empiricalmodel (LOPAR)derivedfromweaponstestingdata in the case of
small particulatesand vapor (lessthan or equal to 10 microns).
Radiationdoses to populationsare calculatedbased on environmental
concentrations.The dose conversionfactorshave been derivedusing a model
developedby the InteragencyNuclearSafetyReviewPanel-Biomedicaland
EnvironmentalEffectsSubpanelfor the 1986SafetyEvaluationReport. In
the calculationof radiationdose, the conceptof de minlmishas been used,
representinga dose level below concern(NegligibleIndividualRisk Level,
or NIRL)(NCRP1987). A de minimisdose of ! mrem per year (50 mrem lifetime)
has been used. Populationdose is reportedin person-rem,which is the
cumulationof doses to all of the affectedpopulation.
The assumptionsand featuresof the analyseswhich are significantto
the magnitudeof the resultsreportedhere are:
I. The fuel remainsin the insolublePuO2 form in the environment.
2. Particlesizedistributionsare unchangedfollowingthe accident
except for the effectsof vaporizationin fireballs.
3. The initialplume configurationof ground leveland elevated
releases(cloudsize,height)is importantto the results.
4. Long-termdoses containa componentdue to Food ingestion. It is
assumedthat all vegetablesconsumedby the populationare grown
locally(in home gardens). This may be true for some individuals,
but is unlikelyto be true for the generalpopulation.
The radiologicalconsequencesof the PuO? releasesfor the most
probable,maximumand expectationcases are d_pendenton the cl,_i'acteristics ';
of the modelsutilizedand valuesselectedfor key model parameters. Due to
the potentiallylarge rangeof PuO2 releasesand environmer_talconditions
that could affectthe results,an uncertaintyanaly_;ishas been performedto
determinewhat variationfrom the 9stimatedradiolc_icalconsequencesand
missionrisksmight be expected(USDOE1988c).
Importantvariableparametersor conditionsaffectingthe radiologica]
consequencesand missionrisks includethe followirg:
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I.
Accidentscenario
e Accidentenvironment
• Accidentprobability
Releasecharacterization
e Conditionalsourceterm probability
: • Sourceterm
• Modificationsto the sourceterm and particlesizedistribution
becauseof mechanical,chemicaland physicalinteraction_rior *_
deposition
• Particlesizedistribution
_. Initialclouddimensions
• Verticllsourceterm distribution
• Releaselocation
Meteorologicalcond;tions
%
• Atmosphericstability
• Wind speedand direction
• Mixingheight
e Sea-breezerecirculation
• Fumigation
e Space and time variation ,"
Exposurepathwayparameters
• Populationdistribution
• Resuspensionfactor
• Depositionvelocity
• Vegetableingestion
• Protectiveaction
Radiationdoses and healtheffects
• Internaldose factors
e Healtheffectsestimator- Potentialvariationin these
parametersor conditionsand their effecton the radiological
consequencesand missionrisks are evaluatedin the uncertainty
analysis. However,the approachtaken is dependenton the type of
radiologicalconsequencesunder considerationwhich includethe
following: ."
q
- Short-termpopulationdose (withand withoutde minimis)
- Long-termpopulationdose (withand withoutde minimis)
- Surfacecontaminationlevels !
- Healtheffects.
Populationdose healthefiects,and risk, are the primarytypes of
resultsconsideredin the ullcertaintyanalysis. The otherm_asuresare
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Wdiscussed_.nereappropriate,but are consideredas being of secondary
importancefroman uncertaintyviewpoint, i
i
T_e detaileddescriptionof the uncertaintyanalysisand the
methodologyusedare presentedin AppendixH of the Final SafetyAnalysis
Report,VolumeIll (USDOE1988c). The followingpresentsa summaryof the
uncertaintyanalysisresults.
The uncertaintyfactorsresultingfromconsiderationof accident
probabilities,releasecharacterization,meteorologicalconditions,and
exposurepathwayparametersare summarized. Based on these uncertainty
factors,the overalluncertaintyassociatedwith varioustypes of
radiologicalconsequencesand missionrisk are determined.
• The log-normaldistributionsof each of the individualuncertainty
factorrangeswere combined,such that the overallmean uncertaintyfactor
was taken as the productof the individualmean uncertaintyfactors
affectingthe resulttype. The standarddeviationof the log-normal
d_stributionrepresentingthe overallrangewas determined.
: Ba_ed on the methodologyoutlinedabove,the resultingoverallmean
uncertaintyfactorsand associatedrangesare summarizedin Table B-12. The
' uncertaintyfactorsrepresentmultipliersthat could be appliedto the
resultspresentedin the followingsectionsin order to describethe
potentialeffectsin more preciseand realisticterms. However,in all
cases but one (thePhase I missionphase risk-surfacecontaminationarea)
the mean overalluncertaintyfactorwill reducethe p_!blich_althand .
environmentalconsequences.Thereforeit is not as conservativeas the "
approachused.
B.4.3RadioloqicalConsequenceResults
The resultsof the radiologicalconsequenceanalysisfor the most
, prooableAnd maximumcases are summarizedin TablesB-13 and B-14.
_ Referenceshouldbe made to TablesB.-9 ,,d B 10 in relatingaccidentfuel
releasescenariosanG radiologicalconsequences.
TablesB-13 and B-14 presentthe releaseprobability,populationdose ,_
in person-rem,total and abovede mini_is,and the area with deposition
abovethe screen!nglevel of 0.2 uCi/m_. The depositionareas are further
dividedintodry land, swamp,inlandwater and ocean. ForAexamplefor Phase
I most probablecase the releaseprobabilityis 3.30 x 10TM. Total :_
populatiopdose is 176 person-remwith 0.003person-ramabove de minimis. . ,
Areaswith depositionare 43.3 squarekilometersof dry land, 15.9 square ,:
kilometersof swamp,25.7 squarekilometersof inlandwater, and no ocean
areas.
• The resultsfor the most probablecase show the populationdoses i
varyingfrom a total person-remrangeof 0.23 in Phase 2 to 1,280 in Phase
5. The pnpulationdose above de minimisrangesfrom 0 person-remin Phase0
to 83Z person-remin Phase 5. [he totalperson-remfor the _naximumcase
ranges_-om8 in Phase2 to 54,000in Phase 5. The populationdose abovede
"' minimisrangesfrom I person-,'emin Phase2 to 52,900person-remin Phase 5.
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TABLE B-12. OVERALLUNCERTAINTYANALYSISRESULTS !
OverallUncertaintyFactor
ResultType Meana Ra_ag__eb
_ • Radiologicalconsequencesa
- Short-termpopulationdose 0.25 0.013 - 4.6
" - Long-termpopulationdose 0.22 0.0042- 1.4
- Total populationdose 0,23 0.0067 - 7.9
_ - Healtheffects 0.23 0.0063- 8.5
- Surfacecontaminationarea 0.75 0.051 - 5.2
• Missionphase riskb
Phase i
- Short-term population dose 0.42 0.061 - 2.9
% - Long-term population dose 0.37 0.024 - 5.7
- Total population duse 0.39 0.035 - 4.3
'- - Health effects 0.39 0.032 - 4.8
- Surface contamination area 1.3 0.22 - 7.8
Phases O_ 2-5
- Short-term population dose 0.25 0.55 - I.I
- Long-term population dose 0.22 0.019 - 2.5
- Total populationdose 0.23 0,029 - i.8
- Healtheffects 0.23 0,026 - 2.0
- Surfacecontaminationarea 0.75 0.20 - 2,9
a. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor radiologicalconsequencesmultipliesthe
expectationcase results(TableB-15) to yield a best estimateof the
expectationcase results. The best estimateresul_ for the expectation
case shouldbe multipliedby the uncertaintyfactorrange to yield a best
_ e_timateof the 5- and 95-percentilevaluesof the range of radiological
consequences.
• b. The mean uncertaintyfactorfor missionphase riskmultipliesthe mission
phase risk results(TableB-16) to yield a bes_ estimateof missionphase
risk (definedas total probabilitytimes expectationcase }esults). The
best estimateresultfor missionphase risk shouldthen be multipliedby
the uncertaintyfactorrange to yield a best estimateof the [- and 95-
percentilevaluesof the best estimatefor the missionphase ri_k.
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Individualimpactsare expressedin termsof individualdose and the
numberof personsexceedingthe lifetimedose level. These are presented
for the most probable,maximum,and expectationcases in FiguresB-7 through
B-g.
Thes_ figuresshow for the most prchable,maximumand expectationcases
the numberof personswho will exceedd' _erentlevels. For examplefor
Phase I most probablecase (FigureB-7) approximatelyi personwill receive
a lifetimeclose of 50 mrem.
B.4.4 InteqratedMissionRisks
o.
The missionrisks associatedwith the use of the RTGs and LWRHUson the
Galileomissionhave been assessedbasedon the sourceterms for the
expectationcases. The resultingradiologicalconsequencesarisingfrom the
expectationcases are summarizedin Table B-15. The overallmissionrisks
associatedwith the RTGs are presentedin Table B-16.
These resultsare based on the averagesourceterms from all the
postulatedaccidentsand their probabilities.The release,dispersion,and
dose calculationconditionsfor these (many)componentsof the expectation
sourcetermswere the same as those assumedfor the most probablerelease
cases. Since these are probabilityweightedconditions,they are
representativeof no specificscenarios. Only the "bottomline" risk
i resultshave any significance.
Risk, in termsof individualrisk of cancerfatalitywithin the
affectedpopulationreceivingdoses can be comparedwith other risks due to
naturaland man-madehazards,as summarizedin Table B-17.
B.5 ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENTMETHODOLOGIES
The plutoniumdioxide(PuOR)releasesfor the most probable,maximum
and expectationcases are descrTbedin SectionB.4. Since the most probable
and maximumcases are developedto identifypopulationdose impactsand
thereforedo not necessarilyrepresentmaximumenvironmentalconsequences.
They representan emphasison impactsto populationareas and tend to
minimizeimpactsto naturaland water areas. The expectationcase more
accuratelyreflectspotentialenvironmentalimpactsbecauseit is not
designedto emphasizepopulationdose but ratherto representthe averageof
all releaseswithina missionphase,combinedwith the averagemeteorology
_. withoutregardto populationdose. In generalthiswill result in a :
decreasein depositionon land ares and increasein depositionin water
: areaswhen comparedto the most probableand maximumcases. Areas of '
radioactivedepositionresultingfromthe most probable,maximum,and
expectationcases are presentedin SectionB.4, TablesB-13 throughB-15.
Accidentalreleasescan occur in the KennedySpace Centervicinity
duringPhases0 and I and at unspecifiedareasworldwideduringPhases2 -
5. Section3 of the EIS presentsa descriptionof the environmentsthat
could be affectedby radioactivedeposition. Two differentimpact
assessmentmethodologieswere developedto analyzethese releases.Both
methodologiesuse the mos! probable,maximum,and expectationcases. One is
for the KennedySpace Centervicinityduring Phases0 and I. The other is
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fTABLE B-17. INDIVIDUALRISK OF FATALITYBY VARIOUS
CAUSES FOR THE UNITEDSTATESa
Numberof Approximate
AccidentType Fatal Accidents IndividualRisk
I for 1983 Per YearC
Motor Vehicle 44,452 2 in I0 thousand
Falls 12,024 5 in iO0 thousand ..
Drowning 5,254 2 in 100 thousand
Fires and Flames 5,028 2 in 100 thousand
Poison 4,633 2 in 100 thousand
Water Transport 1,316 5 in i million
Air Travel 1,312 5 in 1 million
Manufacturing 1,200 5 in 1 million
Railway 1,073 4 in 1 million
Electrocution 872 4 in I million
Lightning 160 7 in 10 million
Tornadoes 114b 5 in 10 million
Hurricanes 46b 2 in 10 million
All Other Accidents 9,311 4 in 100 thousand
All Accidents 77,484 3 in 10 thousand
Diseases 1,631,741 7 in 1 thousand
Source: USBC 1986
a. Based on 1983U.S. population
b. 1946 to 1984 average
: c. Fatality/TotalPopulation
B-42
P
1990012832-191
globalfor Phases2 5. Includedwithinthe KennedySpaceCenter
assessmentmethodologyis a discussionof the relationshipof PuO_ particle I
siz_distributionte the potentialareas of radioactivedepositioB. The
methodologyfor estimatingpotentialeconomiccosts resultingfrom the
accidentsis also provided.
B.5.1 KennedySpace Centerand Vicinity
The methodto assessimpactsfrom Phase0 and Phase I accidents
involves3 main steps. The first step is the identificationof areaswhere
there could be depositionabove a specifiedlevel for each of the three _.
. cases by missionphase (TablesB-13 throughB-15). [he level chosen is
based on EPA guidance(EPA1977) for contaminationof soil by unspecilied
transuranicelement§ includingPuO2 and is expressedin micr_curiesper
squaremeter (uCi/m_i. This EPA screeninglevel is 0.2 uCi/m_ at particle
sizes les_ than 2 mm. The EPA suggeststhat areas contaminatedabove the
0.2 uCi/m_ level shouldb_ evaluatedfor possiblemitigationactions. The
recommendedscreeninglevelwas selectedon the basisof limitingthe
additionalannualindividualrisk of a radiationinducedcancerdeath to
less than one chance in one million. Given that humansare generally
consideredthe speciesmost sensitiveto radiationeffects,contamination
belowthe screeninglevelis conservativelyjudgedto have minimalimpacts
on other _lant and animalspecies. Thus, areaswhich do not exceedthe
0.2 uCi/m_ screeninglevel are consideredto have negligiblepotentialfor
significantenvironmentalimpact,and are not analyzed.
A
i
The data presentedin T_blesB-13 throughB-15 identifythe area
contaminatedabove 0.2 uCi/m_ for four categories:dry land, swamp,inland
water, and ocean. The dry land categoryincludesall non- wetlandinland
land cover classes,suchas, uplandforest,urban,and agriculturalareas.
The swampcategoryincludesall _etlandtypes,such as coastalmarshesand
mangrove,and freshwatermarshesand swamps. The inlandwater category
includesall estuarine(brackish)and freshopen water. The oceancategory
is any marinewaters.
The secondstep is to adjustthe dry land areacategoryto reflectthe
typesof land uses that occurwithinthis category. For example,potential
impactsto naturalhabitats,within the dry land category,are likelyto be
quitedifferentfrom potentialimpactsto urban areas,alsowithin the dry
land category. To estimateenvironmentalresourcesthat could be affected
by deposition,the dry land areaswere assumedto be similarto the
percentageof urban,agriculture,and naturalvegetationlandcover types in
BrevardCounty. _
i
The percentagesfor BrevardCountyare used as an approximationof the
relativeamountsof these land cover types in any area contaminatedby a
Phase0 or I release. A databaseobtainedfrom the EastCentralFlorida
• RegionalPlanningCouncil(ECFRPC1988)was used to determinethe percentage
of urban area and naturalvegetation. Data on the percentageof
agriculturallandswere obtainedfrom anotherstudy (USDOE1983),which
includedidentificationand tabulationof land uses within32 kilometersof
LaunchComplex39 at KennedySpace Center,and overlayedon the East Centra]
FloridaRegionalPlanningCouncildatabaseto determinethe relative
percentagesof the three cover %'pes. The resultsof this analysisshow
B-43
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thatdry land areas are composedof approximately74 percentnatural
vegetation,21 percenturban,and 5 percentagricultural.These
percentages,representedas decimaln ,_ers,are theftmultipliedwith the
dry land total presentedin TablesB-I_ throughB-J5 to estimatethe area of
these covertypes that is affectedfor each Phase 0 and Phase I accident
case.
The last step in environmental assessmentmethodology is the
identification of the nature and magnitude of the impacts in the areas
affected_ A brief discussion of how PuO2 movesthrough the ecosystem and
how it could affect plant and animal species is presented in B.6. Potential
exposure effects are determined through a survey of PuO_research ..
literature. In addition to effects caused by exposure to PuO2 in the
environment, deconta_nination and mitigation activities employ6d to reduce
PuOpexposure could also affect natural habitats and humanland uses.
Potential decontamination and mitigation methods are also presented in B.6
along with an analysis of the impacts resulting from mitigation activities.
Because PuO_deposition is partially dependent upon the distribution of
PuO2 particles r_leased during an accident, two fundamental assumptions were
made. The first is that particles of released PuO_will be distributed such
that the majority of large particles are deposited-closer to the
accident/impact site, with the size of particles decreasing with distance.
The second assumption is that the highest concentrations of released curies
are closerto the releasepoint,and thatconcentrationswill tend to
decreasewith distance.
B.5.2 GlobalAssessment
Becauseareasof impacLsin the latterphases (2 - 5) are unknown,the
environmentalimpactsare discussedin generalterms. The relative
percentagesof naturalvegetation,urban,and agriculturallandcover types
elsewherein the world are unlikelyto match the percentagefor the Kennedy
Space Centervicinity. Therefore.no distinctionsare made withinthe dry
land class presentedin TablesB-13 throughB-15 For Phases2 - 5.
B.5.3 _¢onomicImpact
Due to the uncertaintyin definingthe exact magnitudeof economic
' costs associatedwith the r_diologicalimpacts,a range of mitigationcosts :
t
were estimatedin orderto boundthe costswhich could resultfrom an
, accident.The minimumeconomicimpact_s basedon the estimatedcost of a w
radiologicalmonitoringprogram. This estimaterepresentsthe costs of
equipmentand personnelneededto developand implementa comprehensivelong '
ter_nmonitoringprogram. The maximumeconomicimpactis definedas
comprehensive_mitigationactionsundertakenon all areas contaminatedabove
the 0.2 uCi/mz level. The economiccosts followinga pote_Itialaccident
could be reasonablyexpectedto fallwithin this range. Only economic
impactsassociatedwith the effectsof radioactivedepositionare estimated
in this analysis.
The post-accidentmonitoringprogrambuildson the initialmonitoring
effortin place at the timeof the launch. Beforelaunch,monitoringteams
and equipmentfrom DOE, EPA,NASA, and the Stateof Floridawill be in place
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and commence monitoring as part of the Federal Radiologica_ Emergency
Response Program (FRERP) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment [
Center and Radiological Control Center operations. In the event of an
accident, these teams would continue monitoring for at least 30 days, after
which EPA assumes responsibility for long term monitoring. A large.
percentage of the costs associated with this program occur in the first year
or two: a program plan must be developed, equipment must be purchased, and
personnel must be hired and trained. After the program has been initiated
: and a shakedown period has been completed, costs decrease to a maintenance
". level necessary to run the program in the succeeding years. Lonsultations
with experts in the radiological monitoring field have provided the costs
for a radiological monitoring program. The cost estimates are presented in
.- Table B-18.
A number of factors can affect the cost of radiological decontamination
and mitigation activities including:
• Loc_.ion - affecting ease of access _o the deposition, eg. a steep
hillslope could be more expensive to cleanup than a level field,
also access to the site location and necessary decontamination
resources sL'chas heavy equipment, water, clean soil, etc.
• Land cover type - the characteristics of some kinds of land covers
makp them more difficult and therefore more expensive to
- decontaminate, for example plowing and restoration ot'a natural
vegetation area c_uld be more costly than using the same technique *
in an agr_cu_tural area
e _,_tial cor,_aminationlevel - higher levels of initial
' contamination can require more sophisticated an_ more costly ,
decontamination techniques to meet a particular cleanup standard
" than a lower level of initial contamination '
i
• Decontamination method - more sophisticated methods, such as
wetland restoration is much more expensive than simple actions
such as water rinses
e Disposal of contaminated materials - dispesal of contaminated
vegetation and soils onsite could be much mo e cost-effective than
•transportation and disposal of these same material to _ distant
repository
e Cleanup standard. ,_
' In setting the level at which specific mitigation efforts will be v
taken, one must t_ke into accoun_ the character,stics of the materi_l
deposited• _s has been stated, Pu02 is extremely low solubility in _ater I,
and has a low bioaccumulation rate within the _ood chain; its alpha
. emissions are short range, and the primary concern is inhalation of I
_ respirable fines Fi_lly, the recommended screening level of 0.2 uCi/m? i
• !
results in a potential dose rate of about 0.25 mrem/yr, so mitigation steps I
oth¢:rthan monitoring may not be warranted or below that level. i
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WTABLE B-18. MONITORINGPROGRAMCOST ESTIMATES I
(
Period Activity Cost
Year one Transitionfrom launchmonitoring $1,000,000
activity,plan development, _ !
supplementalequipmentpurchases,
hiringof personnel
Year two Testingand shakedownof program 500,000
methodsand monitoringnetwork,
monitoringof mitigationactions
Year three Transitionto longterm monitoring 250,000
of impactsand mitigationactions
Year four and Programmaintenance 100,000 _ :
each succeeding
year
t
L
r.
t
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At thistime, while contingencyplanningis activelyunderway,it is
not yet complete. Planningto date is as follows:
• In the eventof an accident,the groundmonitoringprogramwill be
based upon;
- airbornemeasurementsof the amountand characteristicsof
the release
- atmosphericmodel estimatesof the amountand locationof
materialdeposited,using recentclimatologicaldata
Guidanceunderdiscussionat EPA and DOE indicatethe need to reduce
dose ratesto below 100 mrem/yrand as-low-as-reasonably-achievable(ALARA).
The draft guidancedoes not indicatecleanupfor dose levelsof 10 mrem/yr
or less. For the purposeof this EIS, an estimateof area cleanupto 25
mrem/yris used to indicateALARA.
Not withstandingthis estimate,actualmititgationactivitiesand
cleanuplevelswill be based upon a separatespecificenvironmental
analysis.
While the actualcost of cleanupassociatedwith a potentialaccident
can not be predictedwith great precisiondue to the numberof factors
involved(above),an approximationcan be developedfrom data providedin an
EPA report (EPA1977). That reportindicatedthat in 1977,cleanupcosts
could range from approximately$250,000to $2,500,000per squarekilometer
($1000to $10,000per acre) if removaland disposalof contaminationis not
required. Removaland disposalof contaminatedsoilat a near-surface
facilitycould cost from approximately$36,000,000to $47,500,000per square
kilometer($145,000to $190,000per acre). In terms of 1988 dollars,these
costs shouldbe doubled. (Cleanupwithoutremovaland disposalwould range
from $500,000to $5,000,000;and with disposal,from$72,400,000to
$95,000,000. )
In addition, there are significant secondary costs associated with the
decontaminationand mitigationactivities,such as
• Temporaryor longerterm relocationof residents
• Temporaryor longerterm loss of employment
e Destructionor quarantineof agriculturalproducts,including
citruscrops
e Restrictionor bans on commercialfishing
" e Landuse restrictions(whichcJuld effectreal estatevaluesand
tourismactivity)
e Publichealtheffectsand medicalcare.
• In order to determinethe magnitudeof these secondaryeffects,results
from a nuclearreactorrisk assessmentmodel were used. A U.S. Nuclear
Regulatorydocument(NRC1975)presentsresultsfrom a probabilisticrisk
assessmentand an economiccost distributionfor accidentsat commercial
nuclearpower plants. Althoughthe kinds of radioactivecontamination
resultingfrom a potentialnuclearreactoraccidentare quite differentthan
the contaminationresultingfrom an RTG accident,the decontaminationand
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mitigationactivitieswould be very similar.Therefore,the NRC findingsare
consideredapplicablein this study.The cost dist_'ibutionstudy found that
decontaminationcosts accountfor approximately20% of the total economic
cost of an accident. In otherwords,the total cost of radioactivecontami-
nationaccidentcould be as much as five times the directdecontamination
costs. This multiplierof 5, howeverappliesonly to those types of areas
thatwould incur secondarycosts,namelythe urban and agriculturalland
cover typesdescribedin SectionB.5.1. %
Usingthe two sourcesof informationabove,in conjunctionwith the
surfacedepositiondata, a rangeof economiccosts resultingfrom the
decontaminationand mitigationof most probable,maximum,expectationcases ._
can be estimated. At the lower end of this range are decontaminationand
mitigationactivitiesthat stabilizethe depositionin place,with no
removalof vegetationor soilsand a lesserdegreeof environmentaland
secondaryimpacts. At the high end of the range,vegetationand soil are
removed,the most highlycontaminatedstructuresare demolished,and all of
thesematerialare placedin a geologicalrepository. These actionswould
have significantenvironmentaland secondaryimpacts. Table B-19 presents
hypotheticaldecontaminationand mitigationactionsrepresentedin th_ low
and high range of cleanupcosts.
In order to determinethe estimateddollarcost of the range of cleanup
optionsfor Phase 0 and ! accidents,the area of depositionfor each land
cover type is multipliedby the lowestand highestunit cost for cleanup
discussedabove,$500,000and $95,000,000per squarekilometer !
respectively. For urban and agriculturalareas,this value is then
increasedby a factorof five,representingthe inputof the secondarycosts
mentionedabove. For Phase2 -5 accidents,the depositiondata are
multipliedby the low and highdollarvaluesabove.As a conservative
estimationof secondarycosts,the entiredry land total is increasedby a
factorof five to capturethese secondarycosts.
B.6 ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES I
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof an accidentin I
which plutoniumdioxideis releasedto the environment.A briefdiscussion i
of how PuO_behavesin the environmentprecedesthe impactanalysis.The
impactanaTysisis dividedinto two major categories,I) the potential
impactsof the representativemost probable,maximumand expectationcases
during Phases0 and I; and 2) the potentialimpactsof the representative
most probable,maximumand expectationcasesduring Phases2, 3, 4, and 5.
These cases are describedin SectionB.4. Tiledescriptionof the affected
environmentin Section3 of this EIS is also used.
Resultsare presentedfor exposureimpactsand mitigationimpacts.
Exposureimpactsare those that resultfromthe depositionof PuO_ on
variousenvironmentalmedia and subsequentmovementof PuO2 in th_
environment.They includeimpactsto naturalenvironments;water resources,
man-usedresources,and agriculturalresources. Mitigationimpactsare
those impactscausedby decontaminationand mitigationactivitiesundertaken
to reduceradioactivecontaminationlevelsin the environment. The economic
cost estimatesassociatedwith the impactanalysesare also presented. The
methodsdescribedin SectionB.5 are used in this assessment.
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B.6.1 PlutoniumDioxidein the Environment
The exten and magnitudeof potentialenvironmentalimpactscausedby
PuOp releasesresultingfrom STS/IUSaccidentsare dependenton the mobility
and-availabilityof PuO_ in the environment. The mobilityand availability
of PuO_ in turn, is directlycontrolledby a number Jf physicaland chemical
parametersincluding:particlesize,potentialfor suspensionand resuspen-
sion, solubility,and oxidationstateof any dissolvedPuO_. It is these
factors,in conjunctionwith the three potentialexposure_athways(surface
contact,ingestion,and inhalation),ti_atdeterminethe impactson aquatic
and terrestrialecosystems.
The size of PuO2 particlesis an importantfactorin assessingimpacts
to environmentalresourcesresultingfrom an accidentalrelease.Particle
sizecan affectthe rate of dissolutionof PuO2 in water and the initial
suspensionand subsequentresuspensionof partTclesin air and water. The
dissolutionand the suspension/resuspensionpotentialultimatelycontrolthe
mobilityand availabilityof PuO2 to plant and animalspecies,including
man. Generallyspeaking,largerparticleshave less potentialfor suspen-
sion and resuspension;as particlesize decreases,particlesare more easily
kept in suspension. Dependingupon the surfacearea per unit mass of these
particles,the effectof gravitymay be counterbalancedby a resultingair
resistance_ Consequently,turbulencefrom air currentscan cause these
' particlesto remainsuspendedfor long periodsof time.
Particlesizeshave been predictedfor the Phase0 fireballaccident.
Distributionof the PuO2 aerosolis shown as a functionof particlesize and
is also shownas a correspondingpercentageof the total sourceterm of the
accident(the sourceterm valuecan vary for each accident).
Particlesize is correlatedwith depositionrange. For a fireball
accident,approximately94.5percentof the releasedcurieswill be depos-
itedas particlesgreaterthan 44 microns,and the greatestnumberof these
particleswill fall in an area from 0 to 10 km from the accident.
Approximately1.5 percentof the releasedcurieswill be depositedas
particlesin the range of 30 - 44 microns,and the greatestnumberof these
particleswill fall in an area from 10 to 20 km From the accident.Approxi-
mately2.5 percentof the releasecurieswill be depositedas 10 - 30microns
particles,and the majoritywill fallwithin the rangeof 20 -50km from the
accident. The smallestparticles,those less than IO microns,accountfor
approximately1.5 percentof releasedcuries,and the majoritywill travel
greaterthan 50 km.
For both the fireballand groundlevel accidents,largerparticleswill
tend to settlequicklyout of the air close to the accidentlocation.
Smallerparticleswill remainin the air longerand may be transportedsome
distanceby winds. These finerparticlescould also be more easily
resuspendedby subsequentwind action.
In aquaticsystems,largerparticleswill quicklysettleto the bottom
sediments,while smaller,silt-sizeparticlesmay remainin suspension
withinthe water column indefinitely.Smallerparticlesmay not even break
the water surfacedue to surfacetension,insteadforminga thin layeron
the water surfaceand subsequentlybeing transportedto the shoreline
B-50
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(Bartram1983). Resuspensionof smallerparticlesfromthe bottomcan occur !
due to physicaldisturbanceof the sedimentsby wave action,recreational J
use of the water bodies (suchas swimming,boatingand fishing),as well as
by the feedingactivityof aquaticspecies. Plutoniumdioxideparticles,as
a componentof the bottomsediments,may alsobe transportedtowardand
along the shorelineby wave actionand currentsin near shoreenvironments.
A numberof factorscan affectthe solubilityof PuO_ in water.
7 Physiochemicalparametersmost importantto the solubilit_of plutonium
dioxideare the reactivesurfacearea and oxidationstate of PuO2 and the
solute (water)chemistryincludingpH, Eh, and temperature.Mass to surface
.. area ratiosof particlesaffectreactivityand solubility,with solubility
being inverselyrelatedto particlesize. The solubilityof plutoniumin
water has beenmeasuredat 10-13moles/L(Looney,et. al. 1987). Although
this measurementwas made undermildly oxidizingconditionsat a pH of 5.0,
it servesto illustratethe low solubilityof plutoniumin aqueoussystems.
It is also importantto note that dissolvedplutoniumconcentrationsin
water can increaseunder the followingcondition_(Bartram1983):
e IncreasingpH
e Increasingdissolvedorganiccarbonconcentrations(DOC)
• Increasingoxidizingconditions
e Increasingcarbonat_concentrations
• Increasingnitrateconcentrations
• Increasingsulfatecuncentrations.
Plutoniumalso tends to dissolvemore readilyin fresh water,and at
coolertemperatures.Once in solutionthis plutoniumcan coexistin
multipleoxidationstateswhich can affectits availabilityto organisms.
The solid/_olute_istributioncoefficient(Kd)for plutoniumhas been
estimatedat 10_ to 10v (Looney,et. al. 1987, BaFtramet. al., 1983). This
means that plutoniumenteringintoa water/sedimentsystemwould be
preferentiallytaken out of solutionand bound in saturatedsedimentsin
amounts10 to 100,000timesgreaterthan the amountsthat would remain in
the associatedwater column.
The Kd for plutoniumvariesbasedon the oxidationstate of the
element. Under the oxidizing_conditionssimilarto those encounteredinb+
most surfacewater bodies,Pu would tend to b_ the dominantspeciesof •
plutonium,and the KA would be approximately10_. Under the reducing .
conditionsencounteredin most bottomsedimentsand groundwatercbodies,Pu4+
' would tend to be dominant,and the Kd would be approximately10v (Bartram
1983).
Plutoniumdioxidemay be carriedintothe soil by a numberof routes
• including:percolationof rainfalland subsequentleachingof particlesinto
the soil, animalburrowingactivity,and plowingor otherdisturbanceof the
soil by man. Migrationof the PuOpparticlesintothe soilcolumn is of
concern,primarilybecauseof the _otentialfor Pu02 to reach groundwater
aquiferswhich are used as drinkingwater supplies.-The opportunitywould
most likelyoccur where surfacecontaminationis depositedon primary
aquiferrechargezones. Plutoniumappearsto be extremelystable,however,
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once depositedon soils. Soil profilestudieshave shownthat generally
more than 95 percentof the plutoniumfrom falloutremainedin the top 5 cm
of surfacesoil after 10 to 20 years of residencetime in undisturbedareas
(USDOE1987).
Directcontaminationof an aquiferwhere it reachesthe surfaceis
possiblealthoughit would be expectedthat clays,organics,and other
anionicconstituentswould bind most of the PuO?. The bindingof PuO_ would
occur in the first few metersof sediment,thereforegreatlyreducing-the
concentrationof this constituentwith depth. This naturalfilteringof
PuO? would probablyreduceconcentrationsto levelsthatwould be below the
PrimaryDrinkingWater Standardof 4 mrem for exposuredue to drinking ..
water.
It is also possiblethat surfacewater runoffcontainingPuO? could
directlycontaminatedrinkingwater suppliesfrom surfacewater bSdies
(USDOE1988c). The dangerfrom this type of contaminationis greatestdue
: to suspendedPu02 and not from dissolvedPuO2. Becauseof this, filtering
of the surfacewater beforechemicaltreatmentmay be enoughto reducethe
i concentrationof total plutoniumto an exposurelevel of less than 4 mrem.
i The availabilityof PuO2 to biota in aquaticand terrestrial
environmentsdependson the Foute of PuO2 exposureto the biota and the
physicaland chemicalinteractionof PuO_with the water and soil of the
affectedarea. These interactionsdeterminewhetherPuO2 is availablefor
i root uptakeby plantsand for ingestionand inhalationby aquaticand
I terrestrialfauna. The routeof PuO_ exposurediffersbetweenthe two basic
I categoriesof biota,floraand faunaT Flora,in both aquaticand
terrestrialenvironments,can be exposedto PuO2 contaminationvia surface
I wJ contamination,root uptake,and leaf absorption.Fauna can be exposedvia
! skin contact,ingestion,and inhalationof PuO2 particles.
Surfacecontaminationand skincontactdoes not pose a significant
dangerto the biota. The alpharadiationemittedby plutoniumhas very
littlepenetrationpower (Hobbset al. Ig80). Therefore,littlepenetration
can occur throughthe skinof fauna. In addition,severalstudieson root
uptakeand leaf absorptionof Pu02 indicatethat very little,if any, PuO2
is absorbedby plantswhen PuO_ is in an insolubleform (Bartrumet al.
1983,Cataldoet al. 1976,SchOIzet al. 1976).
The significanceof ingestingPu02 can vary betweenterrestrialand
aquaticfauna. Most plantshave limiteduptakeand retentionof PuO2 and
the digestivetractsof the animalsstudiedtend to discriminateagalnst
transuranicelements(Bartrumet al. 1983,Cataldoetal. 1976,Schulzet al.
1976). However,ingestionmay be significantfor small fauna in terms of
total exposure. These fauna,especiallythose that burrow,ingestsoil
alongwith food material. If the soil is contaminated,ingestionof PuO2
could result. Althoughthe transferfactorfrom the intestinaltract to-the
blood and other organsis small,total activitypassingthroughthe tract
could be large.
The impactof ingestingPuO_by aquaticfauna can be significant
dependingon PuO2 availability.-For example,studieshave found that
bioaccumulation_f PuO2 does occur in benthicorganismsthat ingest
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sedimentscontaminatedwith PuO_ (Thompsonet al. 1980). However,most of 1'i
these studiesalso indicatedthat the bioaccumulationof PuO2 was nut
criticalto the uppertrophiclevels,includingman.
Inhalationis consideredto be the most criticalexposureroute for
terrestrialfauna (Wicker1980). However,inhalationimpactdependson
severalfactorswhich includethe frequencyof resuspensionof PuO), the
concentrationand size of resuspendedparticles,and the amountaclually
" : inhaled(Schmel1980, Pinderet al, undated). Smallerparticleshave a
greaterchancethan largerparticlesfor beingresuspendedand inhaled.
Althoughmany of the particlesmay be subsequentlyexhaled,the smallest
particleshave the greatestlikelihoodof beingretaineddeep in the lung
(Hobbset al. 1980,Thompsonet al. 1980). However,resuspendedmaterial
availablefor inhalationis on the orderof Ixi0TM of the grounddeposition,
thus high levelsof groundconcentrationwould be requiredto constitutea
riskto animalsthroughthis route•
No definitiveresearchhas beenconductedthat definesthe specific
effectsof PuO_on plant and animalspecies,particularlyat the relatively I
low contaminatTonlevelsresultingfrom potentialSTS/IUSaccidents.
Generallyspeaking,however,radiationcan cause threemain types of
physicaleffectson organismsI) somaticinjury,that is damageto the
normalmorphologyand functioningof the exposedorganism;2) carcinogenic
injury,that is an increasein the incidenceof cancers;and 3) genetic
injury,affectingreproductivecells and causingdeleteriousgeneticchanges
in organism'soffspring. Any of these three physicaleffectscould cause L
increasedmortalityto exposedorganisms. Althoughmaximallyexposed
individualorganismscould die as a resultof these effects,overall
ecosystemstructureis not expectedto change,and thereforeno significant
ecologicalconsequencesare anticipated.
J
B.6.2 Assessmentof Impactsto K_nnedySpaceCenterand Vicinity ,:
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phase O,
Prelaunch/Launchand Phase I, FirstStage Ascentaccidents. Phase 0 i,
includesthe time periodof 8 hoursbeforelaunchuntil launch. Includedin
this periodis the loadingof the liquidpropellants,firingof the Orbiter
main engines,and firingof the solidrocketboosters. Phase I, First Stage
Ascent includesthe periodfrom launchto 128 secondsof missionelapsed
time. Includedin this phase are lift off, clearingof the tower,clearing
of land, and burnoutand jettisonof the solidrocketboosters.
B.6.2.1 SurfaceAreas Contaminatedby RepresentativeAccidents
The land areas contaminatedfrom the most probable,maximum,and
expectationaccidentsin phases0 and I are presentedin Table B-Ig• i
The sourceterm rangesindicatethat most radioactivematerial(94.5
percent)will remainwithin 10 km of the accidentlocation(within i
controlledarea) ,"
Surfacecontaminationresultingfromthe Phase0 most probablecase
producesa total areaof 18.70 kmc which will receivedepositionabove 0.2
uCi/m_. The phase I most probableaccidentproducesa totaldepositionarea
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of 84.90 km2 above the 0.2 uCi/m2 screening level. The breakdownof these t
totals by the six land cover types (natural vegetation, urban, agricultural, 1
wetlands, inland water, and ocean) is shownon Table B-20. Ocean impacts do
not occur for either the Phase 0 or Phase I accident scenarios.
The _hase 0 maxiwumcase produces a total surface area depositio_ above
km=O'_.uCi/m= of 6.94 km_. The Phase 1 maximumcase produces as area of 5.43In both phases, inland water receives the greatest amountof!
contamination (Table B-19). _ '
• The Phase 0 and 1 expectation cases produce total areas of 16.66 and
70.11 km2, respectively, above the deposition screening level of ..
0.2 uCi/m2. In both cases, natural vegetation is the land cover receiving
the greatest contamination.
Areas of deposition for the expectation and most probable cases are
greater than the area of deposition for the maximumcase because the maximum
case maximizes dose to persons. Hence, the meteorology tends to be more
concentrated.
In all cases, 94.5 percent of released radioactive is contained in
particles greater than 44 umand will be deposited within 10 km of the
accident/impact site. The extra energy imparted to the released material by
the explosion and fireball may scatter smaller particles beyond 10 km. 1Particles 10 umand smaller could travel 50 km and more.
B.6.2.2 Exposure Effects
Deposition of PuO_from Phase 0 and 1 most probable, maximum,cases
will have littledirecteffecton land cover. The materialwill not
physicallyalter land cover unlessa particleprovidesenoughheat to start
a fire. Although,PuO2 can affectthe human use of these land covers,there '
is no initialimpacton soil chemistry,and most of the PuO? contamination
depositedon the water bodiesis not expectedto react chemicallywith the
water column. No significantconsequencesto flora and fauna are expected
from surfacecontaminationand skincontactwith the PuO2, exceptwhere
particleconcentrationand/orsize is great enoughto overheatthe
contaminatedsurface.
Plutoniumdioxidedepositionfrom the most probable,maximum,and
expectationcases do not have any directeffectson historicalor
archaeologicalresources. It will not physicallyalternor chemically
degradehistoricalor archaeologicalresources.
B.6.2.3 Long Term and MitigationEffects
i
Long term effectsfrom the depositionof PuO_on the KennedySpace
Centerand vicinityare discussedfor the six lan_covers: w,atural i
vegetation,urban agricultur,wetlands,inland,water, and ocean. A ._
descriptionof potentialmitigationmeasuresand relatedconsequencesis
also presented. It is assumedthat any areawith surfacecontaminationwill i
be monitoredto determinethe specificdegreeof impact.
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NaturalVeqetationand Wetlands "a,
Plutoniumdioxidedepositedon the soil will interactwith inorganic
and organicligandsto form primarilyinsolublecompounds. It is expected
that over 95 percentof the plutoniumwill remainin the top 5cm (2 in) of
surfacesoil for at least 10-20years. No mitigationis necessarybecause
of long term impactsto soil. Mitigationrequiredfor other reasonsmay
result in significantsoil impacts.
As discussedin SectionB.6.I,surfacecontaminationand skin contact
does not pose a significantdangerto biota. No significantconsequencesto
flora are expectedfrom root uptakeand leaf absorption. Ingestionby
terrestrialfauna is negligibleexcept for small faunadue to ingestionof
contaminatedsoil. This could resultin a largetotal activitypassing
throughthe generalintestinetrack. Inhalationdue to resuspendedmaterial
is small (Ixi0"Q of grounddeposition.).No significantimpactsto biota
would be expectedin any of the areas receivingsurfacecontamination.
Areas of highestconcentrationare the resultof depositionof larger
particlesor chunks,which are noninhalable.
The particulat_PuO_on the surfaceof the water bodies is not likely
to be readilyavailableTor consumptionby pelagicaquaticfauna. The
amountof PuO_to be suspendedor _issolvedin the water column is predicted
to be slightl_higherthan ! x 10"_ of the concentrationof PuO_ deposited
in the _o_tomsediment. Thus, for any wetlanda_ea contaminate_at
2.0 uCi/m_ of PuO2, approximately2 x 10TM uCi/m_ of PuO_will be dissolved
or suspendedin tee water column. This small amountof PuO2 availablein
the water column is not consideredto have significantimpaEtsto the
aquaticfauna thatmay ingestthe dissolvedor suspendedPuO2 In
addition,studieshave indicatedthat highertrophiclevel organisms,such
as fish, that are likelyto live withinthe water columnhave a low
accumulationfactor (USDOE1987,USDOE 1988c).
Overall,the major potentialimpactsto the naturalvegetationand
wetlandbioticresourcesof the KennedySpaceCenterand vicinityresulting
from Phases0 and I most probableand maximumreleasecase accidentsinclude
bioaccumulationof PuO2 by benthicorganisms,and bioaccumulationof PuO2 by
the aquaticvegetationT Becauseof the potentialfor bioaccumulationto-
occur in aquaticvegetationand benthicorganisms,there is a potentialfor
the PuO_ to travelup both the terrestrialand aquaticfood chain. However,
bioaccu_ulationof plutoniumdecreaseswith highertrophiclevels Impacts
to the biologica]diversityare not expectedto occur. Redistributionof
PuO2 is a possibleoccurrence,especiallywhen contaminatedterrestrial
fauna, includingbirds,move from one place to another. However,it is
unlikelythat theywill createany additionalimpactsthat have not already ' ;
been described.Recyclingof PuO2 will predominantlyoccur with vegetation
and faunahaving shortlife spans. The bacteriathatdecomposesthe organic
mattermay accumulatePuO2. However,most of the PuO2 shouldreturnto the
sediments. In the aquatiEenvironmentthismay promo[ethe continuanceof
bioaccumulationof PuO2 by the benthicorganismsand aquaticvegetation.
Mitigationof the impactsto flora and fauna in naturalvegetationand
wetlandareas could be accomplishedthrougha combinationof monitoringand
remedialactionbased on monitoring.The amountof PuO2 resuspendedin the
air in naturalareasdeterminesif PuO_concentrationsmay pose inhalation
healthhazardsto man. If levelsare aeterminedto pose inhalationhealth
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hazards, then access to the area could be restricted until monitoring
indicates that PuO2 concentrations will no longer pose a potential health
hazard.
Aqricultural
Citrusgroveson the _ennedySpace Centerwill be contaminatedwith
PuO at or above 0 2 uCi/m_ from Phase ! most probable,maximumand2 .
expectatloncases. A studyon PuO2 contaminatedcitrusgroves indicated
' that the plutoniumdioxideon the Truitsurfaceswas not readilywashable
with water. The PuO2 could enter the human foodchain throughtransferto
internaltissuesdurlngpeelingor in reconstitutedjuices,flavoringsor
other productsmade fromorangeskins. Approximately! percentof the PuO2
"" depositedon the orangegroveswould be harvestedin the year following
deposition. Almostall would be from fruit surfacecontamination.In
contrastwith the fruit,plutoniumwas readilywashed away from leaf
surfaces(Pinderet al, undated).Thus, if the leaf surfaceswere washed,
recontaminationof the fruit shouldnot occur. Resuspensioaof plutonium
from the soil via splashup was also studied. Ver_'little,if any, reached
the fruitor leaf surfaces. This was believedto , .urbecausesplashup
generallydoes not reacha heightgreaterthan I m (3ft)above the ground.
Most orangetree leavesare over I m (3ft)above the ground.
Mitigationof contaminatedcitrusfruitcould includecollectionand
disposalof the contaminatedfruit accordingto Federaland State
Regulations.To preventfuturecontaminationof citruscrops and protect
the safetyof workers,_he trees could be washeddown to removePuO from
the leavesand the soil aroundthe treescould be coveredwith new _oil to
reduceresuspension.Futurecitruscrops could be monitoredfor PuO2
contaminationbeforesoldon the market.
Other crops grown in areas off the KennedySpaceCe.ter sitemay be
contaminatedby surfacedeposition.These cropswould be examinedand washed
to ensureno contamination.Those crops that can not be decontaminatedmay
be destroyed. The landon which the crops have beengrown would be
monitoredand scrapingimplementedif th_ monitoringshows significantPuO2
concentrations.
Urban
The areas of landcover used by man (e.g.,buildings,ro_ds,ornamental
vegetation,and grass areas)contaminatedabove the 0.2 uCi/m_ level would
be monitoredto determineif decontaminationor mitigationactionsmight be
necessary. It is possiblethat monitoringwould indicateno cleanupis
necessary. Ifmitigationactionsare necessary,temporaryrelocationof the
populationfrom theirhomes and workplacesmay be required. Cleanupactions
could last from severaldays to severalmonths. Rainfallcould wash paved
surfacesand exteriorsof buildingsand move PuO2 into the surfacesoil and
surfacewaters.
There are severalarchaeologicalsiteson the KennedySpace Centersite
and vicinitywhich may receivedepositionby PhaseOand I accidents. In
addition,KennedySpace Centerfacilitiesthat have historicalsignificance,
and are not damagedin the blast,could also have PuO2 depositedon them.
Presentlyunknownarchaeologicalsitescould be withiBthe area of deposi-
tion, and might be affectedby the cleanupactionsundertakenin those areas.
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iThe deposition also has a long term affect on future investigation at
any archaeological site. Archaeological digs by their very nature disturb !J
the soil surface with digging and sifting operations, which could expose
workersand othersto the PuO2. Radiologlcalsafetymeasureswould need to
be taken to preventpotential-healtheffectsto the workersand could
greatlyincreasethe cost of investigatingthese sites. If investigationof
archaeologicalsitesthat have PuO)depositedon them is proposed,a safety
analv_i_would be completedand approvalto proceedfrom appropriateFederal
and/orstate authorities. '
InlandWater _nd Ocea_
The waters surroundingMerrittIslandare classifiedby the State of
Floridaas Class II and Class Ill waters,with radionuclidecontamination
thresholdlimitsof 15 pCi/l. Most of the PuO2 depositionis not expected
to be dissolvedin the water column,therefore;PuO2 is depositedin these
_aters,this thresholdlevel is not expectedto be exceeded.
Some of the waterssurroundingMerrittIslandare considereJ
OutstandingFloridaWaters (OFW). These watersare designatedto receive
protectionwhich supersedesany otherwater classificationsand standards,
and as such prohibitsany activitywhich reduceswater qualityparameters
below existingambientwater qualityconditions. A Phase0 or Phase I
accidentcould depositsufficientamountsof PuO2 to resultin violationof
this protectionstandard.
Althoughshellfishharvestingis prohibitedor unapprov_din some
waterssurroundingMerrittIslanddepositionabove0.2 uCi/m= could impact
an area of conditionallyapprovedshellfishharvesting.
Mitigationof PuO2 impactsto inlandwater bodiesmay includeany of
the following:
e A11 ditchesand borrowpits with shallowdepthsand i_!clo_e
proximity_tohumar activityreceivingsurfaceconcentrationsof
0.2 uCi/m_ or greatermay need to be monitored.If the monitoring
resultsprovideevidenceof contaminationthe ditchesand borrow
pitsmay need to be drainedand any contaminatedsedimentremoved
and disposedof withinFederaland State requirements.Larger
areas of pondedwater in close proximityto human activitycan
also be monitored. Mitigationcould includeskimmingto remove
the surficiallilt:of PuO?. Monitoringafter skimmingwill
determinethe need for wa_er and/orsedimentremoval. Measures
shouldbe employedto reducesurficialrunoffand sedimentfrom ' '
enteringwater bodieswhich are used by man.
t
e Recreationalwater activities(e.g.,swir,_ing,boating)as well as
sport and conBercialfishingmay need to be restrictedin larger
water bodiesuntilmonitoringresultsindicatethat it is safe for
them to be resumed.
Monitoringthe amountof PuO2 suspendedand/ordissolveJi;ithe wate,
columnsof impactedwater bodies_ill determineif PuO_ has b_en deposited
in the sediments.Benthicorganismssuch as clams,scaTlops,and crabs
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shouldbe monitoredfor bioaccumulationof PuO_. If bioaccumulationof PuO2 !
in benthicorganismsis significant,then it s_ouI" be determinedif J
consumptionof suchorganismswould pose a human ,,..th hazard. If it is
determinedthatconsumptionof such organismswill pose a human health
hazard,harvestingof suchorganismsshouldbe banneduntil concentration
levelswithinthe organismsno longerpose a Chreat.
If it is determinedthat PuO2 concentrationsare significantin either
the water or sedimentof impacted-waterbodies,then Pu02 bioaccumulationin
aquaticvegetationshouldbe monitored. If bioaccumulatTonof PuO_ in
aquaticvegetationis foundto be significant,then organismsthat-feedoff
•_ of these aquaticplantsshouldalso be monitoredfor PuO2 bioaccumulation
and the levelsof bioaccumulationdeterminedthat could pose a human health
threatif such organismsare consumed.
Surfacecontaminationlevelsmay also impactthe rechargeareas of the
surficialaquifer. The surficialaquiferservesas the potablewater source
for tne citiesof Titusville,Mims, and PalmBay. In additionmany wells on
privateland in the areause the surficialaquiferas a sourceof water.
Plutoniumdioxidemay have the potentialto contaminatethis aquifer,but
given the fact that PuO2 is essentiallyinsoluble,it is unlikelyfor any
contaminationto reach _he wellheadsof municipalwater supplies. It is
' alsohighlyunlikelythat any contaminatiohon the KennedySpace Centerwill '
reachoffsitewells,includingmunicipalwater supplywells. Transport
throughthe underlyingaquatardto the lowerFloridanaquiferis considered
veryunlikely.
Mitigationcould includeassessmentof the amountof contaminationin
the differentsoilhorizonsin aquiferrechargeareasto determineif the
plutoniumdioxideis migratingto the water table. If the potentialfor
migrationof PuO2 to the aquiferis high, these areascould be scrapedto
belowthe contamlnationdepthand the spoildisposedof properly. Private
wells in the area of contaminationcould be monitoredand alternativewater
suppliesdevelopedif contaminationoccurs.
B.6.2.3 EconomicImpacts
The boundingeconomiccost of each accidentfor Phases0 and I are
presentedusingthe methodsdescribedin SectionB.5._. In all cases the
minimumcostwill be the costof the monitoringprogram. This programis
estimatedto cost $1 millionin the firstyear, $500,000in the secondyear,
$250,000in the thirdyear and $100,000per year afterthe third. These
numbersmay be somewhatless for Phase 0 and somewhatmore for Phase I since
the areas contaminatedin the Phase I accidentsare greater.
%
The majorityof contaminationresultingfrom Phase0 most probableand
maximumcase accidentsis confinedto the KennedyS_aceCentersite. The
economicimpactsfromthese accidentswill thereforebe confinedto Kennedy
Space Centerfacilitiesand operations. Cleanup,as a mitigation measure
appliesto areascontaminatedat 25 mrem/yror above. The model yieldedno
areascontaminatedat this level,thus cleanupcosts are noted as zero.
The Phase I most probablecase accidentshave the highestlevelof
impactson the KennedySpaceCenterand vicinity. Table B-21 providesa
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breakdownof economiccost associatedwith the Phase I cases.The costs for !
the most probablecase range from $7.6 millionto $762 million.The maximum J
case has costs of SO.B millionto $65 million.
The expectationcase representsdepositionon an area of 7.2 km2. The
cost of cleanuprangesfrom $5.3 millionto $392 million. Of the six dry
land cover categories,agriculturehas the lowestminimumcost of $.04
f million. The maximumcost of $317.2millionis For the clean up of urban
lands. Since the majorityof the depositionis estimatedto occur on
KennedySpace Centerproperty,the costs are estimatedto be toward the low
end of the cost range. Secondarycosts for agriculturaland urban uses on
the KennedySpace Centerprobablywill not be 5 times the clean up costs. ..
All agricultureon the KennedySpace Center is citrusproductionon leased
land and the urban areas are industrialareas. Impactsto wetlands and
naturalareas on the KennedySpace Centercould be isolatedby controlling
accessrather than removaland restoration.Ocean clean up costs are
limitedto searchand removalof large particles. This is also estimatedto
be at the lower end of the cost range.
B.6.3 Ass_s@ment.ofGlobal Impacts
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phases2, 3, 4,
and 5 as describedin SectionB.2 The methodologyof impactassessment 'i
presentedin SectionB.5.2 is used to determineand describeimpacts.
Mitigationtechniquesthat may be used are describedalong with the impacts
that may resultfrom mitigation.
The contaminationFrom Phases2 through4 will resultfrom accidentsin
which modulesimpacta hard surface. For phase 5, the contaminationwill
come from the impactof GraphiteImpactShells. The number of modulesor
shells is presentedin TablesB-9 and B-IO. j,
Each of the modu]esor GraphiteImpactShells involvedin the accidents
will releasePuOR at a differentlocationseparatedby kilometersto
hundredsor thousandsof kilometers. Each releasepoint is independentof
the other.
Depositionfrom the Phase 2, 3, and 4 cases did not exceed the cleanup
level so no costs have been estimated.
The estimatedeconomiccosts of Phase 5 are presentedin Table B-22. "
The depositionthat exceedsthe screeninglevel occurson dry land and
inland_water(FiguresB-13_ B-14, and B-15)._The areas of impactvary from
0.2 km: for the most probablecase to 1.4 km: for the maximumcase. Costs
for the maximumcase vary from $3.5millionto $657 million.
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APPENDIX C i
ANALYSIS/CONSEQUENCESASSESSMENTFOR THE TITAN IV
LAUNCHVEHICLE
r
C.I LAUNCHVEHICLEAND PAD DESCRIPTION
An overalldescriptionof a Titan IV/IUSconfigurationfor the Galileo .
mission,accidentscenario,environmentsand probabilitieswas compiledfor
the SafetyAnalysisbelow (MartinMarietta1988).
- C.I.1 GeneralDescriotion
The Galileospacecraftand its InertialUpper Stage (IUS),when
launchedon a Titan IV, is protectedby a 56-footlong payloadfairing
(PLF). The integratedflightvehicle(stack)consistsof the spacecraft,
its adapter,upper stage,PLF, and the Titan IV launch vehicle (shownin
FigureC-l). The launchvehicleconsistsof the two-stagehypergolic
liquid-propellantcore vehicleand the two solid propellantrocketmotors
(SRMs)attachedto oppositesides of the core vehicle. The SRMs are located
well below (behind)the spacecraft.
The total lengthof the integratedflightvehicle(stack)is about 174
feet (exitof SRM nozzlesto nose of PLF). The diameterof the core vehicle i
and each of the SRMs is about 10 feet (120 inches);the diameterof the PLF
is about 200 inches. The total weightof the integratedflightvehiclejust
priorto ignitionof the SRMs is nearly2 millionpounds;about 6Z percent
is in solidrocketfuel of the two SRMs;the liquidpropellantof the core
vehicleis only about22 percentof the total weight. The solid fuel weight
in the two-stageIUS is only a littleover 2 _ercentof the solid fuel of
the SRMs; the liquidpropellantweightof the space-craftis less than one-
half percentof that of the two stagesof the core vehicle.
C.I.2 LaunchComolex
LaunchComplex41 is used at Cape Canaveralto launchthe Titan IV (see
FigureC-Z). It includesa ready building,complexsupportbuilding,fuel
holdingarea, protectiveclothingbuilding,oxidizerholdingarea, gas
storage,paint-oil-lubricantbuilding,emergency power shelter,launch
stand,exhaustduct, umbilicaltower,aerospacegroundequipmentbuilding,
mobileservicetower,air conditioningshelter,camerapads, and television
towers. •
T
At the launchcomplex,the stack is readiedfor launchnext to the
permanentumbilicaltower (seeFigureC-3). The umbilicalmast, permanently
mountedon the transporter,accompaniesthe launchvehiclefrom the vertical
integrationbuilding. The transporterconsistsof the transporterframe
which servesas the launchplatformand undercarriageassemblieswhich are
moved from the launchcomplexprior to the actuallaunch. The mobile
servicetower,which surroundsthe launchvehicle,is moved away shortly
beforelaunch. )
The launchpad is a concretedeck with fixed foundationsto supportthe
launchtransporterwith the mountedTitan IV launchvehicle,the mobile
servicetower,and the umbilicaltower. A concreteexhaustduct is an
integralpartof the launchpad and deflectssolidrocketmotor exhaust
t'!
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FIGURE C-l. DIAGRAM OF TITAN IV CONFIGURATION
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY C-2
1990012832-216
FIGURE C-2. MAPOF KSC AND CCAFS
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FIGURE C-3. DIAGRAM OF UMBILICAL TOWER AND MOBILE SERVICE TOWER
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gases away from the launch pad to reduce the acoustic and overpressure _
launch environments.
For range safetyconsideration,the relativeareas of hard and soft
surfaceshave beendeterminedwithina 600-footradiuscircleof the
positionof the launchvehicle. Sand occupies70 percentof the total area,
asphaltoccupies23 percent,and concreteoccupiesabout 7 percent. All
major buildingsare includedin the concreteportionas each is built on a
concreteslab and has eithera reinforcedconcreteroof or one of steel beam
coveredwith corrugatedsteel. With past Titan launches,no personnelhave
been a11owedwithin8,000 feet of the launchpad at the time of launch.
This distancemay be increasedfor Titan IV launches.
C.I.3 Launch/Fliqh)Seaue_ce
Lift off of the integratedflightvehicleis accomplishedsolelyby use
of the SRMs firingtogether,generatingaround3 millionpoundsof thrust.
Maximumaerodynamicforcesare encounteredapproachingthe mid-pointof the
SRM burn. The first stageof the core vehicleis startedjust beforethe
SRM burn is completed(atwhich time the SRMs are jettisoned). Towardthe
end of the first stageburn, the PLF is jettisoned(as soon as the atmosphere
is sufficientlytenuousso that aerodynamicheatingto the spacecraftand
: upper stage is acceptablylow. When the firststage (liquid)has used up
its propellant,the secondstage (alsoliquid)of the core vehicleis
started;this processseparatingthe first stage. Upon completionof the
secondstage firing,a very low Earth orbit (witha minimumaltitudeof
85 n mi.) is achieved(lifetimeis estimatedto be up to about a day), and
the IUS-spacecraftcombinationis separatedfrom the secondstageof the
corevehicle. Time sequenceinformationof the nominallaunchprocessis
listedin Table C-I. At an appropriatetime/locationin Earth orbit,the
first stageof the IUS is fired,followedby the secondstage,sendingthe
separated5,700-poundspacecrafton its inter-planetarytrajectoryto swing
aroundVenus,beforeit passesby Earthtwice on its way to Jupiter. A
diagramof a nominalinterplanetarytrajectoryis shown in FigureC-4.
TABLE C-I. ASCENT-INJECTIONACTIVITIESFOR REFERENCEMISSION(GALILEO)
L l i
Sequence Time
ii i i
SRM Ignition 0.0
Lift off of Titan IV launchvehicle 0.2
, Startof Titan Ist stageliquidengine 117
SRMjettison 126
Pt.Fjettison 250
Startof Titan 2nd Stageliquidengine 303
Separationof IUS-Spacecraftfrom Titan 543
(IUS-Spacecraftis in low Earth orbit) )
IUS Stage I ignition 5,605 !
IUS Stage I burn out 5,757 -
IUS Stage 2 ignition 5,875 i
EscapevelocityfromEarth gravityfield 5,965
reached
t
IUS Stage 2 burn-out 6,005 i
C-5 i I
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C.I.4 Ranne Safety
To ensurethat the Titan IV/IUSlaunchvehicleond its payloadwill not
pose a threatto peopleor propertyon the groundin the event of a launch
accidentor failure,the followingrange safetycapabilitiesexist on the
launchvehicle:
I) The liquidpropellantsof eitherstageof the core vehiclecan be shut
off.
2) The liquidpropellantsof the core vehiclecan be disbursedby
.- rupturingthe tanks. This capabilitymay also be incorporatedfor the
spacecrafttanks by a shapedchargelocatedon the second (upper)stage
of the IUS.
3) The ;olilpropellants(SRMs and IUS)can have their thrustterminated
and/orthe propellantbrokenup by rupturingthe outer caseswith an
explosive-chargedestructsystem.
The rupturingcan be accomplishedby the inadvertentseparation
destructsystem(ISDS)which is automaticallyinitiatedby on-boardsystems
if eitherof the SRMs inadvertentlybecomesdetachedfrom the core vehicle.
Althoughonly the SRM which experiencesan unscheduledseparationis
initiallydestroyedby ISDSaction,the consequencesof this actionwill
cause furtherelementsto becomeseparatedand subsequentlydestructed.
The Range SafetyOfficer(RSO),basedupon the interpretationof the launch
vehicle'sactualtrajectoryversusthe acceptableone, can initiatethe
commandshutdownand destructsystem(CSDS)which will shutdown the motors
and/oractivatethe launchvehicledestructsystemby radio command.
C.2 USE OF THE TITAN IV/IUSAS A LAUNCHVEHICLE
The activitiesassociatedwith preparationof the spacecraftfor launch
on a Titan IV/IUSfor launchin 1991are minor. There are no expected
environmentalconsequencesassociatedwith these _ctivities,either in the
existing buildingsat the Jet PropulsionLaboratory(JPL)or at the KSC
(NASA 1988a).
C.2.1 ExpectedEnvironmentalConsequencesfrom NormalTitan IV/IUSLaunch
The anticipatedenvironmentalconsequencesassociatedwith the normal
launchof the Titan IV/IUSfrom CapeCanaveralAir ForceStation(CCAFS)have t
, been addressedby the U.S. Air Force in its EnvironmentalAssessmentof the
ComplementaryExpendableLaunchVehicle(CELV),datedJune 1986 (USAF 1986)
(TheCELV is now known as the Titan IV.) The CELV EnvironmentalAssessment
was supplementedin May of 1988 (USAF1988b). These two documentsform the
bases for the followingassessmentof a Titan IV/IUSlaunchof the Galileo
spacecraft.
Lan_ Use
The launchof the Galileomissionon a Titan IV/IUSfromCape Canaveral
Air ForceStationshouldhave no significantimpactson land uses at the
launchsilo or in the local areaor region.
C-7
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Air Quality
Air emissionswould be generatedduringall the launchphasesof the
Galileomission. Pre-launchemissionswould occur duringfuelingof the
Titan IV, from associatedindustrialoperations,and from the use of mobile
backupdieselelectricgenerators(USAF1986,USAF Ig88b)o Fmissionsfrom
fuelingwould be controlledby the use of a FuelVapor IncineratorSystem
(FVIS)and an OxidizerVapor ScrubberSystem (OVSS). Oxidizer(nitrogen
tetroxide)emissionsof about 0.06 tonsof NOx during the pre-launchphase
will occur. Fuelingemissionswould occurover a 20-hourperiodduringthe
20-daylaunchcycle (USAFIgB8b).Both the FVIS and the OVSS representBest
AvailableControlTechnology(BACT)for the controlof fuel and oxidizer ""
emissions{USAF1986),and the air emissionsfromboth systemsare not
expectedto excee_NationalAmbientAir QualityStandards(NAAQS}.
The safetyof propellantloadingis increasedby the requirementthat
specificconditionsbe met beforeand duringthis activity. Range Safety
personnelmonitormeteorologicalparametersfrom the on-sitenetworkof
meteorologicaltowers,and integratethe data intothe WeatherInformation
NetworkDisplay(WIND)(USAF1986). The WIND systemcombinesthe
• meteorologicaldata intoa dispersionmodel to predictthe downwinddistance
to a safe concentrationassuminga "worstcase" spillof propellant. (The
worst case spill is a completelossof N204 fromthe launchvehicle.) If
the predictedcriticaldistanceincludesan on- er off-siteuncontrolled
area, propellantloadingis prohibitedby range safetycriteria, i
Launchemissionsare exemptfromFDER permitting(USAFIg88b),largely
due to the short-termintermittentnatureof the emissions. At launch,the
solid rocketmotors (SRMs)igniteand continueto burn throughthe first 115
secondsof the flight,at which time the Titan IV would be at an altitudeof
about 160,000feet and about30 milesdownrange. At this point,the main
liquidpropellantengineswould ignite. The principalSRM exhaustemissions
are aluminumoxide (A1203)particulates,gaseoushydrogenchloride(HCf)and
carbonmonoxide(CO)(DSAF1986). The exhaustemissionswould be distributed
alongthe trajectoryof the Titan IV, with the greatestemissionsoccurring
at groundlevel and remainingdetectablethroughthe first 2,500 feet of
altitude. The resulting"groundcloud"would be concentratedin the pad
area, and would dispersein a downwinddirectionfrom the launchsite.
Given the prevailingwinds duringthe springof the year, (seeSection
3.1.?),at the time of year when a 1991 launchof the Galileomissionwould
probablyoccur,the groundcloudwould tend to move to the west and
northwestfrom the launchsite. The Titan IV groundcloudwould be about
60 percentsmallerthan for the STS,given the smalleramountof solid
rocketfuel and fasteraccelerationof the Titan IV.
The Air Forceconcludedthat SRM exhaustemissionswould not affect
uncontrolled_reas in the vicinityof the launchsite (thenearest
uncontrolledareasare 16 km fromthe site) (USAF1986,USAF Ig88b).
Workersat and near the launchsitewould be appropriatelyprotected.
Duringthe post-launchphase_small releasesof fuel and oxidizerwill
probablyoccurwhen the filtersin thosedeliverysystemsare changed.
Estimatedreleasesare 0.5 poundof fuel and 0.1 pound of oxidizer(USAF
1988a). These releasesare unavoidableand are not expectedto
C-8
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significantlyaffectair qualityat the launchsite or in the local areaor
region.
Sonic Boom
The ascentphase of a Titan IV launchresultsin sonic booms (USAF
1986). Overpressuresfrom the ascentphasewill be experiencedover the
: open ocean. Shippingalong the oceantrack where sonic boom may occur is
warnedof impendinglaunchesas a matterof routine. No problemshave been
reportedas a resultof sonic booms.
•- Sonic boomswill alsooccur duringthe descentof spentsuborbital
boosterstagesand with randomre-entryof spent orbitalstages. The sonic
booms associatedwith these eventswill be relativelysmallcomparedwith
the ascentphase. As a matterof standardpractice,the ascentphase of all
Titan IV launchesand plannedre-entryof suborbitalstagesoccur over open
ocean areas,thus precludingsonic boomsover land areas.
Hydroloqyand Water Use
The principalsourceof potentialgroundwatercontaminationassociated
with the launchof the Galileomissionaboarda Titan IV/IUSat CCAFS is the
water used for delugeduringlaunchand for post-launchwashdownand fire
suppression(USAFIg88b). Approximately400,000gallonsof municipalwater
will be utilizedforthese purposesduringa Titan IV launch (about300,000
gallonsdelugewater,100,000gallonspost-launchwashdownand fire
suppressantwater). About 20 percentof thiswater is estimatedto flowoff
the launchpad and percolatedirectlyintothe shallowunconfinedaquifer
describedin Section3.1.3. The remainingwater would collectin the flame
bucketbeneaththe launchvehicle. Thiswater would be testedand if
meetingState of Floridaand Federalregulations,would be releasedto grade
to percolateintothe shallowunconfinedaquifer. If the water failsto
meet theseregulations,it will be disposedof in accordancewith applicable
regulations.An industrialwastewaterpermitapplicationhas been filed
with the FDER for the dischargeof deluge,washdown,and fire suppressant
water to grade. Given that the volumeof water involvedis relatively
small,no significantimpactto groundwaterhydrologyor water quality
shouldoccur.
Surfacewater hydrologyin the vicinityof the launchsite shouldnot
be affectedby the launchof the Galileomission. As noted above,the
waterborneeffluentsfrom the launchwill eitherbe dischargedto groundand
, will percolatethroughthe sands intothe shallowaquifer,or will be
disposedseparatelyas a contaminatedindustrialdischargein accordance
with Floridaand Federalregulations.
Surfacewater qualitymay be affectedby the groundcloud of SRM
exhaustemissions. The groundcloudwould tend to move downwindof the
launchcomplex,and would be residentat any given locationfor only a few
minutes(USAF1988b). Giventhe prevailingwinds in the springat CCAFS,
the groundcloudwould most likelymove to the west or northwestof the
launchsitetowardsthe BananaRiver and nearbymarsh areas. Given the
short-termnatureof the launchevent,significan'impactsto surfacewaters
from HCI depositionshouldnot ensue (USAFIg88b).
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Geoloqyand Soils
Launchof the Galileospacecraftaboardthe Titan IV/IUSis not
expectedto impactthe geologyof the launchsite, nor that of the localor
regionalareas.
BioloqicalSvstems
Launchof the Galileomissionaboardthe Titan IV/IUSat CCAFS is not
expectedto resultin long-termadverseeffectson terrestrialflora and
fauna (USAFIg86, USAF Ig88b). Wildlifedirectlyin the path of the ground
cloudwill experienceshort-termexposureto elevatedbut non-lethal --
aluminumoxide particulatesand hydrogenchloride(principallygaseous,with
some mist) with levelsdependentupondistancefrom LaunchComplex41.
Vegetationnear LaunchComplex41 is primarilysc_'ubhabitat. This
vegetativecommunitywould be subjectto impactsfrom HCI depositon. In the
"nearfield"within about700 feet of the launchcomplex,vegetationmay
experienceacute damagesimilarto that associatedwith STS launchesat KSC
(USAF1986). Vegetationin the "far field"(beyondabout 700 feet from
LaunchComplex41), may experienceshort-termimpactsfrom launchof the
Galileomissionsuch as leaf spotting. These effectsshouldbe less than
those experiencedwith an STS launch,given that a Titan IV would yield much
less HCI mist (abouthalf, USAF Ig88a)than experiencedwith the STS.
Aquaticbiotamay also be impactedby launchof the Galileomission
throughinteractionof the groundcloud with the aquaticenvironment.
Nearbysurfacewaterswill probablyexperienceshort-termacidification
dependingupon the directionthe groundcloud moves. Acidificationwould
likelybe shortterm due to rapidneutralizationof the HCI falloutby the
moderatelyhigh bufferingcapacityof BananaRiver water (TotalAlkalinity
141 to 164 mg/l; Calciumabout54 mg/l). Aquaticorganismswould likely
experienceshort term stressfromdepressionof pH, and if also subjectto
other seasonalstress(hightemperature,low dissolvedoxygen)some fish
killcould also ensue. If fish killsoccurred,theywould probablybe
experiencedin smallnearby impoundmentsand not in the BananaRiver itself.
Shouldthe groundcloudmove over the nearbyocean (aboutI/2 mile to
the east) the HCI falloutwould be rapidlyneutralizedby the ocean'shigh
bufferingcapacityand aquaticbiota shouldnot experienceany impact.
_ndanqeredand ThreatenedSpecies
¢
Launchof Galileofrom LaunchComplex41 aboardthe Titan IV/IUSis not
expectedto adverselyaffectany endangeredor threatenedplantsor animals
residingat CCAFS or in nearbysurfacewaters,(USAF1986, USAF 1988b).
SocioeconomicFactors
The CCAFS has beendevelopedto providelaunch,tracking,and other
facilitesin supportof spaceprograms. The normallaunchof the Galileo
missionprogramis compatiblewith currentand projectedfut_,'eland uses on
CCAFS. The programwill have no significantimpactsto the socioeconomics
of CCAFS or BrevardCounty,Florida. No undisturbedlandswill be affected
' C-I0
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by the proposedaction. No new utilityservices,socialservices,or
additionaltransportationaccesswill be required. Emergencyservicesare
alreadyin place,and no historicalor culturalresourceswill be disrupted.
C.2.2 ImolicBtionsof Balanceof Mis_ign
Post-launchimpactsto surfacewatersunder normalflightconditions
: will be confinedto the oceans (USAF1986). Vehiclestagesthat do not go
intoorbit will enter the ocean,wh_le stagesthat reach initialorbit will
re-enterthe atmosphereand will also enter the open ocean due to pre-
programmedflighttrajectories.Small amountsof residualfuels may be
.- releasedto the oceanwatersas a consequence(USAF 1986). The Stage I
residualpropellant(Aerozine50 and N204) for the Titan IV/IUSwould amount
to about 1,100pounds. The SRMsmay containsmall amountsof ammonium
perchlorateand binder. The initialconcentrationsof fuels enteringthe
marineenvironmentfrom the spentstagesmay be beyondthe maximum
acceptablelimitsfor marineorganismsin the immediatevicinityof the
spentstage. The rapiddilutionby the oceanwaterscombinedwith the small
amountsof propellants,however,shouldprecludesignificantadverseimpacts
to marinebiota.
Corrosionof the hardwareon the spentstage will contributemetal ions
to the immediatewaters,but shouldnot resultin significantimpactsdue to
the longperiodover which the corrosionprocesstakes place and the large
quantityof dilutionwater available(USAF 1986).
C.3 MISSIONACCIDENTS
C.3.1 Ac¢iden_ScenarioDefinitionAooroach
The approachused to developcatastrophicaccidentscenarioswas to
dividethe Titan IV missionlaunchprofileinto sevenphasesas listed
below. Subsequently,crediblesinglepoint failuresand somemultiple
failureswere identified,from a reviewof failuremodes and effects
analysesand safetyanalyses,that could causecatastrophicfailuresin the
launchvehicle. Each scenariowas developedto determinewhich environments
couldbe created. In general,many failurescould initiateresponseswhich
had the potentialto createblast,fragmentation,fire/thermal,and impact
environments.In addition,certainsystemfailuresare commonin more than
one phase. Many of the differentinitiatingfailureslead to a common
vehicleresponse. Thus, two pre-flightaccidentscenariosand five in-
flightaccidentscenariosare representativeof the vehicleresponseto any
, of the knowncrediblesingle-pointof multiplefailureswhich were
identified.
MissionPhasesfor AccidentAssessment
Phase O: Propellantloadingto launch (maximum) T-40 days to T-O
Phase I: Launchstack clearsthe launchtower T-O to T+5 sec ,
Phase 2: Predictedinstantaneousimpactpoint T+5 to T+23 sec
stillon land
Phase 3: Predictedinstantaneousimpactpoint T+23 to T+250 sec
on water to time of jettisonof PLF
: C-11
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(Mission Phases for Accident Assessment(Continued) I
Phase 4: PLF jettison to separation of IUS T+250 to T+543 sec
from Titan IV launch vehicle
Phase 5: Separation of IUS to Planetary T+543 sec to 5965s
Injection
Phase6: InterplanetaryInjectionto 2nd Earth T+5965sto
Flyby T+38 months : .
C.3.2 Accid_ptS_n_rio_
Phase 0 pad fires and/orexplosionscan occur from a structuralfailure
of the launchvehicleduringor followingtankingof the liquidstagesof
the core vehicle. Also, the sameeventscan occur if the FlightTermination
System (FTS)is inadvertentlyactivated(FigureC-5).
In-flightaccidentsduringphase I must considerinteractionswith the
launchtower,and ground impactwith piecesof the vehicleand or
propellant/groundinteractionenvironmentsapplyduringPhase 2. The basic
vehicleresponseto variousvehiclefailures,however,can generallybe
brokeninto three specificscenariosduringpoweredflight.
¢,
, I) SRM case failureleadingto instantaneousvehiclebreakup,and ,
productionof SRM fragmentstowardthe RTG if the failureoccurs
in the top end of the SRM.
2) Vehicledispersementby actuationof the ISDSdue to a SRM case
failureor any other structuralfailure.
J
3) Vehicledispersementby activationof the CSDS by groundcommand *
in event of vehicleloss of control. '
The specificenvironmentsassociatedwith these scenariosdependon
when the accidentoccurs,as summarizedin SectionC.4 and addressedin _
detailin SectionC.5.
Accidentswhich occur afterSRM BurnoutthroughPhase 4 are similarto
the SpaceTransportationSystem (STS)in that theywould resultin vehicle
breakupat the time of the accidentor on subsequentre-entry.
_imilarly,IUS failuresduringphase 5 are identicalto the treatment
of these failuresfor the STS/IUSlaunchvehicletreatedin AppendixB. ,
The Venus-Earth-Earth-Gravity-Assist(VEEGA)trajectorydesignapproach
for the 1991missionis generallysimilarto the 1989mission. However,
while planetaryalignmentsrequiretwo Earthflybysat minimumaltitudesof
approximately900 and 300 kilometers(km)for a 1989launch;the !
correspondingvaluesare 9,000 and 3,200 km for a 1991launch. ,_
Althoughone might concludethat the greaterflyby altitudeswould
reducethe probabilityof inadvertentre-entry,this is not true.
Irajectorydispersionsfor a functioningspacecraftare very smallcompared
to the minimumflyby altitudesas documentedin JPL 1988. However,
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FIGUREC-5. FLIGHTTERMINATIONSYSTEMCOMPONENTLOCATIONS
FOR THE TITAN/IUS
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trajectorydispersionsfor a failuresuch as micrometeroidpenetrationof
a propellanttank are large comparedto the 13,300km diameterof the Earth.
Therefore,the expectedprobabilityof_inadvertentre-entrywould not change
from the 1989mlssionvalueof 5 X 10". In the remotechancethat re-entry
did occur,the environmentswould be the same as for the 1989mission.
C.4 ACCIDENTENVIRONMENTS
C.4.1 SRM FraQmentEnvironmen_
A RadioisotopeThermoelectricGenerator(RTG)threatcan only come
from a catastrophicfailureof the forwardclosureof a SRM by virtueof the -.
substantiallyforwardpositionof the RTG relativeto the SRM. Intrinsic
structuralfailureof the forwardclosurewould certainlyproduceclosure
fragmentation.Sidewallfailuresof the uppercylindricalsegmentsor
destructsystemactionmight also cause forwardclosurefragments. It is
noted,however,thatno damagewas sustainedby the upper stage/payload
involvedwith the Titan 34D-9 launchaccident. In this accident,one cf the
SRMs failedby case ruptureof an aft positionedsegmentand the other was
destroyedby ISDSactuation.
Experiencewith the modelingperformedin determiningthe STS SRB
fragmentationspecifications(AppendixB) has shownthat the Titan SRM
forward closurefragmentationspecificationcan be significantly
simplified. For veryearly MissionElapsedTime (MET),when most of the
propellantremains,the fragmentcharacteristicscan be basedon Titan 34D-9
findings. By design,forwardsectionpropellantis consumedin about 30
seconds,thus beyondthis time fragmentcharacteristican be based on STS
51-L findings,appropriatelyscaledto accountfor the propellantremaining
attachedto the case wall on STS 51-L. Applyingthis approachresultsin
the Titan SRM fragmentationcharacteristicsas a functionof MET shown in
Table C-2. Velocityreductiondue to the interveningPLF structureand its
oblique aspectto the expectedfragmenttrajectoriesis also shown in Table
C-2 togetherwith the estimatedprobabilityof a fragmenthittingan RTG.
C.4.2 Core PropellantExDlosionEnvironments
C.4.2.1 Blast Environments
The hazardsimposedby explosionscan be characterizedfor purposesof
safetyanalysisby specifyingestimatedvaluesfor the blastwave parameters
of peak overpressure,overpressureimpulse,peakdynamicpressure,dynamic
pressureimpulse,and peak reflectedpressurein probabilisticterms.These ,
parametersare describedin AppendixB. .
Pre- and _arlY-FliqhtGround-PoolExplosions
A significantexplosionsourcefor the Titan is from the possible
massivespill of the hypergoliccore propellants.Spillsof these
propellantsresultfrom core structurebreakup;Titan impactwith the launch
tower or tip over to the ground,due eitherto one SRM failureto igniteor
very early loss of thrust;early destructaction;or SRM case rupturewhich
could lead to collection,mixing,and ignitionof significantportionsof
the propellantson launch-padsurfaceswhile the Titan is stillessentially
at the pad.
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TABLE C-2. SRM FRAGMENTENVIRONMENT:TITAN/IUS
Intervening
Structure
Fragment Spin Hit Velocity
: MET (s) Velocity(fps) Rate (HZ) Probability Reduction(%)
0 130-380 0-18 -1/50 -30
0-30 Linear
Interpolation
Between0 and
30s Values
30-120 400-760 0-18 -I/50 -30
Along with a massivefire,a low-yield(10 percentileupper limit of
0.5 percentTNT equivalent)explosionwould be expectedeven thoughthe ,
short ignitiondelay for hypergolicpropellantsassureslittleaccumulation
of mixed propellantscomparedto non-hypergolsuch as liquidoxygenand
liquidhydrogen. The resultingexplosion-drivenblastwave subsequently
sweepspast the PLF,actingon its exteriorsurfacesin a mannerto implode
or crush the structureintothe RTGs withinthe PLF. It is also possible
that, as the blastwave fails the structure,the RTGswill be directly _,
exposedto the blastenvironment.Thus, not only PLF fragmentationbut also
blast loading(acceleration)hazardsare presentedto the RTGs.
Upper limit blastenvironmentsare estimatedfor the Titan IV core
propellantsspillingto the pad surfaceby using existingexperimentaldata
from I00 foot drop tests. These blast environmentsare appliedto the PLF
surfacevia a blast loadingcalculationmodel (sameas mentionedin Appendix
B). Typicalblast and PLF fragmentationenvironmentsestimatedto result
from theseground-poolexplosionsat severaldistancesabove the pad surface
are shown in TablesC-3 and C-4, respectively.
In-Fliqht Exolosions _.
• A secondexplosionsource involvingthe Titan core propellantsis
possiblefor a short time after the Titan has clearedthe tower.
Aerodynamicconditionsthroughthe next 18 seconds(up to a MET of 23
seconds)are such that failuresof the core structureor initiationof i
destructactionleadsquicklyto Titan breakupand the consequentairborne
dump of the hypergolicpropellants.The low-yieldnatureof any ensuing _:
hypergolicpropellantexplosionand the unconfinedcollectionand mixing
situationin-flightleads to a low chanceof significantexplosion;however,
two separateexplosionsassociatedwith the two separatecore stagesare
consideredpossible. The estimatedblastenvironmentfrom these explosions
are shown in Table C-5 for the breakupstartingwithinthe MET periodof 5-
23 seconds. Beyond23 seconds,changingatmosphericand aerodynamic
conditionswill precludesignificantairborneexplosions, i
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TABLE C-3. BLAST ENVIRONMENTS*DUE TO DESTRUCTOR GROUND-POOL
EXPLOSIONS: TITAN IV/IUS
Pressure(psi) Impulse(psi-s) ;
Height (ft) Over-pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
In-pool go0 400 2,300 0.50 0.050
Just Above
Pool 300 610 2,010 1.7 0.28
20 15 15 56 0.45 0.23
100 7 7 32 0.19 0.10
*Upper10 percentileestimatesfor on-padexplosionsof respectiveliquid
bipropellants(exceptfor in-pooland just above pool).
TABLE C-4. FRAGMENTVELOCITIES*FROMDESTRUCTOR GROUNDPOOL
EXPLOSIONS: TITAN/IUS
Height (ft) Flyer PlateVelocity(fps) ShrapnelVelocity(fps)
In-Pool 727 - 1,936 O 57
Just Above
Pool 965 - 2,138 I 101
20 189 - 347 0 - 62
100 93 - 177 0 - 29
*Upper]0 percentileestimatesfor on-padexplosionsof respectiveliquid
bipropellants(exceptfor in-pooland just above pool).
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The potentialPLF fragmentvelocitiesassociatedwith the airborne
blastenvironmentsin Table C-5 are shown in Table C-6. These fragment
velocitieswere estimatedby the same procedureused for ground-pool
explosions.
C.4.3 FireballEnvironmentFromTitan Core Propellants
The updraftsand high temperatureswithin the fireballproducedby a
largeliquidpropellantgroundfireare hazardsif the exposedRTG fuel
cladshave been breachedearlierby severemechanicalimpactloads. The
releasedfuel fines in this case can be vaporizedand dispersedintothe
atmosphereby the fireballenvironment.
The fireballcharacteristicsand thermalenvironmentthat would result
from a massivespill of Titan Core propellantsat the launchpad can be
specifiedby: (I) maximumfireballdiameter,(Z) fireballlift-offtime,
(3) durationof the fireball,(4) temperatureinsidethe fireball,and (5)
totalheat flux producedwithinthe fireball.
Usingavailableexperimentaland analyticalinformationand assuminga
fullTitan load of propellantis involved(417,400pounds),a maximum
fireballdiameterof 649 feet is predicted. The fireballis also predicted
to have a totaldurationof 18 secondsand to liftcompletelyoff the
ground afterabout 8 seconds.
J
The temperaturesto which an RTG could be exposedrange from
approximately4,000degreesFahrenheitat f_reballinceptiondown to 3,500
degreesFahrenheitat fireballliftoff. The total heatflux rangesfrom
about300 to 100 Btu/second/100feet over the sametime span.
C.4.4 {nvironment@FQr Re-entrYFrQm Orbit
The resultsof analysisof the uncontrolled,accidentalre-entryof the
Shuttle/IUSprior to the deploymentof the upper stage and payloadis deemed
applicableto the Titan/IUSmission. This analysisshowsthat the RTG
conditionjust prior to Earth surfaceimpactvarieswith the time of launch
failure. For the time intervalof interestbetweenSRM separation(MET=
126 seconds)and the achievementof the parkingorbit (MET= 543 seconds),
the breakuppredictionsare:
I) The Titan and IUS will alwaysbreakup duringre-entryand will not
reachthe surfaceintact.
2) For MET less than 495 seconds,the RTGs or GeneralPurposeHeat Source
(GPHS)modulesreach the surfaceover the AtlanticOcean.
3) For MET between126 and 155 seconds,the RTGs reachthe surfaceintact
• and withoutcase melting.
4) For MET between155 and ZlO seconds,the RTGsmay reach the surface
withoutcase melting,or the GPHSmodulesmay be releasedprior to
reachingthe surface.
5) For MET greaterthan 210 seconds,the GPHS modulesare releasedprior
to surfaceimpact.
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TABLE C-5. BLAST ENVIRONMENTSDUE TO IN-FLIGHTEXPLOSIONSFROM
DESTRUCTOR MASSIVESTRUCTURALFAILURES: TITAN/IUS
Pressure(psi) Impulse(psi-s)
MET(s) Over-pressure Dynamic Reflected Static Dynamic
5 - 23*
Stage I 7 7 32 0.12 0.06
Stage2 10 I0 40 0.16 0.08
i *Over-waterthreshold.
(
TABLE C-6. FRAGMENTVELOCITIESFROM IN-FLIGHTEXPLOSIONSFROM
DESTRUCTOR MASSIVESTRUCTURALFAILURES: TITAN/IUS
MET(s) Flyer PlateVelocity(fps) ShrapnelVeolocity(fps)
5 - 23*
Stage I 69 127 0 - 22
Stage 2 83 157 0 - 23
*Over-waterthreshold.
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c.4.5 Ius PayloadEnvirgn_ents
The IUS vehicleitselfdoes not significantlyadd to any of the
accidentenvironmentsproducedby the main launchvehicle. The solid
propellantis not dc_onableundercredibleaccidentconditionsfor the
Galileomission. A.cnoughIUS propellantimpactingthe groundas ejecta
from other eventsmay reactvigorouslyas an explosion,these eventsproduce
: only localizedblast effects. In addition,the propellantdoes not
contributesignificantlyto fireballenvironments,since the burn is
relativelyslow and occursat ambientpressure_
. Some IUS failuresafterthe deploymentof Galileo/IUSfrom the Orbiter
resultin errantre-entrywithinthe designcapabilityof the RTGs. Earth
impactconditionsare similarto those for re-entryfromorbit.
The only IUS failurethat can c_use a directthreatto the RTGs is a
motor case ruptureduringthe seconclfiringof the IUS. The dominantthreat
from this failureis the productionof fragmentsof solidpropellant
estimatedto be travelingat velociliesin the range of 9Z to 728 feet per
secondand weighingfrom 2 to 8 poundsper fragment.
i
The Galileospacecraftalsodoes not significantlyadd to any of the
, accidentenvironmentsproducedby the main launchvehicle.
I
C.5 NON-RADIOLOGICALACCIDENTCONSEQUENCES
Accidentsof concernrange frompropellantloadingemergenciespriorto
launch,to an on-paddestructof the Titan IV/IUSto an explosionduring i
ascentof the vehicle(USAF1986,USAF 1988a,USAF Ig88b). Duringa fueling
emergency,both fuel and oxidizermay be venteddirectlyto the atmosphere
with ruptureof a part of the fuelingsystem. The fuelingsystemutilizes
redundantflow metersand redundantautomaticshutoffdevicesto minimize
the consequencesof such an event. Only one emergencyreleaseof nitrogen
tetroxide(I,000gallons)has occurredsince operationalstart-upof the
Titan programat CCAFS in 1963. That releasewas controlledand occurred
slowlyintothe flame bucketwhere it was neutralized.As noted in Section
4.Z.Z.Z,propellantloadingoperationsare prohibitedwhen meteorological
conditionswould be suchthat a totalreleaseof nitrogentetroxidefrom the
Titan IV would result in an unsafeconcentrationin downwinduncontrolled
areas, All propellantspillsat the launchsitewould be retainedin either
the imperviouslined holdingareassurroundingthe fuel tanks,or in the
flame bucketbeneaththe launchvehicle. Spillswould be removedand
, disposedat an appropriateoff-sitehazardouswaste facility(USAF 1986),
thus surfacewater resourcesand associatedbiota shouldnot be impacted.
In the event of a destructon the pad, a failurein flight,or a
commandedvehicledestruct,the liquidpropellanttanks and solidrocket
motorswould be ruptured(USAF 1986). Most of the liquidpropellantswould i
igniteand b{Irndue to theirhypergolicnature. The solidrocketmotorsare
designedsuchthat most of the solid propellantwould be extinguisheddue to i
the s_,ddenreductionin chamberpressure.
The air emissionsfrom such an eventwould be similarto those produced
duringlaunch,with resultingnitrogenoxide concentrationsdependentupon
I,
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the type of accident(USAF1988a). For all but a launchpad accident,
nitrogenoxide would be generatedat a verticaldistancefrom the pad. The
amountof dilutionat groundlevelwould dependupon that distanceand
existingmeteorologicalconditions.
In the case of a launchpad accident,ground-levelincreasesin
nitrogenoxide emissionswould occur, (USAFIg_a). Again,the levels
reaching uncontrolledareas would depend upon the amount of atmospheric
mixing and existing meteorological conditions. Adherence to launch
meteorological requirements would minimize the transport of high
concentrations to uncontrolled areas.
Someliquid propellant may enter nearby surface waters. In the event
of a worst case scenario (USAF1986), the vehicle would fail on or near the
pad, and the commandedestruct system would fail (an event which has never
occurred. Depending upon the amountof fuel reaching the surface waters
(e.g., BananaRiver or Atlantic Ocean), aquatic biota in the receiving area
could be subjectto short-termimpacts. The U.S.Air Force has estimated
the probabilityof sucha "worstcase" scenarioto be extremelysmall. In
the case of a releaseto the ocean,the resultingplume could extendto a
radiusof 800 to 8,000 feetdependingupon the amountof fuel enteringthe
ocean. Subsequentmortalityof aquaticbiotacould occur in at leastthe
near field plum due to exposureto hydrazine(fromthe AerogineSO fuel) or
from the nitrogentetroxide. Giventhe volumeof the receivingwaters
offshoreCCAFS,the impactswould be localizedand short-termin nature.
Entry of the propellantintonearbysurfacewaters such as the BananaRiver
could resultin a relativelyhigheramountof impact,given the smaller
receivingwater volume. Fish kills and mortalityof other aquaticbiota
could be greaterin the near-fieldplume,but again sucheffectswould be
short-termin nature.
With a vehicularbreakupor destructfurtherintothe mission,the
oceanwould receivethe impact. Some amountof liquidpropellantcould
enter the ocean,dependinguponthe lengthof time after lift off the "
accidentoccurs. Betweenlift off and separationof the solid rocketmotors
(about126 secondsintothe flight)the potentialfor liquidpropellant
enteringthe oceandiminisheswith increasingaltitude. The liquid
propellantthat can reachthe ocean in concentratedquantitiesdecreases
becauseof the dispersingeffectsfrom the releasedpropellantfalling
throughthe air. Beyondabout I?_ seconds,the amountof liquidpropellant
that is availableto contaminateocean watersdecreasesrapidlywith
ignitionof the main liquidfueledrocketengines. Solid rocketfuel that
could enter the ocean decreasesrapidlyfrom ignitionuntil about 126
secondsinto the mission.
Until such time as the Titan IV clearsland and is out over the ocean,
a vehicledestructcould also impactthe terrestrialenvironmentthrough
fragmentimpactsand fire. Firewould affectthe environmentnear the
launchpad. It can be assumedthat plantsand animalsnear the launchpad
would probablyexpire in the fire. Some biotawould also expirefrom
fragmentimpacts. The work force in the launchexclusionareawould also be
impacted,althoughimpactsshouldbe relativelyminor given the protective
measuresemployedby the workforceduringa launch(shelters,protective
clothing,etc.).
#
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C.6 TITAN IV/IUS RADIOLOGICALRISK ANALYSIS
The Titan IV/IUSis a potentialalternativelaunchvehiclefor the
Galileomissionin 1991. Becausethe configurationand propellantsof the
Titan IV are differentfromthe Shuttle,the potentialaccidentscenarios,
accidentenvironments,and accidentprobabilitieswill also be different.
As a consequence,the risk quantificationand environmentalimpactsof
potentialaccidentsmust be evaluatedto evaluateTitan IV/IUSas an
alternativeto the Shu_t_e/IUS.
C.6.1 Bask AnalysisMethodoloqv
It is desirableto put the Titan IV/IUSrisk assessmenton the same
analyticalbasis as for the Shuttle/_US.Differencesdue to the preliminary
informationavailablefor the Titan IV are described. The resourcesurod
for the Titan IV/IUSrisk analysiswere:
e Titan IV Data Book (MartinMarietta1988),
e Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReportVol Ill,Books I and 2
(USDOE1988c),
|
= • The same radiologicalconsequenceand risk quantificationmodels
and methodologyas used fo$-the Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysis
ReportVol Ill.
• Hydrocodeanalysesfor the Titan IV/IUS Radioisotope
ThernloelectricGenerators(RTG)geometry,to determinethe
responseof the RTGs to fragmentimpacts. )
;
In summary,the Titan IV/IUSrisk assessmentwas performedas follows:
I. Titan Data Book informationwas used to constructFailure/Abort
SequenceTrees (FASTS)for eachmissionphase. FASTs are also
known as EventTrees.
2. The accidentscenarioend pointswere examinedto identify
accidentenvironmentsof the RTGs,as describedin the Titan Data
Book. These environmentsare describedin SectionC.5.2.1and can
broadlybe characterizedas: ,:
• Pool explosion(a massivespillof Titan hypergolic
propellantsonto the launchpad forminga "pool',and
exploding)
• Flightdestruct
)
• • ForwardclosureSolidRocketMotor (SRM)failure(a SRM case !
failureresultingin fragmentationof "_ forwarddome of the
case) i
• Reentry.
3. RTG behaviorin each accidentenvironmentand subsequentevents i
was analyzedfor upper-limitand averageaccidentparameters, i
C-ZI i!
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4. AccidentRTG fuel releaseestimateswere made based on the
followingsteps:
e Use of Sr}uttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReportanalysesand
specificTitan IV hydrocodeanalysestoestimateFueledClad
distortions,
i
• Use of Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcorrelations
i betweencladdistortionsand failurethresholdsand release "
' quantification,
I
i • Use of Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReportjudgmentsand ..
assumptionsregardingfuel release,given FueledClad
failure.
!
i 5. For each missionphase,three releasecases are defined,identical
to thosedefinedin the ShuttleFinalSafetyAnalysisReportand
describedin AppendixB.
! The most probablecase is the averagereleasefor the Failure/Abort
: SequenceTree subbranchhavingthe highestprobabilityof a release. This
casecan be used to estimatethe likelyconsequencesof an accidentthat
*_ resultsin a release.
L) The maximumcase is that Failure/AbortSequenceTree subbranchthat on
upperlimit accidentparameters,will r_sultin the greatestconsequences.
This case can be usedby plannersto identifythe uppermagnitudeof
accid_ts whichmay haveto be dealtwith.
The expectationcase is a prcbabilltyweightedreleaseconsideringal_
accidentscenariosin the phase and theirreleaseprobabilities.This cLse
is used for overallriskquantification.It does not representa particular
accident,but is a way of representingall potentialaccidentsaccordingto
theirprobabilities.
The Titan IV Data Book is the analogof the ShuttleData Book (NASA
1988c),which was the basis of the accidentscenariosand parametersused
for the Shuttle/IUSrisk assessment.The Titan Data Book however,is
preliminaryin n=tureand has not receivedthe samelevel of peer reviewas
the ShuttleData Book. Further,the scenariodescriptionsand accident
, environmentstendtowardupperlimit or worst case situations. The Shuttle
i Data Book providesprobabilitydistributionsof accidentenvironments.
! Equivalentdata are not yet availablefor the Titan IV. o
The Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReportII Volume II (USDOEIg88b)
containsdescriptionsof the technicalbases for the Shuttleaccident
analyses. These bases includeRTG test programdata; hydrocodeanalysesof
explosion,fragmentand impacteventsthat are calibratedusing the test
- data;and correlationsof test and analysesinformationto describecriteria
for RTG fuel containmentfailureand quantificationof releaseamounts.
Thiswork is used as the startingpoint for the analysesof Titan IV/IUS
accidents. The TitanS_fetyanalysismakes use ofpointvalues(as opposedto
probabilitydistributions)of upper limit and averageor mid range accident
parametersto quantifymaximumand averagereleases. In contrast,the
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.Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReportII makes use of Monte Carlo
analyses,running10,000trial accidentanalysesfor each scenariowith
independentaccidentparametersselectedfromtheir respectiveprobability
distributions.
A numberof hydrocodeanalysesspecificto the Tita_ IV/IUS
configurationwere performedin orderto calculateRTG responseto accident
environments.
Where releaseof fuelmaterialis identifiedusing the same failure
criteriaand fuel releasemodelsas for the Shuttle/IUS,identicalmodels
and methodologiesfor consequenceassessmentwere used for both the
Shuttle/IUSFinal SafetyAnalysisReport II and Titan IV/IUS.
C.6.2 Acqiden_Scenario_and SourceTerms
C.6.2.1 Failure/AbortSequenceTrees (FASTs)
The Failure/AbortSequenceTreesgeneratedfor eachmissionphase are
representationsof potentialaccidentsequencesthat could impose
environmentson the RTGswhich might led to a fuel release. Each FAST
beginswith missionphase identificationand dividesintodecisionbranches
representingmissionphase successand failure. The successbranch
indicatesthat the missionphase objectiveis achievedand it leads directly
to the next missionphase. The failurebranchis subdividedintovarious
accidentscenarioinitiatingevents,as definedin the Titan IV Data Book
(MartinMarietta1988). EachoF the initiatingeventshas been associated
with an RTG environmentsuch as a pool explosion,destruct,reentry,and so
on. Probabilityestimatesfor the variousFAST branchesand events are
included.The missionphasesare definedin SectionC.3.I.
Missionphases5 and 6 are essentiallythe same for the Shuttle/IUSand
the Titan IV/IUS. Some probabilitieswill be differentdue to likely
differencesin the durationthe spacecraft-IUScombinationremainsin Earth
orbit dependingon the launchvehicleand becauseof the capabilityof the
Shuttleto returnwith its payloadfrom orbit. However,these differences
are judgednot to be of sufficientmagnitudeas to requirespecific
analysis.
The initiatingaccidentsshownon the Failure/AbortSequenceTrees
resultin accidentenvironmentsfor the RTGswhich must be evaluatedfor the
risk assessment. FigureC-6 showsthe missionsummarylevel FAST. In
phases0 and I of the mission,pool explosionenvironmentsare involved.
Many in-flightfailuresin Phases1, 2, and 3 involvevehicledestruct
environments.SomeSolid RocketMotor failures(lossof thrust)pose a
uniquefragmentthreatto the RTGs duringPhasesI, 2, and 3. Phase 4 and 5
failurescan involvereentryand impactof the RTG. Phase4 and 5 failures
are like the Shuttle/IUSPhase4 failures.
IUS initiatedfailuresin missionphasesI through4 are Reaction
ControlSystemtank failures,inadvertentIUS destruct,and structural
failures. The ReactionControlSystemtank failureis dismissedfrom
considerationsincethe resultingtank fragmentswould not be a threatto
the RTGs. It would lead to a missionfailurelike a vehiclebreak-up,
C-23
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destruct,or reentrydependingon the missionphase,but the probabilities
are judged"ratherremote"in the Titan IV Data Book (MartinMarietta1988).
This was interpretedto mean that their probabilitieswere small when
comparedto other initiatingfailuresleadingto the same consequences.The
IUS destructscenariosare includedwith the Titan IV/IUSdestructfailure
Failure/AbortSequenceTree branches.
_ilures Leadinato Pool ExDlosionScenarios
Severalaccidenttypes in missionphases0 and I are projectedby the
Titan Data Book to lead to massivespillsof the Titan IV core vehicle
liquidpropellantsonto the launchpad suchthat they would pool and
-- explode. The RTGs responsewas evaluatedfor varyingdistancesabove or
away from the pool explosion. These scenariosare discussedunder their
scenariodescriptorsin the followingparagraphs.
PrelaunchStructuralFailure(FASTBranch0'). Titan IV or IUS
structuralfailureduringthe periodof fuel loadingand preparationsfor
launchis projectedto resultin a collapseof the vehicleand the upper-
stage/spacecraftonto the launchpad. Duringthe processof collapse,the
core vehiclehypergolicpropellantsare postulatedto pool on the pad such
that a low yield explosionand fireballresults. The RTGs are withinthe
payloadfairing,which is abovethe pooledpropellants. Pooledpropellant
: explosionparametersare providedin the Titan IV Data Book, based on
ProjectPYRO test data (Welloughbyet. al. 1968). An upper limit of 0.5
percentTNT equivalentyield and an averagJ(50 percentile)TNT equivalent
yield of 0.3 is estimated.
The probabilityof this failureoccurringhas been estimatedas 8.3 x
10-6 for the Titan IV and less than I x 10"_ for th_ IUS. The IUS
probabilityis assumedto be much lessthan I x 10TM and does not contribute
significantlyto the overallprobability. Further,the IUS would not
contributeto the threatenvironmentof the RTG exceptthroughfire,
accordingto the Titan IV Data Book.
InadvertentCommandShutdown.andDestructSystem (CSDS)Activationin
Phase0 (FASTBranch0"). InadvertentCommandShutdownand DestructSystem
activationon the launchpad would cut the cases of the Solid RocketMotors,
core, and upper stages. Solid RocketMotor case cuttingbefore ignitionis
benignsince there is no internalpressurizationto propelfragments.
Cuttingcore propellanttankswill cause a massivedump of propellants.The
Titan Data Book projectsthat a propellantpool is createdresultingin low
yield local explosions. The payloadfairing,containingthe RTGs, is above
the pool at the time of the explosi@ns. The probabilityof this scenario
' has been given as less than _ x I0TM. For analysispurposes,it has been
taken to be equal to ] x I0TM. The RTG environmenthas been specifiedto be
like the structuralfailurecase.
It shouldbe noted thatthe PYRO commanddestructtests,on which the
explosionenvironmentis based, involvedcuttingthe propellanttanks on
oppositesides of the tanks so that the propellantswould not contacteach
other until hittingthe groundsurface. The Titan destructchargesare
betweentanks. This placementwould resultin immediatecontactof the
propellant. Since hypergolicpropellantsigniteon contactwith essentially
C-25
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no delay,a more likelyscenariothan the poolingof propellantson the pad (
and explosionswould be a deflagrationand fireballwith extremelylow
pressurewaves.
Phase I (0-5seqond@)StructuralFailure(FASTBranch 1C). Duringthis
lift-offperiodstructuralload marginsof the vehicleare at their minimum.
Catastrophicstructuralfailurewould resultin activatiunof the
InadvertentSeparationDetectionSystem,which would cause the destruct .
chargeson separatedelementsof the Titan IV/IUSstackto explode. The
Titan Data Book projectsthatthis would result in the spillageof Titan
; core liquidpropellantson the launchpad which would collect,pool, and
explode.
At the time of explosion,the RTGswould be fallingeitherlaterally
away fromthe pooledpropellantsor downwardtowardthe pool. The
parametersspecifiedin the Titan Data Book are that each possibilityis
equallyprobable,with the RTGs beingbetween20 to 140 feet above the pool
in the case of a downwardfall.
Phase I Solid RocketMotor Failures(FASTBr_nchIS). There are ,
fourtypesof solid rocketmotor failuresthat have been defined(see
FigureC-7). :.
a. Uneventhrust,whereinone of the two Titan IV Solid RocketMotors
has an off-nominalthrustresultingin eitheran impactwith pad
structurescausinga structuralfailurescenarioas described
above or a deviationfrom the prescribedtrajectoryand destruct
actionin Phase 2 {FASTBranchISI)
b. One (only)Solid RocketMotor ignitionleadingto vehicletipover
on the pad with the RTGs being 40 to 140 feet above a pool _:
explosionor leadingto tower impactof the vehicle,whereinthe
RTGs could be from 20 to 140 feet above a pool explosion(FAST
Branch IS2) ;
c. Solid RocketMotor thrustvectorcontrolfailureleadingto an
erranttrajectoryand Phase2 destructaction(FAST BranchIS3)
J
do Solid RocketMotor loss of thrustcausedby failureof a motor !
insulationliner and localcase burn-throughor a fractureof the
motor casing (FASTBranch1S4)
As discussedabove,the first two failuretypescan lead to variations
on a pool explosionscenariowith the RTGs at varyingdistancesaboveor
away from the pool at the time of explosion.
Phase I InadvertentDestruct(FASTBranchID). The Titan IV Data Book
definesthis scenarioas equivalentto a Phase I structuralfailure, i
-- However,for the same reasonsdiscussedfor the prelaunchinadvertent ,_
CommandShutdownand DestructSystemactivation,a more likelyscenariois a
deflagrationand fireball. This would be no threatto the RTGs since
testinghas shown them to withstandlaunchpadfires.
Phase I InertialGuidanceSystem (IGS)Failure(FASTBranch)G). A
failureof an electroniccomponentof the IGS FlightControlComputercould
C-26
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Lresultin loss of attitudecontrolor prematureinitiationof a roll I
program. The Titan IV Data Book estimatesthat one half of the time this
could leadto impactwith the launchtower and a pool explosiontype of
scenariowith the RTGs aboveor to the side of the pool, like the Solid
RocketMotor tipoverscenario. The other 50 percentof the time, this
failureis projectedto lead to a CommandShutdownand DestructSystem
actionin Phase 2.
a
Inadvertent(Titan)Staae 2 lanition(FASTBranchIT). In the case of
prematureStage 2 ignition,that is ignitionbeforeStage i has separated,
the burningpropellantsand thrustingwouldcause a structuralbreakupof
the Titan IV vehicleand the initiationof the InadvertentSeparation
DestructSystemdue to the breakageof the continuitywires.
In Phase I, this scenariois identicalto the Phase ] Structural
Failure,that is, it would resultin a poolexplosionon the launchpad,
with the RTGs above or away to the sideof the pool.
FailuresLeadinato In-FliqhtDes_ruqtScenarios
Most in-flightfailureswill lead to vehicledestruct,eitherby
deliberateor accidentalactivationof the CommandShutdownand Destruct
i System,or by activationof the InadvertentSeparationDestructSystemas '
: the vehiclebreaksup becauseof aerodynamicloading. Sincethe destruct
systemsare designedto inducestructuralbreakupwith mild explosionsof
destructcharges,these are not a threatto the RTGs. The IUS destruct,
becauseof its locationnear the RTGs, appearedto representsome potential
threat,but this was analyzedand foundnot to be the case. A vehiclein-
flightdestructwould resultin a deflagrationof liquidpropellants. Even _
in the case of an explosion,ratherthan deflagration,the distancesof the
RTGs from the destructchargelocationsare such that the explosion _.
environmentwould leave the RTGs intact. Fragmentsfrom the Solid Rocket
Motor casewould not be directedtowardthe RTGs and thus are not a threat.
Therefore,the only differencebetweendestructscenariosare the altitude
of the destructand the locationof impactof the RTGs (oceanor land).
Consistentwith the treatmentof RTG impactin the Shuttle/IUSFinal
SafetyAnalysisReport II (USDOE1988b),therewill be no RTG fuel release
in the cases of impactin the Cape Canaveralarea (Phase2) or for water
impacts. In Phase 4, theremay be impactsof GeneralPurposeHeat Source
moduleson hard rock, which can involvea releaseof fuel. Phase 4 destruct
scenariosare treatedas atmosphericreentrycases.
Solid RocketMotor Lo@@ of ThrustScenarios(FAST brBnch¢@)$_, _S, and
Solid RocketMotor failuresthat leadto loss of thrustincludefailure
of the Solid RocketMotor insulationliner leadingto motor case burn
throughand failureof the motor case by fracture. This fracturemight be
causedby an undetectedcase flawor by a pressurepulse inducedby a
propellantflaw. In most failures,Solid RocketMotor case fragmentswould
not be directedto_,ardthe RTGs, and a simpledestructtype of environment
would be involved. However,if the case failurewere to occur in the motor
forwardclosure,fragmentsmay be directedtowardthe RTGs. Only one RTG
C-28
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if
might be impactedby thesefragmentssincethe IUS would shieldthe one I
oppositethe failedSolidRocketMotor.
AtmgsohericR_entrv$q_narios
The scenarioconsequencesfor reentriesduringascentin Phase4 (to
impactin Africa)or in Phase 5 are the same for the Titan IV/IUSas for the
• Shuttle/IUS.Only the probabilitiesare affectedbecauseof the different
vehiclesand the fly-backcapabilityof the Shuttlein the case of some
failures. The Phase 2 IUS failureis deferredto Phase5 and would be a
reentrycase.
MissionPhase5, on orbit,involvesonly the IUS and spacecraftand
MissionPhase6, VEEGA trajectory,involvesonly the spacecraft. The Titan
vehicleis not involvedexceptas how it might affectthe time on orbit
beforeinsertionintothe VEEGA trajectory. Therefore,the risks associated
with accidentalreentryduring thesemissionphasesare the same as for the
Shuttle/IUSlaunchoption.
C.6.2.2SourceTerm Evaluation@
, Accidentsthat have been identifiedcan be groupedinto I) thosethat ,
resultin a massivespillof liquidpropellantsthat may pool on the launch
pad and explode,2) thosethat resultin in-flightdestructaction,3) those
which involvea solidrocketmotor failurewith the potentialfor a fragment
field beingdirectedtowardan RTG, and 4) those that resultin a reentry
into the Earth'satmosphere.The followingsectionsdescribethe source
term evaluationsperformedfor thesetypes of RTG environments,as related
to specificFASTbranches.
t
Pool _xplo_ionScenario_ _
FigureC-8 showsthe pool explosionFASTsubbranch. _,leseaccidents
occur in the prelaunchphase and in early (0-5 seconds)ascent,while the
launchvehicleis just above the launchpad. The Titan liquidpropellants
are hypergolicbipropellantswhich ignitewith essentiallyno delay upon
contactwith each other. Therefore,the conceptof these propellants )
forminga pool and exploding,ratherthan resultingin a largedeflagration
and fire is essentiallya conservativeone in the contextof a threatto the
RTGs. In the absenceof an explosiontherewould be only RTG fall-backand
a fireenvironment.Tests have shownthat a fire alonecannotcause an RTG
fuel release. The fall-backis at sufficientlylow speedsas to not be a
threatto the RTGs.
I
Nevertheless,a poolexplosionenvironmenthas been specifiedin the
Titan Data Book, as well as a specificationfor the heightabove the pool of
the RTGs for the variousscenarios. TablesC-7 and C-8 show these i
specifications.It can be seenthat the RTGs are not expectedto be any
closerthan 20 feet abovethe postulatedpool explosion. At this closest _
distance,the speedof impactof the collapsingPayloadFairingdriven by
the explosionis calculatedto be no greaterthan 277 feet per second.
Calculationsperformedfor the ShuttleSolid RocketMotor sidewallfragments
impactingside-onto the RTG show a FueledClad distortionof ten percentor
less as a resultof an impactof a one-halfinchthick steel plate at this
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TABLE C-7. POOL EXPLOSIONSCENARIODISTANCESPECIFICATIONS I
i
(
FAST Branch Scenario Probability Distance*
0' StructuralFailure 50% Out-of-range
50% 40-140 ft.
O" InadvertentCommandShutdown 50% Out-of-range
DestructSystemActivation 50% 20-140ft.
'" IC StructuralFailure 50% Out-of-range
50% 40-140ft.
151 UnevenThrust/TowerImpact 25% Out-of-range
75% 20-140ft.
IS2 I Solid RocketMotor Ignition/ 100% 40-140ft.
Tipoverto Ground
ID InadvertentCommandShutdown 50% Out-of-range
DestructSystemActivation 50% 20-140ft.
IT InadvertentStage 2 50% Out-of-range
Ignition/Struct,, _reak-up 50% 20-_40ft.
IG InertialGuidanceSystem 25% Out-of-range
Failure/TowerImpact 75% 20-140Ft.
*out-of-R_'n-gemeans distanceis greaterthan 140 feet.
Distancesin rangegiven are uniformlydistributed.
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TABLE C-8. POOLSEXPLOSIONSCENARIOPRESSUREAND
VELOCITYPARAMETERS.
20 FeetAbove Pool
StaticOverpressure 15
(psi)
Peak ReflectedPressure 56
(psi)
Peak DynamicPressureImpulse 15
(psi-s)
StaticOverpressureImpulse 0.45
(psi-s)
DynamicPressureImpulse 0.23
(psi-s)
Flyer Plate Velocity 157-277
(fps)
ShrapnelVelocity 0-64
(fps)
NOTE: In 1991, the VEEGA fly-byaltitudeswould be greaterthan in 1989, but
the probabilityof inadvertentre-entrystillremainsat 5 x 10".
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speed• The Payload Fairing is aluminumof about 0.154 inches thick, l
average. Thus, the PayloAd Fairing impact on the RTGswould be muchmilder
than that calculatedfor the ShuttleSolidRocketMotor fragment_ Based on
this information,noneof the pool explosionscenariosare expectedto cause
a releaseof fuel fromthe RTGs, sincethe failurethresholdof a Fueled
Clad has beenestimatedto currespondto a distortionof thirty percent. It
shouldbe noted that the GeneralPurposeHeat Sourcemoduleshave not
• releasedfuel in testsof aluminumand titaniumbulletsbeing shot at them
at speedof 319 m/s. Therefore,_he shrapnelpostulatedfor this scenario
is also not a threat. Subsequentimpactsof moduleson concreteor steul
also would not be expectedto releasefuel since no significantvelocity
.. would be impartedto the RIG or its componentsfro,nthe explosion.
In-FliahtDestruc_Scenarios
FiguresC-g and C-I0 showthe accidentscenariosthat result in a
destructenvironmentwhile the Titan IV/IU5vehicleis in flightduring
ascent. The purposeof the destructmechanismis to disruptthe flight in
case of a failureso that the failurecannotresultin danger to personsor
propertyin a subsequentfall-backand impact. The Titan Data Book contains
estimatesof the staticoverpressureand impulseat the RTG locationsin the
case of a destructof 7 to 10 psi and 0.12 to 0.16 psi respectively.These
are very mild, and the resultof a destructwould only be the fall-backof
the intactRTG on landor water dependingon the positionof the vehicleat e
the time of destructaction.Based on analysesin the Final SafetyAnalysis
Reportfor the Shuttle/lUS,such impactswould not be expectedto release
RTG fuel.
The IUS destructchargeis in a positionto potentiallyaffectthe RTG.
However,the fragmentsspecifiedare so thin (0.068in) that the impactof a
fragmentat the estimatedspeed of 5250 fps would not be a threatto the
GeneralPurposeHeat Sourcefuelcontainment.Any disruptionof the RTG
case freeingthe GeneralPurposeHeat Sourcemoduleswould actuallyincrease
the marginof safety. The modulesare designedto withstandreentryimpacts
individually;howeverimpactof an intactRTG would be more severethan
individualmodule impacts.
$glid RQqketMotor Lossof Thrust$_narios
The Failure/AbortSequenceTrees for the Solid RocketMotor loss of
thrust scenariosin MissionPhasesI, 2, and 3 are shown in FiguresC-7, C-
11, and C-12: ._
l
• These failurescan be a threatto RTG fuelcontainmentif the loss
of thrustresultsfrom or involvesa failureand fragmentation
ofthe forwardclosureof a Solid RocketMotor case. If this were
the situation,then the resultingfragments,propelledby the
cembustionproductsof the burningSolid RocketMotor propellant, i
could be in the directionencompassingthe locationof the RTG
above the failedSolid RocketMotor.
The FASTs show a branching,differentiatingbetweena fragmentend-on
hit of the involvedRTG and no-hit. The no-hitbranchincludesSolid Rocket
Motor sidewallfailuresand forwardclosurefailureswhen the fragmentsmiss
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I the RTG. In this case, the consequencesare muchlike the in-flight I
( destructscenarios. That is, the RTGswould be freed and fall-backintact I
i land water the of the vehicleat the time ofon or dependingon position
) failure.Analysesdocumentedin the Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReport
) II (USDOE1988b)show no fuel releasefor these events.|
!
) In Phase I, a fragmentend-onhit on the RTG would releaseFueledClads
from two GeneralPurposeHeat Sourcemodules. The momentumof the fragment
I would be sharedwith the freed GeneralPurposeHeat Sourcemodulesand
, FueledClads,such that they would impactup to terminalvelocityon the
, fall-back.There would be no fuelreleasefrom the modules. However,an ;
end-onfragmenthit in Phase I can releasefuel if the freed FueledClads
impacton concreteand the impactingfragmentis sufficientlyenergetic.
BecausePhase I is from 0-5 seconds,it is estimatedthat one-halfof the
time such impactsare on conc,re, but outsidethe influenceof any
associatedfireball. The maximumreleaseis calculatedon the basis of an
impactof the most energeticfragmentand impactof all eight freed Fueled
Cladson concrete, rhe averagereleaseis based on the assumptionthat
duringthe intervalto 5 secondswhen the vehicleis clearingthe tower that
on averagetwo of the four FueledCladswill impactconcrete. No detail_d
trajectoryanalyseswere performedto supportthis. However,at the tim_ of
clearingthe tower,the RTGs are at about300 feet above the launchpad aqd
the impactingfragmentgives the FueledClads an additionalupwardvelocity
of more than 230 feet per second.Consideringthe non-verticaltrajectory
and the layoutof the launcharea, it is unlikelythat any of these Fueled
Cladswould iF)actconcrete.
In Phase2 the fragmentsare more energetic,and would cause fuel i*'
releasesfrom FueledClads in the first two GPHS modulesnear the end of the
phase. Becausethis is away fromthe launchpad, subsequentimpactsof the ,
GPHS modulesand FueledCladswould be on sand. Those that failedin the
initialfragmenthit would have an additionalreleaseupon impacton sand, _:
as shown in FigureC-11.
DuringPhase 3, the fragmentenergeticsare similarto that at the end
of Phase I. It is estimatedthat about36 percentof the fragmentsthat hit
will resultin a fuel releaseat altitude. The failedFueledClads will
exposefuel to seawaterwhen they fall-backin the ocean.
The sourceterm estimatesshownin the Failure/AbortSequenceTrees are
based on a fragmentmodel specificationin the Titan Data Book and hydrocode
calculationsperformedin supportof thiswork. The probabilitysplitsfor
fragmentenergeticsare basedon an assumptionthat within specified ,
fragmentspeedranges,the probabilitydistributionof those speedsis
uniform. The estimatedfuel releasequantitiesuse the same distortion
failurethresholdand distortion-quantitycorrelationfor the FueledClads
as used in the Shuttle/IUSFinalSafetyAnalysisReport (USDOEIgBBb).
FailuresLeadinqto African_mpact
There is a one secondperiodat the end of MissionPhase 4, during i
which a failureleadingto Titan vehiclebreakupcould resultin impactof
moduleson the African_ontinent. The total probabilityof Phase 4 breakup
scenariosis 1.27 x 10TM. The probabilitythat the failurewill result in
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Africanimpactis 4.32 x 10"6. The consequencesare the same as if the
failurewere a Shuttlevehiclebreakup.
SourceTerm Summary
The most probable,maximum,and expectationcase sourceterms for the
RTG usingTitan IV as the launchvehicleare summarizedin Tables c-g
: throughC-11, respectively. It shouldbe noted that the sourceterms for
Titan IV phases4, 5 and 6 are identicalfor those correspondingto
Shuttle/IUSphases2, 4, and 5, respectively,althoughthe probabilitiesmay
differ. (Thedescriptionof informationon the tablescan be found in
.. AppendixB).
The sourcetermsand probabilitiesfor the LWRHUswill be identicalto
those for Shuttle/IUS.The particlesize distributionsfor the sourceter_s
presentedare derivedin the samemanneras describedfor the Shuttle/IUS.
C.6.4 Radioloqi_alAccidentAnalysis
The Titan IV risk assessmentis completedon the same analyticalbasis
as the Shuttle. Where analyticaltechniquesdiffer,the approachtaken _or
the Titan IV was designedto be conservativerelativeto the Shuttle. Thus,
Titan IV risksmay be somewhatoverstated. The methodologyused and a
detailed description of the followinganalysisis presented in Appendix
C.4.4.
Eachmissionphase is definedby three releasecases,most probable,
maximumand expectation.These are identicalto thosedefinedfor the
Shuttlein Section4.1.4.3. The missionphasesdefinitionsfollow.
Phase0 is fromT-4G days to T-O sec. Accidentsinvolvedhere are
launchpad accidentsdue to vehiclestructuralfailuresfollowingtankingof
the core vehicleliquidstages,or inadvertentactivationof the Flight
terminationsystem. Phase I occursfromT-O to T+5 sec and involvesthe
lift off period. Accidentalinteractionwith the launchtower and
catastrophicstructuralfailurecan resultrin ground impactof the vehicle
and pooling/explosionof the liquidpropellants.Phase 2 (T+23to T+250
sec) involvesaccidentswith predictedimpactpointson water. Phase4
occursfromT+250 to T+543 sec and involvesatmosphericre-entry
consequenceswith impactsin Africa.
Missionphases5 and 6 are on-orbitand the VEEGAmaneuver,which are
essentiallythe samefor the Shuttleand the Titan IV. Some probabilities¢
may changerelatingto missiontime-lines. Also, the Titan has no
capabilityof missionabortto landingfrom orbit.
The most probable,maximumand expectationcase sourceterms are
presentedin detail in TablesC-9, C-]O and C-11. The sourceterms and
probabilitiesfor the RHUswill be identicalto those for the Shuttle,
becausethe sourceterms occur duringVEEGA re-entryonly. The resultsof
the radiologicalconsequenceanalysisfor the most probableand maximum
cases are summarizedin TablesC-12 and C-13. The resultsfor the RHUs are
identicalto those for the Shuttle.
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The missionrisks associatedwith a Titan IV launchvehiclehave been I
assessedbasedon the sourcetermsfor the expectationreleasecases. The
radiologicalconsequencescalculatedfor the expectationcase are summarized
in Table C-14.
C.6.4.1 Impactsof RadiologicalAccidentsto Individuals
Individualimpactsare expressedin terms of individualdose and the
: numberof personsexceedingthe dose level. These are presentedfor the
most probableand maximumcases in FiguresC-13 and C-14. Table C-14 also
presentsthe averageindividualrisk for each missionphase. This
quantificationof averageindividualrisks can be comparedwith other risks
" due to naturaland man-madehazardsas summarizedpreviouslyin Appendix B,
Table B-17.
C.6.4.2 SurfaceAreas Contaminatedby RepresentativeAccidents
The plutoniumdioxide(Pu02)releasesfor the most probable,maximum
and expectationcase accidentsare describedin SectionC.6.2. The most
probableand maximumcase accidentsare developedto identifypopulation
dose impactsand do not necessarilyrepresentmaximumenvironmental
consequences.The expectationcase is includedin the impactanalysis
becauseit more accuratelyreflectspotentialenvironmentalimpactsthrough
the use of averagemeteorologicalconditions,as describedin SectionB.4.
Areas of radioactivedepositionresultingfromthe most probable,
maximum,and expectationcase accidentsare presentedin SectionC.2, Tables
C-12 throughC-14. The depositionis reportedfor areasof dry land, swamp,
inlandwater,and ocean.
)
Accidentalreleasescan occur in the KennedySpaceCen_erand vicinity
during PhaseO, I and 2 and at unspecifiedareasworldwideduring Phase 3 -
6. Chapter3 of the EIS presentsa descriptionof the environmentsthat
could be affectedby the accidents. Two differentimpactassessment
methodologieswere developedto analyzethese accidents. Bothmethodologies
use the most probable,maximum,and expectationcases. One is for the
KennedySpace Centerand vicinityduringPhasesO, I, and 2. The other is
globalfor Phases3 - 6. The methodologyfor estimatingpotentialeconomic
costs resultingfrom the accidentsis also provided. These methodologies i
are describedin SectionB.5 of AppendixB. 4
No specificlocationsare definedfor the most probableand maximum ._
case accidentsfor Phases3 through6. The amountof surfacearea of
' depositionand the concentrationsof contaminationfrom an accidentduring
these phasescould changeif accidentcharacteristicsand meteorologic
conditionsare differentthan those assumed. Becausethe latterphasesof
the missiondealwith impactson a global scale,the environmentalimpacts
are discussedin generalterms, i
Due to the difficultyin definingthe exact magnitudeof economiccosts
associatedwith the impacts,minimumand maximummitigationcostswere !
estimatedin order to boundthe rangeof costs which could resultfrom an
accident. The methodologyand basis for the economiccost analysisis
presentedin AppendixB.5.3.
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C.6.4.3 Effectsand Mitigationof LandDeposition
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof an _ccidentin
which PuO2 is exposedto the environment.The analysisis divioedinto two
major categories:I) the potentialeffectsof the most probableand maximum
case accidentsduringPhasesO, I and 2; and 2) the potentialeffectsof the
most probableand maximumcase accidentsduringPhases3, 4, 5, and 6. The
first categoryare thoseaccidentswhich coulo affectKSC and vicinityand
: can be representedby a specificmathematicalmodel. The secondcategoryof
accidentsare thosewhich could affectunspecifiedareas of the world and
cannotbe preciselyrepresented.
" Resultsare presentedfor exposureeffectsand long-termand mitigation
effects. Exposureeffectsare those that resultfromthe depositionof PuO)
on variousenvironmentalmedia. Long-termand mitigationeffectsare those-
that resultfromleavingPuO2 in the environment.They includeimpactsto
naturalenvironments,agricuIturalresources,man-usedresources,and water
bodies,alongwith possiblemitigationmeasuresand the effectsof
mitigation° The economiccost estimatesassociatedwith the analysesare
also presented. The methodsused are the same as used for the STS
alternative.
Assessmentof Impaq_sto KeonedvSpace C_nteran) Vicinity
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof PhasesO, I,
and 2 accidents. There are no radiologicalr_leasesfrom Phase 0 accidents
and no areascontaminatedabovethe 0.2 uCi/m_ EPA screeninglevel
recommendationfrom Phase2 accidents. Therefore,Phase 0 and Phase 2
accidentsare not discussedfurther.
ExposureConseQuences
= The depositionof plutoniumdioxidefromthe representativeaccidents
does not physically."terland coversunlessa particleprovidesenoughheat
i to starta fire. However,the PuO2 can affectthe human use o_ these land
i coversand couldresultin a changein land cover.
11
I Contaminatedareaswere analyzedto determinecurrentland cover use
and how PuO2 would reactto variousenvironmentalconditions. This analysis
_ was used to draw the followingconclusionson immediateconsequences:
There is no initialimpacton soil chemistry. Most PuO? depositedon
water bodiesis not expectedto reactchemicallywith the wa_er column,
, thereforeno immediateconsequencesare expectedin thesewaters. No
significantconsequencesto flora and fauna are expectedfrom surface
: contaminationand skincontactwith PuO2.
.)|
The contaminatedareason the KennedySpaceCenterhave characteristics
similarto the areacontaminatedfor Phase0 of the Shuttleaccident. The
impactsand 'nitigationtethniquesfor the Shuttleaccidentas describedin
Section4.1.4.5and AppendixB (SectionB.6.2.3.)are applicableto the
'_ Titan IV Phase I accident.
The bounding economic cost of each release case accident for Phases O,
I, and 2 are presented using the methods described in Section B.5.3. In all
. c-4g
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i cases the minimumcost will be the cost of the monitoringprogram. This
programis estimatedto cost $I millionin the firstyear, $500,000in the
secondyear, $250,000in the thirdyear, and $100,000per year after the
third.
All depositionresultingfrom Phase I most probable,maximum,and
expectationcases is confinedto the KennedySpaceCenterand Cape Canaveral '
Air Force Stationproperty. The economicimpactsfrom these accidentswill
thereforebe confinedto these areas. Table C-17, providesa breakdownof
•. economiccosts associatedwith the Phase I case. The total cleanupcost
representsonly the costsof cleanupand decontaminationactivities. The
overalltotal cost is determinedby multiplyingthe urban agricultural
cleanupcosts by a factorof five to includesecondarycosts relatedto
temporaryrelocation,agriculturalproductlosses,publichealtheffects,
etc. Actualcosts will fallwithinthis range. The discussionof economic
costs and the influenceof mitigationpresentedin AppendixB (Section
B.6.2.3)is also applicableto a Phase I accidentinvolvingthe Titan IV.
Assessmentof Global_mpacts !
This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof accidents _
during Phases3, 4, 5, and 6. A generaldiscussionof the impactsand i
possiblemitigationmeasuresare presented.
No contaminationis expectedfrom a Phase3 accidentsince the release
of PuO2 occurs in the fireballduringan explosionand no particlesare
expectedto reachground. _
Impactsresultfrom one moduleimpactingland for the most probable
accidentsand 3 or 5 modulesimpactingland in the maximumcase for Phases4
and 5 respectively.For Phase6, three GraphiteImpactShellscould impact
for the most probableand the maximumcases (SectionC.6.4,AppendixC).
A reentryaccidentduringPhases4 and 5 would involveorbiter
failureand breakup. Atmosphericreentryspeedand orbiterbreakuprate
will likelyresultin PuO)modulesor GraphiteImpactShellsbeing released
at differentlocations. These independentreleasepointswill resultin
impactareasthat may be separatedby many thousandsof kilometers. Except
< for Phase 6, the areas involvedare less _han I km_ (0.6m_). For Phase 6,
the depositionthat exceedsthe 0.2 uCi/m_ screeningleveloccurso_ dry
land and inlandwater. The areaof impactis estimatedat 0.197 km_ for the
expectationcase. Cleanupcosts for the expectationcase vary from $0.5
millionto $240 million. Mitigationwould includerecoveryand cleanup. {
AdditionalMitiqatinqMeasures
The principalmitigatingmeasuresfor the launchconfigurations
availableunder the delay alternativeare the protectiveshieldsor barriers
for the RTGs and emergencyplanning. The radiologicalcontingencyplanning _
measureswould be similarfor all of the alternativesand were discussedin
' Section4.1.4.6.
For an expendablelaunchvehiclesuch as the Titan IV/IUS,the most
reasonableadditionalRTG protectiondesignprobablywould be a fragment
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_arrier. The designconceptwould be an energy-absorbingstructuremounted
betweenthe RTGs and the IUS. Becausethe fragmentbarrierdesignwould not
fullyenclosethe RTGs, protectionfrom a near-padground impactwould be
limited. Missionperformanceconsiderationswould requirethat the fragment
barrierbe jettisonedprior to the Earth-Orbit-EscapePhase,thereby
providingno additionalprotectionfrom an Earth-orbitexplosionfollowedby
reentry.
_imitation@Bnd Un¢_rtain_ie_qf the AccidentAnalyses
The uncertaintiesin the accidentanalysesin the Titan IV/IUSare
- expectedto be the sameorder of magnitudeas for the STS,discussedin
Section4.1.4.7.
C.4.4 RadioloqicalConsequences
C.4.4.1 FailureAbort SequenceTrees (FASTs)
The resultsof the radiologicalconsequenceanalysisfor the most
probableand maximumcases identifiedin Tablesc-g and C-I0, are summarized
in TablesC-12 and C-13,respectivelyfor the RTGs. Referenceshouldbe
_ made to TablesC-9 and C-10 in relatingaccidentialfuel releasescenarios
and the radiologicalconsequences. (A discussionof the type of information
presentedon the tablesis presentedin AppendixB).
The resultsfor this most probablecase showpopulationdose in Ph:se
I, 4, 5 and 6. These vary from a total person-remof 0.23 in Phase 4 to _
1,280 in Phase6. The populationdose abovethe de minimusrangesfrom .05
person-remin Phase I to 833 person-remin Phase 5.
Individualimpactsare expressedin terms of individualdose and the
numberof personsexceedingthe lifetimedose level. These are presented
for the most probableand maximumcases in FigureC-13 and C-14.
C.4.5 IntegratedMissionRisk
The risks associatedwith the use of the RTGs on the Galileomission
with a Titan IV launchvehiclehave been assessedb_sed on the sourceterms
for the expectationreleasecases presentedpreviouslyin Table C-11. The
radiologicalconsequencescalculatedfor the releaseexpectationcase are
summarizedin Table C-14. The overallmissionrisks associatedwith the
. RTGs usingTitan IV are presentedin Table C-15.
C.6 ENVIRONMENTALCONSEQUENCES
• This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof an accidentin
which plutoniumdioxide(PuO?/is exposedto the environment.A brief
discussionof how plutoniumaioxidereactsin the environmentpresentedin
AppendixB is also utilized.The impactanalysisis dividedinto two major
categories,I) the potentialimpactsof the representativemost probable,
maximumand expectationcases duringPhasesO, I and 2; and 2) the potential
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impactsof the representativemost probable,maximumand expectationcases
duringPhases3, 4, 5, and 6. These cases are describedin SectionC.4. The !
descriptionof the affectedenvironmentin Chapter3 of this EIS is also
used.
Resultsare presentedfor immediateimpactsand long term impacts.
Immediateimpactsare those that resultfrom the depositionof PuO2 on
variousenvironmentalmedia. Long term impactsare those that resultfrom
" leavingPuO_ in the environment. They includeimpactsto naturalenviron-
ments, (natUralvegetationand wetlands),agriculturalresources,urban
, areas,and water bodies (inlandwatersand ocean),alongwith possible
mitigationmeasuresand the impactsof mitigation. The economiccost
estimatesassociatedwith the impactanalysesare also presented. The
methodsdescribedin SectionC.S are used in this assessment.
C.6.1 Assessmentof Imoactsto KennedySDace Centerand Vi{inity
: This sectionpresentsthe environmentalconsequencesof Phases0, I,
and 2 accidents. Phase 0 includesthe time periodof RTG installationuntil
launch. Phase I is the periodfrom launchto 5 secondsof missionelapsed
time. Includedin this phase are lift off and clearingof the tower. Phase
2, from 5 secondsto 23 secondsuf missionelapsedtime, includesclearing
of land.
C.6.1.1 SurfaceAreas Contaminatedby RepresentativeAccidents
The land areawhere PuO2 is depositedfrom a Phase l accidentis
presentedin Table C-16. AIT contaminationis confinedto KennedySpace
_" Centerand Cape CanaveralAir Force Stationproperty, c
As discussedin SectionC.4.2.1,there are no radiologicalreleases o
from Phase 0 accidentsand no areas contaminatedabovethe 0.2 Ci/m_ level _
from Phase 2 accidents. Therefore,Phase 0 and Phase 2 accidentsare not
discussedfurther.
C.6.1.2 ExposureEffects _
Depositio_of plutoniumdioxidefrom Phase I most probable,maximumand
expectationcases will have littledirecteffecton land use. The PuO?will
not physicallyalter land coversunlessa particleprovidesenoughhea_ to i
starta fire. AlthoughPuO2 can affectthe human use of these land covers,
there is no initialimpacton soil chemistry,and most of the PuO_ deposited
on the water bodiesis not expectedto reactchemicallywith the _ater
column. No significantconsequencesto flora and f_una are expectedfrom
surfacedepositionand skin contactwith PuO2, exceptwhere particle _,
concentrationand/orsize are great enoughto overheatthe surfaceupon
which it is deposited.
Plutoniumdioxidedepositionfrom the most probable,maximumand i
expectationcases do not have any directeffectson historicalor ,,
archaeologicalresources. The PuO_will not physicallyalter nor chemically
degradehistoricalor archaeologicalresources.
t
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C.6.1.3LongTerm Consequencesand Mitigation
i
Long term impactsfrom the depositionof PuO2 on the KennedySpace
Centerand vicinityare dividedinto six categorles,naturalvegetation,
urban,agriculture,wetlands,inlandwaters,and ocean. The areas of
depositionhave characteristicsimilarto the areaof depositionfor Phase
0 and I of the Shuttle/IUSaccidents. The impactsand mitigationtechniques
for the Shuttle/IUSaccidentsas describedin AppendixB (SectionB.6.2.3)
: are applicableto the Titan/IUSPhase I accident. It is assumedthat any
areawith surfacedepositionwill be monitoredto determinethe specific
degreeof impact.
C.6.1.4EconomicImpacts
The boundingeconomiccost of each releasecase accidentfor Phases0,
1,and 2 are presentedusing the methodsdescribedin SectionB.5.3. In all
cases the minimumcost will be the cost of the monitoringprogram. This
programis estimatedto cost $I millionin the firstyear, $500,000in the
secondyear, $250,000in the thirdyear and $100,000per year after the
third.
All depositionresultingfrom Phase I most probable,maximum and
expectationcases is confinedto the KennedySpace Centerand Cape Canaveral
Air ForceStationproperty. The economicimpactsfrom these accidentswill
thereforebe confinedto these areas. Table C-17 providesa breakdownof
economiccosts associatedwith cleanupactivitiesfor the Phase I case.The
total cleanupcost representsonly the costs of cleanupand decontamination
activities. The overalltotal cost is determinedby multiplyingthe urban
and agriculturalcleanupcosts by a factorof five to includesecondary
costs relatedto temporaryrelocation,agriculturalproductlosses,public ,
healtheffects,etc. Actualcostswill fallwithin this range. The '
discussionof economiccosts and the influenceof mitigationpresentedin
AppendixB (SectionB.6.2.3)is also applicableto a Phase I accident
involvingthe Titan IV.
C.6.2 A@sessmentof GlobalImpact@
The methodologyfor impactassessmentpresentedin SectionB.5.2 is used
to determineand describeimpacts.Mitigationtechniquesthat may be used
are describedalongwith the impactsthatmay resultfrommitigation.
No depositionis expectedfrom a Phase3 accidentsince the releaseof
PuO_occurs in the fireballduringan explosionand no particlesare .
expectedto reach ground. The depositionfrom Phases4, 5 and 6 is similar :,
' to Phases3, 4, and 5 of the Shuttle/IUS.The impactsand economiccosts
presentedin AppendixB (SectionB.6.3)are also representativeof the Titan
IV cases.
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APPENDIX D.1
: HISTORICAL CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA
AND
LAUNCH WINDOW-SPECIFIC METEOROLOGICAL DATA*
FOR KSC
l
*Meteorological data from DOE 1988b.
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LAUNCHWINDOW-SPECIFICMETEOROLOGICALDATA I
SURFACEDATA
i Surfacedata utilizedto representnearground-levelradiological
releasesfrom an accidentinvolvingthe NationalSpaceTransportation
System/InertiaiUpper Stage (STS/IUS)launchvehiclewere taken from the
1980-1984recordsfor the October7-November25 "launchwindow." Data were
" : obtainedfrom meteorologicalTower 313 of the WeatherInformationNetwork
DisplaySystem (WINDS)at Cape Canaveral(FigureD-I). This 500 foot high
tower is locatedabout3 miles west of LaunchComplex39 and the Atlantic
Ocean. While the tower is instrumentedat six differentheights,data from
the 54-, 204-, and 4g2-footlevelswere utilizedfor the radiolocical
assessmentsin the Tier 2 Galileomissiondraft EnvironmentalImpact
Statement(DEIS).
: FiguresD-2, D-3 and D-4 illustratethe distributionsof wind speed and
directionfor the three tower levelsnoted above. The figuresutilize
c standardmeteorulogicalconventionin that each set of bars illustratesthe
wind speed and frequencyfrom the indicateddirection. The figuresshow
that winds from the north througheast sectorstypicallydominatethe
surfacewinds at all three tower levelsduringthe 1989launchwindow. Peak
winds are fromthe north at the 54-footlevel,and from the east at the 204- :.
and 492-footlevels. At all levelsthe dominantwinds representonshore
flow in the vicinityof the launchpads. i
The averagewind speedsfor the 5-yearperiodexaminedwere 10.0, 14.3,
and 17.2mph for the 54-, 204-, and 492-footlevelsrespectively. Calm
periods(i.e.,zerowind speeds)in the Tower 313 data were treatedas
missing. Previousanalysesof data collectedat the Cape CanaveralAir
ForceWeatherStationshowedan average4.4 percentcalms duringthe fall
season(September-November)basedon 8 years of data (1961-1968).
FigureD-5 presentsthe maximumwind directionpersistenceperiodsby
directionsectorfor each of the three tower levelsas determinedfrom the
5-yearWINDS data set. It can be seen thatthe longerpersistenceperiods
at all levelsare generallyassociatedwith onshoreflows. The maximum
persistenceperiodfor each level and its year/monthof occurrenceare
listedin Table D-I.
The probabilityof onshorewinds persistingfor periodsof I through44 i
hourswere calculatedfor the launchwindowusing 492-footwind data.
These probabilitiesare presentedin FigureD-6 which illustratesthat
persistenceperiodsgreaterthan 3 hours have less than a 50 percent
" probabilityof occurrence. Furthermore,it is seen that the maximum
persistenceperiod (44 hours)has only a 0.03 percentprobabilityof
occurrence.
Few detailedstudieshave been accomplishedto determinethe specific i
characteristicsof the sea breezeat Cape Canaveral. A true se_ breeze _,
conditionis characterizedby the following:
i
I. Very light synoptic(e.g.,gradient)winds usuallyassociatedwith
a high-pressuresystemover the region
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TABLE D-1.
.. Maximum Wind Direction Persistence (Hours)
October 7 through November 25 of 1980 through 1984
Persistence Period
Level Month, Year Sector
•-! (Hours)
54-foot October 1982 E 34
204-foot October 1984 SE 35
492-_oot October 1984 ENE 44 "
J
I
I,
I,
{,
D-7
1990012832-281
D-8
1990012832-282
2. Stronginsolation
3. Daytimeair temperaturesrisingabove sea-surfacetemperatures
_: 4. A shiftof surfacewinds from offshore(perhapsdue to a land
•_ breeze)to onshoreduringthe d;_y
5. The presenceof a definitefront or convergencezone with
correspondingrisingair separatingsurfaceair flowswith oversea
and overlandtrajectories
I
6. The presenceof an unstablethermalinternalboundarylayer which
beginsat the shorelineand increasesin depth with increasing
distanceinland
7. A discernible,thoughsometimesweak, returnflow layer aloft
(i.e.,offshorewind flows)
. 8. The combinationof onshoresurfacewinds, an inlandconvergence
zone, offshorewinds aloft,and subsidingair over the sea
completesthe sea breezecirculationcell.
The KennedySpace Center (KSC)WINDS data were reviewedto identify
thosedays duringthe launchwindowwhen sufficientland-seatemperatures
differentialexistedto supportthe potentialfor a sea breeze. A total of
47 such days were identifiedin the 5-yeardata set. Furtheranalysisof
wind data showedthat 10 of thesecases had the potentialto be sea-breeze
occurrences.
Onshoreflows can also occurduringgradientwind conditions. In this
}
case, the characteristicsea breezecirculationcell does not occur and ,
significantshearsof wind speed or directionin the verticalare normally
not present. Of the eight characteristicsof the sea breezenoted above,
only the occurrenceof the thermalinternalboundarylayer inducedby
insolationand/or increasingmechanicalturbulencemay be present, i
Therefore,the effectson transportand diffusioninducedby the thermal
internalboundarylayermay be present,but the effectsof the circulation
cell will not occur.
UPPERAIR DATA
Three years of KSC launchwindowrawinsondedata (1982-1984)were used
to developthe distributionsof wind directionand wind _peed for the
pressurelevelsof 850, 500, and 350 mb (millibars)(approximately4,750,
18,250and 27,500feet, respectively,in the standardatmosphere). These
distributionsare presentedin FiguresD-7 throughD-9. These figures
demonstratea significantchangein wind directionwith height. The 4,750-
foot level,which approximatesthe gradientwind level,continuesto exhibit
a high-frequencyof onshoreflowswith winds from the northeastclockwise i
througheast dominating. The minimumvalue at this level is also noteworthy
since,withinthe 3-yeardata period,there were no occurrencesof a
northwestwind. The 18,250and 27,500-footlevelsshowwesterlywinds to be i
highlydominantwith easterlywindsoccurringvery infrequently.
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The average windspeeds for the 3-year data period are also seen to i
change with height. At 4,750 feet, average wind speed is 15.7 mph,
increasing to 25.5 and 37.2 mph at 18,250 fe_t and 27,500 feet respectively.
There were no reports of calm winds within the 3-year data period at any of
the levels analyzed.
CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA
Historical climatological data for KSC can be found in Table D-2.
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APPENDIX D-2
AQUIFER RECHARGE AREAS AHD
POTABLE WATER FACILITIES IN
THE VICINITY OF KSC
m- I
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TABLE D-3. POTABLE WATER FACILITIES
'RESTRICTED'
UNITS UNIC. SERVICE :
OMNB_IP CJ_"AI:ITY _EA _ COMnENTS
P
I - City Of Cocoa PUBLIC 40.0 flSO BOTH NO
2 - City of Nelbo,erne- NorthPlant PUBLIC ;.0 BSO BOTH NO
- City of flelbo_neo SouthPlant PUBLIC 16.0 fib0 BOTH NO
.4 - City o_Titusv_lle PRIVATE 1_.0 BOO BOTH NO
5 - SeveralDevelopmentU ilibes - Nalahar PRIVATE 3.0 BBO I_ NO PSCREBULATED
- Pin_,_d l_bileVillage PRWVATE 0.052BOO UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
7 - Tiki _ven floblle Park PRIVATE 0.04_ EGO UNINC YES TRAI_RPARK
8 - Northgateflobile Ranch PRIVATE 0.290NO0 UNINC Y_ TRAILERPARK_ SUBOIVISIOH
9 - NorthBrevardMaterSystem PRIVATE l.l HOD UNINC NO
10- OakParkBobilePark PRIVATE 0,052B60 UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
II o MobileHannrBobile Perk PRIVATE O.I_ B6O UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
12 - HIbiSCus_bii_Park PRIVATE 0.0_ BBD UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
1_ - Ne, HavenBo_le Park PRIVATE 0.0_4 BOO UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
14- EvergreenBo_ile Park PRIVATE 0,0_5 _60 INC YES TRAILERPARK
15- EnchantedLakeEstates PRIVATE 0.08__6O INC YES TRAILERPARK(MALABAR)
lb - CamelotNobilePark PRIVATE 0.080_60 [NC YES TRAILERPARK(_ALABAR}
17 - SouthernCom_orteo_ile Park PRIVATE 0.125flBO _INC Y_ TRALLrRPARK ,
18- IndianRiver _horesMobilePark PRIVATE 0.050BSO UNINC YES TRAI_RPARK
- Snugtiar_or_ohilePark PRIVATE OJI7 NBO UNINC YES nOBl_ HOnESUBDIVISION
ZO- FlorxdaCities MaterCompany PRIVATE hO BSD UNINC YES PSCREGULATED
21 - River_ro,e IIBobblePark PRIVATE 0.072 BOO UNINC YES TRALLrRPARK
_ " River_roveI ,ob:le Park PRIVATE 0.072 BBO UNINC YES TRAI_RPARK ;
23 - Ste AOele PRIVATE 0.0_0_60 UNINC YES CO_OOBINIBUM
24 - Riverv_ev_o_ile Park PRIVATE 0.050BBO UNINC YES TRAILERPARK
25 - BreezHayRo_ilePark PRIVATE 0.030find UNINC YES TRAILrRPARK
_6 - Coveo( SouthBeaches PRIVATE Q,020_60 UNINC YES CONOOBINIUe
27- Coveof Ciiseekee PRIVATE 0.048 _60 UNINC YES CONDO_INIUfl2B- SouthBrevardMaterCo-op CO-OP 0,080BBO UNINC YES SUBDIVISIONS_ CO_O0_INI_
29- Way(areRestaurant PRIVATE 0.020 NBD UN1NC YES FOODSERVICE
30- Stuckey'sPecanShoppe PRIVATE 0.020_80 UNINC YES FO00SERVICE_ RVPARK
_l - Holi,_y VHlage R.V. Park PRIVATE 0.0]0 BBD UNINC YES RVPARK
_2 o TheDugoutBar_ Orill PRIVATE O.OOIfind UNINC YES BAR_ FO00SERVICE
33 - Harold'sPlace PRIVATE O.OOLBSO UN|NC YES BARk FOOGSERVICE
34 - Hick's RiverviemRobilePark PRIVATE O.O_BNOD INC YES TRAILERPARK
_5 - PalmShoresR.V. Park PRIVATE 0.058 _60 UNINC YES RVP_K
Z_ - O,O.T,- Southbound PUBLIC 0.048 N60 UNINC YES RESTAREA
_7 - O.O.T.- Northbound PUBLIC 0.046 _SO UNINC YES RESTAREA
_8 - Harr|s Corporation PRIVATE 0,048NOD UNINC YES INDUSTRY
_9- SummitsLanding PRIVATE 0.20 find UNINC YES BARINA *
40 - SanSebastian PRIVATE 0.1_ _BO UNINC NO PSCREBULATED
• 41 - SouthShores PRIVATE 0.0_0 find UNINC YES PUB
42- FarnunOoli i OceanClub ;RIVATE 0.800B60 UNINC YES PUO
4_ - Chuck'sStilk HOQII PRIVATE 0.040 BED UNINC YES FO00SERVICE
A- Lon_Point Park PUBLIC 0.216 fib0 UNINC YES COUNTYPARK
,_ - SebastianInlet PUBLIC 0.08_B60 UNINC YES STATEPARK
Source: 8revardCountyOfhce o_ NaturalResources1987
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TABLED-17. POPULATIONOF BREVARDCITIES
City 1980 1987 # Change % Change
BREVARD 272,959 371,735 98,776 36.2
Cape Canaveral 5,733 7,744 2,011 35.1
Cocoa .... - 16.096 17,908 1,812 11.2
Cocoa Beach . 10,926 12,638 1,712 15.7
IncUalantic .... 2,883 3,029 146 5.1
Indian Harbour Beach. L 5,967 7,329 1,362 22.9
Malabar 1,118 1,589 471 42.1
Me!bourne .... 46,536 58,116 11,580 24.9
, Melbourne Beach 2,713 3,094 381 14.0
; Melbourne Village-- 1,004 1,042 38 3.8
Palm Bay ...... 18,560 47,096 28,536 153.8
Palm Shores L . 77 _ 13 16.9
Rocldedge _ -_ 11,877 14,260 - 2,383 20.0
_; SatelliteBeach • 9,163 10.167 1,004 11.0
Titusviile _ 31,910 40,213 3,303 26.0
' West Melbourne _ • 5,078 8,067 2,989 58.9
UNINCORPORATED------- 103,318 139,353 36,035 34.9
SOURCE: Universityof Rorida, BEBR, FloridaEstimatesof Population 1986.
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TABLED-5. FLORAAND FAUNAPROTECTEDAT KSC Ft
¢
INDD{ OF ?_ FLORA (i) : !
Designated Status !
Pa_ Scientific Nares Common Name USerS CITES FC_ I_EPA FNKI
D-7 ac_sti_m danae/folium Giant leather fern T 4,'
D_ _m_Tis balsamifera Balsam torci_:_d SP
D-9 *Asclepias curtissil Curtis mi_ T T SP !'
D'lO AsplaniuB platynauron F.2x_y SpI_ T _j
D-If *AviC_.,ia gezminans Black manqz_ce SP _I
0012 Azolla caroliniana Mosquito fern T
[}-13 Calamovilfa curtissii Curtiss reedgrass UR SP
D-i4 Calopoqon tuberosus Grass pink (unnamed) 17 T
0015 Cereus erioL_orus vat. Fragrant wool-bearing
fmgrans cereus E LI Z SP '_
D-16 Cereu...._.ss_ West Coast
PricW/y-apI_e tR IZ Z T SP
D-17 "CI_ZTSO_yII_ olivaefotT_i Satinleaf E '
0018 coco_._.! nucifera Cor_nut palm T I,
-_ D-19 Cenradina grandiflora Large- flowered
rosemary tR SP
D-20 Dichrc_ena floridensis Florida white-top
0021 D_s ludoviciana Florida shield fern T
" 0-22 _ _sis Butterfly orchid II T _:.
00_3 _ al___ wn_ _ _ T
0-24 Habenaria o_ontopetala Rein orchid (unnamed) II T }
0025 Habenaria repens Water spider orchid
or cree%oinqorchid II T !,
0026 Harrisella 10orrecta Orchid (_) II T
P-27 Hexaleetris _ Crested comalroot II T
0028 H=_m_callis latifolia Broad-leaved spider , _,
lily OR SP
0029 llex ambi_ Carol_na holly or
sand holly T
0030 Le_ea cernua Nodding pim_eed UR SP ',
0-31 L)_copodi_ alo_-curoides Foxta/l club moss T !
D-32 Lycopodlum ap_ressum Soutl_rn club moss T
0-33 __=_um carolin_anum Slender Club moss T
P-34 Malaxi._._s_ Florida malaxis II T
0035 Ne_rol_is biserrata Boston fern (unnamed) T _
0036 "O_,_x_lossum _ Adder's tongue fern
(unnamed) OR E Z SP
0037 O_io_lossum _etiolatu_ Adder's tongue fern
(unnamd) T
0038 _ c_._ressa Prickly pear cactus ':
(unna_K1) II T i
D-32
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TABLED-5 (continued).
: Desiqnated Status -
P_e Scientific Name Ccm_n Name USPWS CITES FDA F_A FNAI
0-39 OLountia stricta PTickly pear c_t.um
' (un_amd) I/ T
D-41 Pepercsnia humilis Pe_z (unn_] E
! 0=42 *Pepemmnia abtusifolia Florida _romia E
" 0-43 Pezeskia aculeata Lemon vine I/ T
0-44 Persea borbonia vat. Dwarf rmdbay or
humilis redbay persea OR SP
D-45 Phlebod_um auremn Golden pollq:cdy T
0-46 _ _i_lossoides Rose _ I/ T
0-47 P_nthie_a racemmsa Shadow witc_ I/ T
0-48 l_ilotum m_un _isk fern or
fork fern T
0-49 "_i_rn _ R_ manqcove SP
1>.50 Rhvnc_osia cinerea Brown-haired
sn_tbean OR SP
D-51 Salvinia zz_ifolia Water s_les T ,
4 D-52 Scaeuola _ Scapula T SP
D-53 Selaqinella arenicola Sand _ T
_- 0-54 Sc_o_ camncosa _clacm ;x_ SP
0-55 Sp_ranthes laciniata Lace-lip ladies'-
: tremas or lace-lip
spiral orchid II T
0-56 Suriana maricura Bay cedar Z SP
0-57 Thelypteris inte_upta Aspidium fern (Onna_) T
0-58 Thelyp_eris _lustri$ _:sh fern T
0-59 Thelv_teris _ Aspidium fern (unnamed) T
0-40 Tillandsia simulata Wild pine or air
plant (unnanu_) T
D-61 "Tourne/ortia qna_alodes Sea lavender T SP
D.-_2 Vert_na m_r_tima Coastal vervain OR SP
+
0-63 Ven_ena tamFamsis Tampa vervain %IS SP
D-_4 Vittaria lineata _oestrimg fern T
D=_5 Woo_rdla aerolata Netted ctmin fern T
066 "Zamia u_rosa Za_ cast c_ntie II C T
O-_7 Zeuxine stratetm_tica 0r_id (unnam_l) Xl
Z-I X-.O _--7 Z-I S_-Ia
OR-10 II-lO T-_7 T-4
" II IS C-2 S_2
D-33
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TABLED-5 (continued). "I,
INO_ OP PRTF_LTED FAt_ (I)
Des,i_mated Status
P_e Scientific Name _ Name OSFWS CITES _
_ss
C-8 Centropomus undecimalis C_mmm_ snook S_C
_ _ISL_NS
C-9 *Alligator mississip?iensis A._rican alligator T(S/A} II SSC SSC
C-10 *Caretta caretta caretta Atlantic loggerhead
turtle T I T T
C-f1 *Chelonia _ m_as Atlantic green turtle E Z E E
C-12 Dermochelys coriacea Leatherback turtle E I E R
C-13 *Orlnrerc_oncorals cou_erl Eastern indigo snake T T 5SC
C-14 ,_ _ly_wm_s Gopher turtle _R lI SSC T
C-15 Eretm_helys imbricata Atlantic ha_sbill
in_ricata _rtle E I E E
C-16 *Lepi_>:helys _ Atlantic ridley turtle E I E E
." C-17 *Nerc_ia fasciata taeniata Atlantic salt II_rsh
_ater snake T T E
C-18 Pituophis melanoleucus
Florida pine snake _R SSC
C-19 Ra_ areolata Got_r frog OR SSC
C-20 Sc_!o?orus woodii Florida scrub lizard R
C-21 Accipiter _ Cooper's hawk SSC
C-22 Aimo_ila aestivalis Ea_$mm's sparrow OR
C-23 Ajaia a_aja Roseate spoonbill SSC R
C-24 *_ospiza ._ritu_a
nigrisc_ns Dusky seaside s_arr_ E E E
C-25 *A_rl co:ma c_enalescens
coerulesc_ns Flo_ida scrub jay OR T T
C-26 Aramu._.__ss_rauna Lim_in SS: S_:
C-27 Athene cunicularia Burrowing owl SSC S_
C-28 Suteo _,minscmi Swainaon's ha_ t_
C-29 Casewr_ius albua Great egret SSC
C-30 Omradrius m_lo_us Piping plover T T S_C
C-31 Circu_=..__s _ri_n harrier or
_arsh ha_ II
C-32 Oendroicn discolor
_ludicola Florida prairie warbler SSC
C-33 E_ret.._._ caerulea Little blue _ SS_ SSC
C-34 F_retta rufesct_s R_ddis_ egret UR SS_ ]l
C-35 Egretta thula Snowy egret SSC SSC
D-34
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TABLE D-5 (continued).
Designated Status
Scientific Wam_ CcfnmmnNa_m USF%_ CITE_ F_=WFC FCREPA
C-36 _etta tricolor Trlcolored heron or
_._isi_ms heron SSC SSC
:, C-37 rAanoides forficar._s Swalloe.tailed kite t_
C-38 _hms album White ibis SSC
C-39 ralco columbarius _rlln or plqeon hawk IX _ ./
C-40 .Falco _reqrinus tundrius Arctic pereqrine
_alc_ T l E E
C-41 *Falco s_-verius _ Southeastern kestrel LR IX T T
C-42 Falo: spaz_erius sparverius Eastern kestrel II
C-43 *_ maqnificems Rothchild' s magnificent
rothschildl frigate bird T
C-44 Gru__sscan_enais pratensis Floria- san_ill
crane II T T
C-45 tHaematopus palliatus _mmrlcan oystar-
catcher SS_ T
C-46 _aliN_a_s leu_us Bald Eagle E I T T
C-47 Seh_the_s venuivorus Wozm-eatlnq wad_l.=_ _C
C-4S Ixcbrychus exilis exilis Least bittern SaC
C-49 Laterallus _a_sicensus Slack rail SUD ,
C-50 *Mvc_eria americana Wood stork - E E E
C-51 NycT.anassa viola._ Yello_*-c_ed night
heron SaC
C-52 Nyeticorax nycticorax Olack-_ night
heron SaC
C-53 *Pan(lionhaliaetus Osprey II T
C-54 *Pelecanus occiden_alis
carolinenszs Eastern br_ pelican SS_
C-55 Picoides borealis R_d-cockaded
_,_xl_e_ Z T Z
C056 Picoides villosus au_on£ Hairy woodpecker SaC
C-57 _ (alcinellus
falcinellus Glossy ibis SSC
C-58 Recurvirostra americana American a_cet S_C
C-59 R_chops n,qe_ Black skinwer SSC
C-6O Sesu_us motacilla Louisiana waterthrush R
C-41 _ _t_t_t_t_t_t_t_t_mmnru icilla
rutictllas ;_mrican redstart R
C-_2 *Sterna ant_llarum Least tern T T
C--_] S_.en'_ _ Caspian tan_ SSC
C-54 *Sterna dou_allii Roseate tern LR T T
C-65 Sterna fuscata Sooty tern S_
C-66 Sterna maxsm Royal tern SaC
C-_7 Ste_ sandvicenaia Sardwic_ tern SaC
C-58 Vireo altiloquus Slack-_iskered vireo R
0-35
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TABLE D-5 (continued).
_slq_t.ad Status
,I
¢-69 Fells o_mlor _ Floriaa panther Z I Z Z
C-?0 Lutra canadensis River otter II
C-71 Lynx mfu___s _mt II
C-72 Muste/a fre_ata penis_tae Flozida wemml R
C-73 Museela vison lutensis Florida mink R
C-74 hb_fib,mr alleni Rmmd-tailed muskrat SSC
C-75 *Per_Tscus floridanus Florida muse IR S_ T
C-76 _rric_ec_s manatus
latin_stris West Indian manatee E I E T
C-77 Orsus americanus floridamm Florida black bear _ T T
E-10 I- 9 T- 9 E- 9
T- 5 II-I_00 T-12 T-15
T(S/A)- I 19 SSC-15 SSC-25
b_-1 _._] 36 a- 9
29 _ 2
UTaI_5 - Unll_d States Fish and Wildlife Service: List of Endanc_mr,,aand
Threatened wildlife and Plane.a, 50 CIR 17.11-12 (official UnirAd
States List).
- O_nven_on on International Trade in Endancje.redSpecies of wild
Fauna and Flora.
- Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Coemission: Section 39-27.03-05,
FAC ',offlcLalState of Florida animal list).
I_:_PA - Florida Ccamittee on Rare and Endan_red PUmts and Animals.
• Listed in 1_C Final Environmental Impact Stateennt (1979)
B- Zndanqard; T= threatened; SSC- Sidles of Special Co_ce_n; _= Urger
Review (for possible listinq); I- included in Appendix I; II- included in
Appendix II (of CITES}; I_,Rare, _ Status Undertermin_, T(S/A)-
Threatened due to simlazity o( aR_earance.
(1) _O1: Breininqet et al, 1984.
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FIGURE D-25. STATE PARKS AND RECREATION AREAS
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FIGURE D-29. FLORIDA RECREATIONAL TRAILS SYSTEM
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2. BowerTract(Hills) 20. _ C,_ltorCreek(GFWFC} ' .--
3. BrownTract/BigShredsCorridor(OACS/0NR}_21, LowerAPalachicola(GFWFC}'
; 4. GamlvenllInOl_lrlalPark(DNR) / 22. M.K.Ranch(GFWFC)
5. GayOC=ltz/Nort11Gapltlr_lIsland(DNR) _ 23. NewMahoganyHammock(DNR) i6. Cltusahowttz_Swsml_(GF'WFC}j" 24. Nortt_Peninsula(0NR}
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" 9, DesringHammock(_Oe) ., 27. Rotenburger/HoleyLand(GFWFC} .!10. FastEverotaaes(GFWFC} 28 St.GeorgeIstzn_(DNR} L....
11. EscamOtzBayBluffs(Pen) 29. SaveOurEverg_es {DNR) °_ 36.
12. _tero Bay(DNR) 30. SilverRiver(DNR) i
13. FskallatcheeStrantt(DNR) 31..SouthSavem_lS(ONR} ...... "_ 9q
14. FortSanL.uis(OOS) 32. SpringHammo¢_(DNR)
15. Gateway(Rne) 33 TheGrove(DOS)
16. ClaytonDunes(DNR) 34 WaKuIlaSprings(DNR)
_7 S_anaRWer(GFWFC/ONR} 35. WaCtssazndAueJItaRiverSinksiGFWFC/ONR)
18 I.TT Hammock(DADE) 36. West[awe(Brow)
37 Wl.ndleyKWQl_lrry(DHR).......
_o
GFWFC= Gamean4FreshWaterFishCommlmon
• Hills m HIIIsDorolJghCoollly
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Pen = CityOfPanucola
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FIGURED-30. ACQUISITIONSUNDERCONSERVATIONAND RECREATIONLANDS PROGRAM
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FIGURE D-33, ACQUISITIONS UNDER SAVE OUR RIVERS PROGRAM
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FIGURE D-35. WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS
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FIGURE D-36. NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES
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FIGURED-37. NATIONALWILDERNESSAREAS
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RADIOLOGICALCONTROLS
The use of radioactivematerialsat KSC requiresappropriatelicenses,
specialpermitsand/oruse authorizations.All activitiesinvolvingthe
use, handlingor decommissioningof radiuactivesources,apparatusor work
areas are strictlycontrolled,monitoredand inspectedby healthphysics
personnel. Amongthe numerouscontrolsenforcedat KSC area: (I)
, establishmentof time, distanceand shieldingrequirementsas well as
personnelprotectiondevices,equipmentand measuresto restrictpersonnel
exposuresto below regulatorylimitsand to as low as reasonablyachievable
(ALARA}levels;(2} leakte_c, contaminationsurveys,personneland work
areamonitoring;(3) train,.gand orientationof all personnelengagedin
activitiesinvolvingpotentialexposureto radiologicalsources;(4)
certificationand trainingof all personneldirectlyworkingwith sources,
includingtrainingin emergencyprocedures;and (5) strictcontrolover
visitorsand other non-radiologicalpersonneland workersentering
radiologicalcontrolareas.
Accidentsor incidentsduringroutinegroundoperationsresultingin
damage,ruptureor breachof major radiologicalsourcesor associatedminor
radioactivesourcesrequireimmediate_ctionsto protectoperational
personnel,the generalpublic,and the environment. In the event of such an
incidentor accident,the KSC radiationprc,tectionofficerwould be notified
immediatelyand radiologicalemergencyresponseelementswould be initiated.
A numberof precautionsand requirementsapplicableto emergency
responseactivitiesincludethe following. Radiationair monitoring
equipmentand instrumentationwith an audiblealarmwill be availablein any
storageor use area establishedfor major sources. Portableradiation
monitoringinstrumentsand communicationsequipmentwill be availableduring
transportof major sourceson KSC. All workersand personnelengagedin
activitiesinvolvingmajor sourcesand enteringradiologicallycontrolled
areas,or in areas immediatelyadjacentto areascontrolleddue to presence
of major sourceswill be orientedregardingpotentialradiologicalhazards,
characteristicsof immediateevacuationwarningsignals,fire and radiation
alarms,and of the appropriateresponseto suchwarningsor alarms. Tests
of radiationdetectionequipmentalarmswill be conductedprior to
commencementof operationsinvolvingmajor radiologicalsourcesand daily
during suchoperationsto assurethat systemsare operableand reliable.
Radiologicalequipment,instrumentationand monitoringdevices,protective
clothing/equipmentand associatedsuppliesand materialswill be available
at locationsof storageor use of major sources. Emergencyresponse
personnelwill be trainedand certifiedin the use of emergencykits and
equipment. The RadiologicalControlCenter rillbe activatedfor dealing
with any groundprocessingemergencyinvolvingmajor radiologicalsources.
In addition,writtenemergencyresponseprocedureswill be postedand
will includeproceduresto warn, instructand evacuateindividualsin
endangeredareas,provisionsfor shutdownof work areas,facilities,and
associatedventilationand air conditioningintakesystemsupon verification
of a radiologicalrelease,and requirementsfor associatedresponse
activitiesand re-establishmentof radiationcontrolsand recoveryfrom the
emergencycondition.
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In the event of an accident involving a potential release, the i)
RadiationControlCenter (RADCC)is the onsitefocal point for contingency i
operationsand is the point fromwhich directionis providedto the
radiologicalfield teams. For accidentsinvolvingoffsiteareas, a Federal
RadiologicalMonitoringand AssessmentCenterhas been establishedby DOE to
coordinateFederaloffsitemonitoringand assessmentactivities. Key
personnelwill be predeployedat variousspecifiedsites in the field prior
to launchactivities,and will be in communicationwith the RADCC. All
emergencyresponsepersonnelwill receivetrainingand orientationto
familiarizethem with the physical,chemical,and radiologicalhazards,as
well as radiationprotectionequipmentand techniques.
Three classificationlevelswill be used to indicatethe degree of
severityrelativeto radioactivematerialreleasesexpectedin a given
incidentor accidentsituation. An "Alert"will be declaredif an
incident/accidenthas occurredor is in progressand no releaseof i
radioactivematerialhas occurredor is expectedto occur. An "Emergency"
statusis assignedif an incident/accidenthas occurredand a releaseof
radioactivematerialonsitehas occurredor is expectedto occur but release
of radioactivematerialoffsitehas not occurredand is not expectedto
occur. A "GeneralEmergency"will be declaredif an Incident/accidenthas
occurredand a releaseof radioactivematerialonsiteand offsitehas
occurredor is expectedto occur.
Upon notificationof any abnormalsituationthat could resultin a
releaseof radioactivematerial,the followingimmediateactionswill be i
taken. The RADCCwill coordinateappropriatenotificationsregarding
potentialor real radiologicalincidents. Surveillanceaircraftwill make
an assessmentof airborneand groundlevel radiologicalconditions. Onsite t
radiationmonitoringteams and the on-scenecommanderwill be deployedto
assistin a preliminaryassessmentof the situation. Fire, rescue,
security,and damagemeasureswill be implementedas necessary. Health
physicsrepresentativeswill defineaccesspointsto the affectedarea and
controlthe passageof responsepersonnelthroughthese accesspoints. All
personnelnot directlyengagedin damagecontrolwill be preventedfrom
enteringthe controlledarea. Emergencycrews and evacueesleaving
radiationcontrolledareaswill be monitoredby radiologicalfield teams at
appropriatelylocatedaccesspoints.
!
In coordinationwith, or subsequentto, the immediateactionsdescribed
above,the followingactionswill be taken dependentupon the consequences
of the incident. If there is no breachof the encapsulatedradioactive
material,a searchwill be initiatedand the intactdeviceswill be removed
and placed in temporarystoragecontainers. Radiationmonitoringteams will
conductthorougharea contaminationsurveysas directedby the RADCC. The
State and offsitesupportelementswill performconfirmatorysurveysin the
offsiteareas to verifyno releaseor _)ntamination,the followingactions
will be taken. The onsiteand offsiteradiationmonitoringteams will
monitorthe cloud path and identifycontaminatedareas. Radiological
assessmentaircraftwill trackairborneradioactivematerial,identifythe
cloud path, and assessairborneradioactivematerialconcentrations.
Becauseof the many possiblevariationsin incidentsand circumstances, 1additionalactionsto be performedby onsiteradiationmonitoringteams will
be at the directionof the RADCC. Procedureswill be determinedby the
healthphysicsstaff. |
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